While wars inevitably drain a nation of its human and financial resources, one country’s loss can become another’s economic opportunity. This was precisely the case for Armenia following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when the influx of Russian IT specialists boosted the economy in Armenia (APRI, 2023). Around 49,000 Russians have moved from Russia to Armenia since early 2022 (CivilNet, 2022), and as of now, about 40,000 have legal residency permits and valid documents (Meduza, 2026), in addition to many others in other countries in the region, such as Georgia, Serbia, and Kazakhstan. According to Politico, Georgia welcomed more than 113,000 Russian citizens after a week of mobilization rumors, mainly through the Verkhny Lars checkpoint (Zakharova, 2026).

Amid a growing speculation about a potential new wave of mobilization by Moscow, Yerevan declared its readiness to welcome the second wave. The Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, Alen Simonyan, said in an interview that Russians who wish to flee the new wave of mobilization are welcome in Armenia, adding: “No one at the border will ask why you’ve come. As is well known, Russian citizens can enter Armenia without a foreign passport,” Simonyan said (Akimov, 2026).

Armenia’s open-door policy this time might not be limited to economic benefits, but also a political one. Also, the second wave differs from the first one in many ways, so the payoff is less certain. The benefits of the first wave are easy to pinpoint. The IT sector grew, tax revenue and consumption rose, and Armenia gained skilled workers it would otherwise have struggled to attract (APRI, 2023). A welcome to a second wave shows that the government sees this as an opportunity worth repeating, but that does not necessarily guarantee the same outcome.

Why a Covert Mobilization?

In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Putin announced the draft of 300,000 men, causing widespread panic and protests and leading thousands of men to flee to nearby countries such as Armenia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan (Neiman, 2026).

Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin’s spokesperson, has denied the possibility of a new mobilization by calling it “informational ducks,” a term used to describe something “false.” However, there has been widespread speculation that a new wave of mobilization will be announced soon after the parliamentary elections in September (Ghulinyan, 2026). Russia held State Duma elections on September 18-20 (Meduza, 2026), and for months reporters and analysts expected any new call-up to come after the vote, so that an unpopular measure would not hurt the ruling party at the polls. 

Moscow insists there is no official mobilization wave, and officials have denied plans for a new mobilization at least 18 times; Putin himself has said as much. Yet Western reporting points the other way (Haftko, 2026). Peskov used the same language days before the 2022 announcement

Given the current heavy battlefield losses, which are estimated at over 30,000 casualties per month, the Kremlin is looking for new ways to find new recruits (Corcoran, 2026). Most notably, it is focusing on university campuses, since it is in need of technical expertise for its modern warfare, such as drone operations. The same source also mentions that these students are being offered substantial financial incentives to join the military as drone operators and engineers.

The reason why this time it is a covert mobilization is to keep the costs of exit high. Quiet pressure, threatened restrictions and uncertainty about who will be called all work best when leaving is difficult. Armenia’s open door lowers that cost, which helps explain why Moscow sees a migration policy as a political challenge. 

Kremlin’s Response to Armenia’s Open Door Policy

The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova described Armenia’s readiness to welcome Russians fleeing the mobilization as provocative. Zakharova even went on to say that such actions would “encourage Russian citizens to engage in unlawful actions” and give “traditional Armenian hospitality a toxic political tinge.” She also added that Armenia is seeking to “curry favor with the West and the Kyiv regime” (Ukrainian National News, 2026).

Zakharova’s reaction carries several political messages, targeting Armenia not only for its migration policy but for its pivot toward the West. And for Moscow, Russians leaving the country has a series of consequences including labor deficit and decrease in manpower. The shortage in manpower both labor-wise and military-wise has been a major challenge for the Russian side, where there have been plans to recruit foreigners from North Korea, India, and African countries (Tyschenko, 2026).

What the Open Door Costs Yerevan

The cost is mostly visible on the rental market. According to Euronews, a two-room flat in Yerevan now rents for about €850 a month, and average apartment prices rose 23.5% year on year in August, according to Armenia's Cadastre Committee. Russian nationals account for around 72% of all property transactions by foreign nationals (Sheludkova, 2026). The source also mentions that the average monthly wage in Armenia is about 320,763 dram (€790), meaning the rent of one flat is roughly equal to, or higher than, an average salary. For Russians in Armenia, including the newcomers, these prices are affordable as many work in high-paying sectors such as the IT sector, in addition to favorable tax regimes for IT companies set by Armenia. This is on top of the growing demand by Iranians fleeing the war in Iran, Armenian diaspora repatriating home, and international nomads choosing Armenia as a destination. 

