Hussein Askary: China’s ‘Stability Without Responsibility’ Doctrine in the Caucasus
“Stability without responsibility” is the doctrine underpinning Chinese foreign policy everywhere, including Eurasia, promoting economic engagement with a view to creating a new multilateral governance regime without becoming security providers. In this sense, there is no such thing as Pax Sinica.
While for regional stakeholders’ overland trade routes have geopolitical significance, China sees in connectivity a development model. Projects such as the Middle Corridor and the International North-South Corridors are an attempt to circumvent war and secure supply chains. Sanctions and the deteriorating security of sea routes in the Black Sea, the Gulf, and the Red Sea, have turned railways and highways into a necessary risk hedge. Russia relies on the Northern Corridor for access to global markets; Iran relies on the International North-South Corridor and the Trans-Capsian route for access to Russia. Europe relies on the Middle Corridor for access to Central Asia.
For China, the main objective is economic integration. To gain insight into China’s perspective on Caucasian connectivity, we turn to Hussein Askary, an economist, and the Vice-President of the Belt and Road Institute in Sweden. That is a platform specifically designed to inform and engage European business networks, policymakers, and the public on Chinese investment and industrial policy.
Is Iran a player in transport and connectivity or merely seeks investment, wherever it comes from?
Iran’s public opinion was historically sceptical of Russia and knew little of China. Engagement with the Belt and Road Initiative was limited. While Chinese companies had lots of projects in Iran – such as the development of the subway network in Tehran and other railway projects – the 2022 war in Ukraine played a catalytic role. Now China is a stakeholder in connectivity in the Caucasus and a business partner for Russia and Iran.
Today, the biggest infrastructure project in the South Caucasus is not developed by China or Russia or the Trump administration. It’s a seven-kilometre tunnel being built by an Iranian company In Southern Armenia, in Syunik: a $400 million project that should be completed in three-to-four years. This forms part of a bigger highway, in a challenging landscape for any engineering group. It’s a rough terrain, where construction of transport infrastructure is exceedingly difficult.
The Iranians have become very good in tunnelling, for obvious reasons. Iranian companies undertake a range of engineering projects relating to tunnelling. Three years ago, President Raisi inaugurated a project in the mountains of Sri Lanka. After the war {in Ukraine}, Iran is becoming more interested in the region, as well as its relationship with Russia. Raisi played a key role in Iran’s “Look East” policy towards Russia and China. The moderates were still hoping to improve relations with the Europe and the United States. Raisi and Khamenei said, "no, this is it; we go with Russia and China.”
Following a 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership in 2021, Iran was admitted into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2023 and joined BRICS in 2024. China’s policy line is “Stability without Responsibility.” China is involved in the region, without taking any security measures. They are big players, particularly in telecoms (Huawei, ZTE).
If you look at the Caucasus, you have five states with a “Strategic Partnership” with China: Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Iran.
China has three models of bilateral economic relations: partnership, strategic partnership, and comprehensive strategic partnership. Each of these frameworks carries different significance. Türkiye has a Strategic Cooperative Relationship since 2010, which became a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2025. Georgia was the first of the three South Caucasus states to conclude a Free Trade Agreement with China in 2017, upgraded in 2023 to a Strategic Partnership, and a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2026. Azerbaijan started in 2024 with a Strategic Partnership agreement and upgraded in 2025 to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Armenia signed a strategic partnership in 2025. These countries are keeping equal distance from everybody.
Now we have to look at these partnerships as components of a larger attempt for Eurasian integration, which both Russia and China badly want. Before the war in Ukraine, Russia had its own Eurasian vision but has since become more open to synergies with China. There is this famous the visit by President Xi Jinping to Moscow in March 2023, where he is heard telling Putin, "right now, there are dangers, changes the likes of which we have not seen in 100 years, and we are the ones driving these changes together.”
Is this about reaching Europe or integrating Central Asia?
This is about integrating Central Asia. Ukraine has become a kind of Berlin Wall. In 2013, Yanukovych was the first international leader to travel to China and sign the Belt and Road Initiative Memorandum of Understanding. That was a historical “multi-vector” perspective. Four months later, he was out of the picture. Now, Ukraine is a dividing line. The Northern Corridor {Connecting Europe to China via Russia} is safe but can be disrupted. The Middle Corridor did not have momentum before the war and still does not have a competitive value proposition. But it has potential. In the third Beijing BRI Forum in October 2023, President Tokayev of Kazakhstan invited China to play a more active role in the Middle Corridor.
To this end, China has made some significant steps. First, besides the Khorgos-Alashankou border crossings, there is an additional border crossing signalled by the Bakhty-Ayagoz railway line and dry port infrastructure, explicitly linked with the Middle Corridor or the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. That is accompanied with a $1bn contract with China’s Guoyou Materials Industry Group. Then there is the Jiangsu Haizhongzhou Shipyard investment in Kazakhstan, for the building of adequate vessels for the Caspian. Finally, there is Chinese investment in logistics hubs and warehouses, including grain silos. Investment is now expanding across the Caspian in the Caucasus. There is clearly engagement. However, the overall game is not one of building a bridge to Europe but rather one of intra-regional integration.
How much of this policy is about domestic developments and China’s “Go West Policy,” and move away from the singular development of the coast.
That's very important. In 2024 I published a report about Xinjiang’s economy. Xinjiang is envisaged as an industrial hub with connections to Central, West, and Southeast Asia. China is relocating enormous industrial capacity, including free trade zones and industrial parks.
In 2023-2024 alone, investment in the Xinjiang region reached the equivalent of $78bn, mostly focused on infrastructure and industrial capacity, with capital flowing from the state, regional governments, and corporations. In 2025 investment surged further. In a single year, China invested in a province with a 25 million population more than had been invested across Africa over the course of five years. In Xinjiang, investment focuses on petrochemicals, machinery (Sany Heavy Industry, for instance, is competing with Caterpillar), electronics, and textiles. The region is connected to Turkmenistan, where natural gas comes from, Afghanistan, where mineral wealth comes from, Pakistan and India, which are enormous markets. So, integrating East China and Western China is framed as integrating the Chinese Economy to Central and Western Asia. The Caucasus is part of that effort. And it is important for access to Turkey, Russia, and Iran.
The South Caucasus is sort of the meeting point of all the powers: Turkey, Russia, Iran, European, the Gulf, and Chinese interests. Do you see competition?
The United States left Afghanistan. In doing so, they are ending a 200-years Great Game over Afghanistan that involved the British, the Russians, and the United States. Geography is more important than ideology. China is building on economic partnerships. People say China is replacing Russia. The truth is that China is probably complementing Russia. As I said, Xi Jinping told Putin, "We are making this change together.”
For example, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway was vetoed by the Russians for two decades. In 2023 everything changed, and now China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are building the railway. It's not a replacement for the northern corridor. This is where people get it wrong. It's not a zero-sum game. Everybody wins from the total integration of Eurasia.
If you have more capital, more data, more technology, some are more equal than others.
Yeah, we can have a whole interview on the difference between the Chinese and Western philosophy. The Chinese don't believe in a zero-sum game. They think Africa should be enabled to become rich first, before you could do better business with Africa.
Talking about philosophy and allocation of capital, do you see a substantive difference between different International Financial Institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as opposed to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development?
Chinese IFIs are interested in infrastructure and the real economy. Of course, they don't want to rely on the World Bank and others. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank (of the BRICS) are mostly concerned with the Global South infrastructure gap.
Is there a Chinese angle in the International North-South Corridor?
Not really. The Chinese attitude towards the North-South corridor has three dimensions. First, there is an optimistic view that this could become synergetic with the Belt and Road Initiative. That is significant as India sees the BRI as a competitive project. India wants access to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Russia that can circumvent the Red Sea. They realise Russia can become an interesting market for them and source of critical minerals. Iran is the bridge.
China could complete the overland railway connections much faster if it were directly involved. So far, their participation is indirect: the electrification of the railway from eastern Iran to Tehran, and from Mashhad to Central Iran and the Persian Gulf, for example. They are mostly interested in access to Bandar Abbas, and the overall network benefits. The Russians should theoretically drive investment but, since 2022, they have other priorities. If the network was ever completed, they would bring cargo. They would engage with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, driving cargo from Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis for Caucasus Watch