The latest developments around Nagorno-Karabakh signal a growing willingness from Baku and Yerevan to resolve major issues. However, it will still need Russia’s backing to develop a long-term peace in the South Caucasus.

The recent meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan in Brussels was a clear example that the EU does not want to "leave" the region and that it will continue its efforts to ease tensions through economic or diplomatic steps. It is noteworthy that the Brussels meeting took place after a similar meeting of head of the South Caucasus states with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which was somewhat indicative that the West intends to remain an important player in the region. Surely, Russia enjoys far more solid (military) leverage to exert influence in the region, and the West is well aware of its own limitations. Therefore, Brussels’ official position is not confrontational, but based on supporting the development of infrastructure projects in the region. Following the meeting in Brussels it was reported that Aliyev and Pashinyan finally agreed on the railway link through Armenia.

The EU’s emphasis on promoting infrastructure is understandable. The more open the region is, the greater the opportunity for balancing and penetration into the region for the West. The presence of the EU in the region is also in the interests of Baku and Yerevan, as silent dissatisfaction with and distrust toward Moscow's actions in both capitals are quite high. Both believe that Moscow is more concerned with pursuing its geopolitical interests than establishing real peace in the region.

This progress leads to a broader question of whether Armenia and Azerbaijan could eventually move beyond bilateral problems. Much depends on whether Baku and Yerevan want to move beyond the issues around Nagorno-Karabakh and build extensive economic ties, which ultimately could help diminish tensions. At the same time, as long as Russian troops are stationed there, Baku will periodically face problems, because Azerbaijan’s leadership does not want foreign troops on its territory. If these problems are resolved, then Baku and Yerevan could start building a new model of bilateral relations. This will require tremendous will from the political elites of the two states, a willingness to interact with each other, and the ability to compromise.

But even then, not all regional powers will like the improvement of bilateral relations. For Russia, for example, this would mean imposition of limits on its influence in the South Caucasus. If Baku and Yerevan cooperate, then the expediency of the presence of Russian troops in the region will be minimized. That is why it is crucial for Russia to be present militarily. This would explain Moscow’s push to send peacekeepers into Nagorno-Karabakh. This would also likely mean that Russia will try to extend its peacekeeping mandate in Nagorno-Karabakh beyond 2025.

Geopolitically, tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan makes Russia a winner. For example, being unable to resist the Azerbaijani army, the Armenian government will seriously consider expanding the Russian military contingent along the entire Armenian-Azerbaijani border. The disadvantage of Russia's strategy is that by trying to stay longer in Azerbaijan it will be increasingly pushing Baku towards ever closer ties with Turkey. Both countries have been allies for decades, but their cooperation has reached a qualitatively new level after the second Nagorno-Karabakh War, when Turkish military assistance became key.

One of the examples of balancing Russia’s military predominance was the signing of the Shusha Declaration by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Both pledged to defend each other in the event of an attack on either side. The more Russia increases its influence, the more intensively Turkey will support Azerbaijan. This shows that the era of Russia's exclusive geopolitical dominance in the South Caucasus is coming to an end. The region’s borders are shifting, and it is highly unlikely that the opening of the region would serve Russia well. Blockages in infrastructure made Russia an essential player beyond purely military tools. Therefore, the developing infrastructure bites at Moscow’s influence because Russia has built its influence on excluding other powers from penetrating the South Caucasus.

Overall, however, following the second Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the region has had more chances than at any time since the end of the Soviet Union to turn into an integrated space unhindered by conflicts and closed borders. There is a potential that Armenia and Azerbaijan would finally move beyond their grievances. Turkey and Iran are also seeing the need for the “opening” of the South Caucasus. Turkey thus disrupts the status quo established since the end of the Soviet period. Its growing role in the South Caucasus could be seen as a part of Ankara’s Eurasianist twist. Expanding its reach into Central Asia, in the hopes of forming an alliance of sorts with the Turkic-speaking countries is beginning to look more realistic. In the north, the north-east, in Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, there is an identifiable geopolitical arc where Turkey is increasingly able to puncture Russia’s underbelly.

Russia, as argued above, is somewhat ambivalent. Its illiberal peacebuilding methods fail to produce real security, largely because the Kremlin has no genuine interest in peace and prioritizes its own geopolitical interests. But Moscow must act to show the semblance of working on and promoting stability in the South Caucasus. Doing otherwise will further diminish its prestige, push Azerbaijan to further rely on Turkey, increase suspicions in Armenia and ultimately leave its entire foreign policy solely dependent on military tools.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase.