As Tbilisi’s relations with Moscow come into the spotlight, internal developments in Georgia’s territory of Abkhazia augur critical shifts in the region’s relations with its security patron.

In Abkhazia, a separatist region of Georgia, the de facto leadership appointed an ethnic Armenian, Varazdat Minosyan, to one of the key positions—the first such case when a non-Abkhaz was appointed to such a high position of vice premiership. The seemingly benign decision, however, reflects a deeper shift in the region, where the ethnic picture is changing rapidly and the ethnic Abkhaz population is regarded as losing its primary economic role as well as the status of majority ethnic group.

Abkhaz analysts claim that it was with the help of ethnic Armenians that Badra Gunba managed to snatch victory in the de facto presidential elections earlier this year. Another theory is that ethnic Armenians now enjoy greater support from Russia than the Abkhaz themselves, given the differences over the investment legislation, which would allow foreign (effectively Russian) businesses to buy land in Abkhazia and construct apartment units.

This is significant because the evolving ethnic landscape and the dynamic economic conditions in the region will shape the relationship between Russia and the separatist region. In the longer run, the ethnic Abkhaz population might not be as influential as it has been so far.

The first Armenian settlements in Abkhazia date back to the 19^th century when the Russian Imperial authorities persecuted the ethnic Abkhaz population, which caused their massive forced expulsion from the native region to the Ottoman Empire. As a result, other ethnic groups began pouring into Abkhazia and the ethnic Armenians were among them. By the mid-20^th century, well over 60 thousand Armenians resided in Abkhazia – a nearly hundred percent increase from the early 20^th-century census. The figure further increased to 76,000 in the period just before the explosion of the Soviet Union in 1991. Yet ethnic Georgians and Abkhazians were larger in numbers, while nowadays their share could be the same.

Regional Perspective

Despite these internal shifts, Russia's position on occupied Abkhazia remains largely unchanged. As Moscow’s recent statements have shown, the Kremlin is ready to talk about further improving bilateral relations with Georgia, although this issue should not be tied to the occupied territories. Russia is pushing for a pragmatic approach in bilateral relations, which means that in the longer run it is unlikely that there will be any major concessions from the Russian side regarding the occupied territories of Georgia. In fact, the geopolitical situation in the region and the world, from Russia's perspective, has changed in its favor. The change is evidenced by the continuous direct negotiations Russia has been holding with the United States over Ukraine and other major issues of relevance to the two powers.

Moscow believes that world politics has entered an era of great power competition, where spheres of influence have become the norm. Russia has been trying to achieve this goal over the past decades. Indeed, the initiation of direct negotiations with Russia by the United States is nothing more than a direct recognition of Moscow’s spheres of influence over the former Soviet states. This effectively means that, with the fate of Ukraine being decided in Moscow and Washington, Russia is also trying to strengthen its positions in the South Caucasus.

It appears that the US itself is also in favor of spheres of influence, since it has declared territorial expansion (even though many states perceive the move as frivolous) and expressed sympathy for spheres of influence – all of North America, including the Panama Canal. The United States is no longer satisfied with the liberal international order it created in the Cold War era and then further reinforced in the 1990s. China and others have achieved enormous success, thereby constraining the power of the United States. Accordingly, the emerging international order is expected to be increasingly tumultuous, characterized by the redistribution of resources and the forceful takeover of territory as a prevailing standard.     

In light of this, seeing the United States’ readiness to shift its attention from the wider Black Sea region to other geographies, Moscow sees no need to make concessions to its neighbors. Conciliation is significantly less necessary today. Given the already strained relations between Tbilisi and the EU and US, Georgia will likely need to build a rapport with Russia. According to Moscow, Georgia's shift towards Russia is inevitable, and highlighting the issue of occupied Abkhazia to normalize relations with Tbilisi doesn't seem pertinent.     

The future of Russia’s relations with Abkhazia, therefore, will be contingent as much on wider regional developments as on internal shifts in the separatist region. The radical changes in the composition of the population augur significant geopolitical reverberations not only for Moscow but also for Tbilisi.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.