President Donald Trump is not an outlier in the US foreign policy discourse, but a manifestation of the permanent reorientation in Washington's strategic thinking. Under this realignment, the South Caucasus will generally lose relevance for the security considerations of the US due to the region’s geopolitical circumstances. Georgia is the only country in the region with the ability to oppose this trend by presenting itself as an integral part of an emerging security block.

A New Era for US Foreign Policy Making

Experts and politicians often describe President Trump's foreign policy orientation as a departure from the traditional course of American foreign policy. Most of his supporters enthusiastically welcome this strategic realignment under the banner of economic nationalism and a reduced global military presence and see it as an urgently needed adjustment. Critics, on the other hand, denounce his course as an impulsive form of neo-isolationism that would weaken the global leadership of the United States and undermine the institutional framework for international multilateralism. This debate within the American political elite will continue well into this election year and beyond. Political noise in this polarized atmosphere makes it difficult to decipher which components of this reorientation will remain as permanent features of US foreign policy.

In recent years, critics have generally expressed the hope that this recent departure from Washington's strategic consensus, which has been in place since the end of World War II, will only be a disturbing outlier in American statecraft and that it will not be established as the new norm. Although the break with the status quo may seem bombastic under the current government, these structural changes began before Donald Trump took over the country's highest office. President Obama's attempt to reduce the United States' presence in the Middle East and to set a new focus for American foreign policy with his "Pivot to Asia", along with the passive role of the United States in the conflict in Libya, an approach that became known as "Leading from Behind", indicated a general avoidance of military operations and a reformulation of the country's core strategic objectives.

This reorientation is due to two main factors that emerged more or less simultaneously. The first one was a fundamental shift in the balance of power in the international system towards a more multipolar order. The second one was a profound change in public opinion in America against military missions abroad and international free trade as a consequence of the costly "Global War on Terror" and the often-perceived negative consequences of an accelerated globalization after the end of the Cold War. In addition, the general interest of America’s public in international events has declined, as the country itself is deeply divided politically and is currently mainly concerned with its internal political strives.

While the first factor presents the US with the challenge of redefining its strategic interests, the second factor determines the range of actions available to the political elites in Washington. This will inevitably lead the US to reduce its global security engagement and to try to redirect strategic resources as narrowly as possible to a smaller selection of defined core strategic interests.

The above mentioned foreign policy concepts of the Obama era can be seen as the first cornerstones of this redefinition of core strategic interests, in which the leadership role of the US is generally reduced and which shifted the focus from so-called “state building” in the Middle East to the containment of the People's Republic of China. The National Security Strategy 2017, published under President Trump, officially focused on containing Russia and China as "revisionist powers" in an international arena that is increasingly characterized by conflict and competition. In contrast to previous National Security Strategies, the new document now places the international leadership role of the US behind the pursuit of the newly defined national interests. From this development it can be deduced that the containment of main rivals is now prioritized over other foreign policy goals, while the promotion of free trade, liberal values ​​and the protection of international institutions will receive less attention.

The Containment of Russia and the South Caucasus

What role will the South Caucasus play in the changing strategic direction of US security policy? The balance of power in the region has changed little over the past few years. Since the 2008 invasion of Georgia, Russia has left no doubt that the country remains the dominant player regarding security matters within the South Caucasus. Although containing Russia is part of the new focus of American foreign policy, one has to be aware that Moscow can definitely be rated as secondary to Washington’s larger rival - the People's Republic of China. All previous signs suggest that Russia's containment will be conducted along a more limited range of strategic goals than China's. At first glance, there have been few changes in the profile of American security policy in the South Caucasus since Donald Trump took office. Nevertheless, events in other regions can be used to draw conclusions about the future of Washington's security engagement in the region.