The rent crisis is not only economic, but also very much political, because housing is where most residents feel the effect of the migration. The same arrivals who bring tax revenue and IT growth also raise the cost of living for people without Russian-linked incomes. Language is a second, quieter pressure point. Though Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reiterated that Armenian remains the sole official language of the country (Avanesov, 2023), while encouraging citizens to learn foreign languages, Russian is increasingly heard in Armenia, particularly in Yerevan. Additionally, since many Armenians know Russian, some newcomers are managing daily life without learning Armenian, which may weaken their incentive to integrate. The same integration issue occurred in Georgia, where one source describes a “parallel expat world” that Russian expats have built in the country (SOVA, 2026).

On top of that, more and more diaspora Armenians are choosing to move back home. Over the last three to four years alone, about 20,000 to 25,000 Armenians living abroad have taken up Armenian citizenship and most of them have actually moved to Armenia. According to Hovhannes Aleksanyan from the Diaspora Office, people are coming back from about 45 different countries. Most are returning from Russia, alongside many families coming from Middle Eastern countries like Lebanon and Syria (PAN, 2026). This is further increasing the demand on the housing market and making it difficult for diaspora Armenians, especially from conflict-affected regions to repatriate.

The Implication on Armenia and the Wider Region

That said, the influx of Russians has brought great benefits to Armenia, especially to middle- and higher-income groups, including: house owners, business owners, and others who profit from the new demand. Russians have also added to Yerevan’s vibrant scene, bringing new coffee cultures and gastronomical offerings to the city. But the same arrivals who lift the economy also raise rents, so the people who benefit most are those who are well-off economically.

The risks are political as well as economic. Most Russians in Armenia are escaping the war and the hardships at home, and most are not aligned with Moscow’s policies. Still, there is a low but real possibility that Russia could reuse the excuse it used in Abkhazia. Russia has recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, “mindful of its responsibility for ensuring the survival of their fraternal peoples in the face of aggressive, chauvinistic policy pursued by Tbilisi” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2008). In that logic, Moscow presents itself as the protector of its people abroad and uses that role to justify intervention. Russia has repeatedly justified intervention in neighboring states by pointing to the need to protect Russian citizens and compatriots abroad, as in Georgia in 2008 and Crimea and Donbas in 2014 (O’Neale, 2026). Though, Armenia differs from those cases in many ways, especially that Russians there are spread across the capital, not concentrated in a breakaway territory, and many left precisely to escape the Russian state. Yet the Kremlin’s recent language shows how close this logic can come. Zakharova has already accused Yerevan of encouraging “unlawful actions.” On October 4, Medvedev warned that Armenia could become “a new Ukraine,” and Russia keeps about 5,000 troops at its base near Gyumri (Eurasianet, 2026). That article ties Medvedev’s warning to Armenia’s EU path, not to migration, so these statements form the wider context rather than direct evidence of a plan. For now, this is a far-fatched scenario, but still worth mentioning.

Conclusion

As of mid-October, no official mobilization has been announced, and analysts remain divided on its form. Some expect a covert, phased call-up, a "mobilization by other means" built on regional quotas, financial incentives and administrative pressure, rather than an open nationwide draft (Saratoga Foundation, 2026). For Armenia, the result is the same either way. 

Yerevan announced that Russians will be allowed to enter Armenia without anyone asking them any questions at the border. That statement alone is politically loaded: Armenia will not help Moscow keep its people in Russia by force. A covert mobilization works only when leaving costs a lot, so every open border weakens it. Zakharova’s rage explains that Moscow sees this as another political challenge by Armenia, while Medvedev’s warning about a “new Ukraine” shows how far Russia can go.

The potential newcomers from Russia will keep raising the rents up, while not finding any incentive to learn Armenian. Owners and business owners keep on benefiting from this influx, while renters will be the ones carrying the cost. The Abkhazia scenario is unlikely, because Russians in Armenia are scattered across the capital and many fled their own state. But the Kremlin keeps the “protector” argument ready. Armenia's open door is a strategic choice as well as a humanitarian one.

Contributed by Karen Hekimian. She holds a master's degree in European and International Studies and previously worked as a Communications Intern at the Armenian Embassy in Lebanon. Her research focuses on foreign policy, conflict analysis, refugee integration, and diaspora relations across the Middle East and South Caucasus. She also maintains a research collaboration with the European Institute for Studies on the Middle East and North Africa (EISMENA).