As signs of tentative ceasefire emerge amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, several broad scenarios for Russia’s future can be discerned. The South Caucasus will be heavily impacted by whatever path Russia will be taking.

Russia is in a transitory period. It has now officially re-entered an imperial mode. The invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the subsequent occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, along with the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014 were not seen as a sign of Russia’s desire to rebuild a territorial empire. Many even mocked the idea that the Russian leadership was accused of rebuilding the Soviet Union.

The brutal war on Ukraine launched in February changes everything. Russia is now rebuilding an empire. The Russian political class’s idea of an empire is about controlling the territory if it does not achieve Ukraine’s and Belarus’ near total alignment with Russian interests. This is happening now, and the invasion of Ukraine will reshape Russia’s future both internally and externally in the most unprecedented way.

The most likely scenario is the emerging concept of “fortress Russia.” Seen as besieged by the collective West, the Russian political elites will be viewing the struggle exclusively through historical terms. European invasions of Russia throughout the 18th-20th centuries will be regarded as a precursor to what Russia is facing currently through sanctions. This Russian thinking is both dangerous and incorrect in many ways. Dangerous because it brings Russia’s near total isolation which endangers the economic development the country has achieved since 2000s. In a way, Vladimir Putin’s ability to rule was largely based on the social contract of him providing general stability and the population being relatively content as opposed to the chaos of the 1990s. Diluting this advantage will damage the pillars of his and security apparatus’ power.

Thus comes a long period of Russia’s economic decline, along with what I would call “de-Westernization” of Moscow’s foreign policy will take place. The Kremlin will be increasingly detached from the collective West with greater incentives to look to Asia. What could have been seen as a positive development years or even months ago, after the invasion, Russia’s Asian pivot will be a forced as Moscow becomes ever more dependent on China, India, and others.

Yet another alternative for Russia would be the pursuit of autarchy: not impossible, but an increasingly difficult task to carry out. Even then, however, the decline of Russia as a power will only accelerate. Autarchy would however mean a steep impoverishment and declining ability to project power abroad. Moreover, to carry out the autarchic scenario successfully would be impossible without establishing the totalitarian control inside the country. Putin’s rule has been increasingly repressive, but it has hardly reached the level the Soviets achieved in 1930s-1950s. In other words, Russia has fewer resources and the government, be it Putin or his successors, wield less economic and military might to dominate as decidedly as the Soviets did in the life of ordinary people. Autarchy and isolation without total control over the population is an impossible task.

Third broad scenario could be Russia falling into chaos. Chaos is an integral element of Russian history. A series of crises resulting into full breakdown of an entire edifice of Russian state took place in the Rurik, Romanov, and Soviet periods. Those were followed by either relative or complete regeneration of Russian power, but it usually took decades to achieve it. This cyclic history is peculiar to Russia, and we indeed might be entering the period of one such Russian decline. Or rather we should see it as a continuation of the breakdown of Russian influence following the Soviet collapse. Surely, under Putin Russia’s power grew, but he did not change it fundamentally, but rather slowed the process. Over the long term, the period of 1991-2022 could be seen in the future as a continuous diminution of Russian prestige and power and Russian political elite trying to reverse it by invading neighboring countries.

What do these scenarios could mean for the South Caucasus? The highly fractured region where Russian influence is maintained exclusively through military instruments will feel firsthand reverberations from Russian decline. The decline however will not necessarily mean rapid withdrawal of Russian forces. On the contrary, Moscow could exacerbate the security situation in the region to increase its relative position vis-à-vis the collective West or the regional powers, Turkey and Iran.

Even if the contours of Russian withdrawal from the South Caucasus emerge, the departure will not be smooth. Too many conflicts would serve as a reminder of how Russia maintained the control the region and how it would strive to retain its major position.

These are broader scenarios of what might await the region amid fundamental changes Russia is presently experiencing. And all three South Caucasus states fear Russia’s total victory in Ukraine. This would close the region to the collective West. Though poor, Russia will nevertheless be able to further isolate the Black and Caspian seas and the space in between. This explains why Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have been cautious in their approach to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Each state loathes Moscow’s influence and fears what a victorious Russia could have in store for the region. There is little the three states could realistically do as the West seems unwilling to commit militarily to the defense of the South Caucasus. The region is not as important as Ukraine and much depends on what future relations between Washington and Ankara will be.

What is more troublesome for the South Caucasus is that whatever scenario discussed above develops in Russia, the downsides for the South Caucasus could be almost always bigger than the potential geopolitical benefits.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase.