How does Armenia’s Crossroads of Peace initiative fit within the Middle Corridor vision? The Crossroads of Peace is a government initiative. Armenia frames this vision as a rules-based transit hub linking Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Georgia. Its core principle is that access to all transport transiting through Armenia is provided on the condition of reciprocity, without extraterritorial corridors. It is framed as part of a post-conflict peace architecture, embedding Armenia in both East–West and North–South flows.

The Middle Corridor is a multinational logistics chain connecting, primarily, Europe to Central Asia via the Caspian Sea, Türkiye, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. This is a market-led project informed by geopolitical realignments that currently bypass Armenia. The question is whether these two visions align or collide.

Few analysts are better placed to interpret the country’s competing connectivity narratives than Johnny G. Melikyan, a senior research fellow at the Orbeli Center, an analytical platform supporting the Office of the Prime Minister. His background in institutions linked to the Prime Minister’s Office, combined with advisory work for the Security Council of the National Assembly, International Crisis Group, and Amnesty International, provides him with a unique viewpoint on how connectivity narratives are framed, communicated, and contested.

As elections near, the contrast between a sovereignty-first peace agenda and an externally propelled regional corridor sharpens. Melikyan helps clarify how these competing frameworks shape Armenia’s options at a moment when infrastructure has become inseparable from political legitimacy and regional positioning.

The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) is a public communications framework rather than a diplomatic term. However, how does TRIPP match the Middle Corridor vision? 

For the moment, the question is how the Middle Corridor can pass through Armenian territory. There is a will to connect Türkiye and Central Asia via Armenia; to connect Europe, Anatolia, and the Central Asian plateau via the Caucasus. Armenia seeks a role there.

Before the 2020 war, Armenia was under blockade (closed borders with Türkiye and Azerbaijan), and the status quo remains largely unchanged. However, politically, the situation dramatically changed after the conflict. The trilateral agreement or the Washington Declaration created the prospect of Armenia reconnecting to logistics networks in the region.

Of course, the situation is evolving, not least due to the conflicts in Ukraine and Iran. The two routes connecting Europe with Central Asia via Iran and the Northern Corridor via Russia are now disrupted for obvious reasons. Therefore, there is more demand for the Middle Corridor.

Since 2020, Yerevan has decided to present its own vision for the future of the region, which is about lifting regional blocks to connectivity, allowing Armenia to integrate into emerging international corridors. 

There is an envisaged route from the Nakhichevan exclave to Azerbaijan proper via Armenian territory. That is what I understand as the TRIPP Corridor. Then there is the Middle Corridor… and then there is the Crossroads of Peace. The latter, in some respects, is about reviving and perhaps modernizing existing Soviet infrastructure. Can you talk us through where these visions meet?

The “Crossroads of Peace” initiative is not only about reviving Soviet infrastructure but also inviting new investment. It goes beyond the small part of the territory linked with the TRIPP corridor, from Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan. It’s a broader vision that sees Armenia reconnecting to the region after 30 years of being excluded from logistics networks: East-West and North-South. To do this, there is a lot of homework. We need to update and expand domestic infrastructure, standing ready to connect to international transit routes.

The Middle Corridor is already functioning. It connects Türkiye (and thereon the EU) to Central Asia via Azerbaijan and the Caspian. That is why, after the Washington Declaration, we can imagine Armenia fitting in as a piece of the puzzle in this route—Southern Armenian highways, the Meghri railway interconnector, and so on.

There is an alternative. Prior to the war in Iran, there was a route from Armenia to Central Asia via Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan to Kazakhstan. We had a couple of successful trials on that route, alternating between trucks and railways. Given the complex security situation regarding Iran, this route is now disrupted. There is renewed momentum for the Middle Corridor.

In terms of developing infrastructure that could be shared, I understand there is already a train line being developed from Azerbaijan to Türkiye, and that train line does not align with the existing Soviet lines in Armenia. Is my understanding correct?

Yes, there is work towards laying a 43km route via Armenia connecting the two segments of the Azerbaijani network, from the mainland to the Nakhichevan exclave. Armenia is advancing the idea of a transit route from Northern Armenia, via Nakhichevan, to Southern Armenia, restoring reciprocity.

Also, there is an option of creating a link between Kars and Nakhichevan via Armenian territory—restoring a small part of the former Kars-Gyumri railway. But what we see now is that Ankara is doing the opposite—it has started to build a railroad on its territory which will link Kars with Nakhichevan directly. The route proposed by Armenia is cheaper and faster to develop. The Turkish vision will cost up to $3bn USD or more. I see this as another step to bypass Armenia and limit its options. Let’s hope this negotiation ends well.

What is the state of play in this negotiation? 

At this stage, we must implement the Washington Declaration. Armenia and the United States are negotiating the founding of a TRIPP company, which later will begin to implement the TRIPP route. This also requires the Armenian-Azerbaijani intergovernmental commissions to progress in the delimitation and demarcation process in the Meghri region.

Of course, there is a greater political challenge still. Under the terms of the Washington Declaration, Armenia is conceding to the development of a route via Armenian territory to link the Azerbaijani mainland to the Nakhichevan exclave. Azerbaijan has not assumed an equivalent reciprocal obligation to allow transit via Nakhichevan. It’s a matter of goodwill, or lack thereof.

As regards the Armenian-Turkish border, we initially expect that it will open for third-country nationals, as agreed before by the representatives of Yerevan and Ankara. In time, this will allow transit for everyone. This means opening checkpoints across the Turkish-Armenian border. There are three options in that respect. One of them is the Margara checkpoint, used a couple of years ago to send humanitarian aid following the earthquakes in Türkiye. Then the idea is to link the Armenian railroad system to the Turkish one.

Is the Russian owner of the Armenian railway system ready to take on the investment required? 

There is a commitment to invest and, therefore, retain the concession rather than lose it. They want to keep this concession. This would require the modernization of the Soviet connection. I think that the Russian-owned “South Caucasus Railway” is committed to this development.

To be clear, if the bilateral politics are right, you are confident that the Russian company would assume the cost of developing the infrastructure. 

Yes, because Yerevan's position is that the railway system requires modernization to connect to international transport corridors. To keep the concession, the company needs to abide by this demand. Otherwise, the concession will be revoked when it’s up for renewal, which I believe is in 2038. Besides, the cost is not prohibitive. Regarding the Kars-Gyumri or Yeraskh-Nakhichevan routes, they only need to add a couple of kilometers of new railway tracks.

Are the standards between the Azerbaijani, the Turkish, and the Armenian railways the same? 

The network does not have the same specifications. There is compatibility between Armenian and Azerbaijani systems, but not necessarily with the Turkish one. There is a need to harmonize.

Assuming the question of standards is addressed, is there interest from private stakeholders that would make investment in Armenian infrastructure commercially viable? Or is the interest in this infrastructure purely political? 

For more than 10-15 years, the prospect of connecting Armenia to Türkiye has been discussed from a commercial angle. There is clearly private sector interest. The Russian operator has already prepared a couple of distinct business cases for routes to Türkiye. And I think they will be preparing for the opening of the border.

If we are talking about the broader economy and specific clients, the first target sector is mining, with major prospects in Southern Armenia. There is even Chinese interest in some mines in the region. To answer your question, yes, business is interested. And we can imagine that the flow of goods will make this a profitable venture.

After the disruption of the Northern Corridor (Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland), the Middle Corridor went from 300,000 tons of goods to three million and is growing. The target is to double that flow. In sum, the business case for investing in this infrastructure is strong. There would be no competition. All routes and all capacity are needed. There is complementarity, inclusive of the routes via Georgia.

These negotiations take place in bilateral formations between Ankara, Yerevan, and Baku. Is there a regional forum?

We have not moved beyond bilateral frameworks yet. Recently, when the Kazakh Minister of Foreign Affairs was visiting Yerevan, he was accompanied by the Minister of Transport. Kazakhstan is trying to understand how TRIPP will affect regional connectivity via the Middle Corridor. External actors have an interest in the South Caucasus. For years, there has been a “3+3” format, inclusive of Iran, Türkiye, and Russia. The geopolitical and security context has made this format less relevant.

For the moment, we have trilateral formats of convening. This last convened at a Deputy Foreign Minister level two years ago. But we do not have a regional forum as such, if by that we mean a permanent process with continuity. All parties are motivated to create and retain this trilateral format. This would make sense for transborder challenges such as transport, water, and infrastructure. In sum, we have a format, but not a forum.

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis for Caucasus Watch