In the Middle East in particular, there was increasingly less willingness to confront Russia about its ambitions in Syria and Libya. The fact that Washington gives Moscow more room to maneuver in a region that traditionally held immense geopolitical weight in the competition between great powers, raises doubts about future American initiatives in the South Caucasus. In addition, it appears that the Trump administration is trying to focus on containing Russia in the so-called "Intermarium", the space between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. The goal will be to actively support a blockade against the spread of Russian influence into Central Europe by allied countries in this region. The speech by the US President in Warsaw in the summer of 2017 is one of the most symbolic moments since Trump took office and it has underlined the willingness of the United States to cooperate closely with Poland, Romania, Ukraine and the Baltic States to contain Russia's ambitions in this geographic area. This readiness has so far led to an increased number of NATO military exercises in the Baltic States and Poland as well as an expansion of US arms deliveries to the Ukrainian government.

With the reduction of American military presence around the globe and the narrowing of Washington’s strategic agenda, there will be no deepened security policy partnerships with the countries of the South Caucasus in the long-term. This will also affect the behavior of European partners, who have primarily focused on the political and economic integration of the South Caucasus, while significant western security efforts are rarely pursued without the leadership of the United States. Under the current conditions within Europe, it is unrealistic to expect that European powers will assume a leadership role on security issues in the South Caucasus.

As a consequence, Azerbaijan and especially Armenia will have to continue looking for alternative partners such as Iran and Turkey, if they want to challenge the Russian monopoly on security issues in the region. If this does not happen, the status quo will increasingly solidify. Moscow would then continue to act as a veto power in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between the two countries and could try to secure geopolitical concessions from Baku and Yerevan in an even more open and aggressive fashion. The Pashinyan government is expected to continue to walk a slippery slope in order to advance its goals of the Velvet Revolution in a way that does not induce Moscow to retaliate on behalf of the former pro-Russian elites in Armenia.

Although it will generally be more difficult for Georgia to get attention within the US foreign policy circles as well, the country can still appear on Washington's new strategic agenda, as long as Tbilisi makes necessary adjustments to its geopolitical profile. The original definition of the "Intermarium" is limited to the countries west of the Black Sea. Some experts, such as Dr. Andreas Umland, however, show an expanded conceptualization of the "Intermarium", which could include Georgia. Ultimately, this could enable the country to integrate itself more closely into the Western alliance structures without being tied to its NATO and EU ambitions, which seem rather unrealistic.

Political realities, too, show signs of a continuing US interest in the small country in the South Caucasus. The then prime minister, Giorgi Kvirikashvili, announced in 2017 that President Trump assured him of his full support in the matter of the Russian occupation of Tskhinvali and South Ossetia. In addition, the NATO foreign ministers adopted a new aid package for Georgia and Ukraine on May 1. These facts show that Georgia - in Washington and within the NATO leadership - is still openly seen as a central pillar for containing Russian influence in the Black Sea. In Tbilisi, there should therefore be hope that Georgia will not disappear from the strategic agenda of the United States, even if US foreign policy will be narrowly focused on the “Intermarium”. Depending on how the Georgian government sells the country's geopolitical role, it might even be among the select few, who will ultimately benefit from the strategic change.

The Georgian leadership has an influence on two factors that will shape this process. First, Tbilisi needs to focus more on building and strengthening partnerships with the primary regional powers in the “Intermarium” - especially Ukraine, Poland and Romania. If this succeeds, Tbilisi could benefit from the lobbying of these partners for the inclusion of Georgia in the US containment approach. Second, the Georgian government must present itself to American decision-makers and strategic thinkers as an important building block of the "Intermarium"-concept. Accordingly, the rhetorical focus of Georgia's elites should be shifted from the traditional reference to western values and democratization to the country's strategic importance for the Black Sea region. In the future, Realpolitik-vocabulary will be increasingly well received in by the US leadership, even beyond Trump's presidency.

Although the reorientation of US foreign policy presents challenges to Tbilisi, Georgia could be the only country in the South Caucasus to benefit from this process. While Georgia's course of Western rapprochement and democratization has only resulted in lip services and minimal support from the United States in the past, an opportunity for more tangible support is opening through the integration into the emerging security structures of the "Intermarium".

Philip Roehrs-Weist