On the first anniversary of the second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the railway revival project remains elusive as does general peace in the South Caucasus. Reasons vary but are mostly related to mutual distrust between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Russia’s seeming unwillingness to push for genuine peace agenda. Geopolitics drive Moscow’s peace effort which precludes the emergence of a long-time peace.

Following the second Nagorno-Karabakh war Russia proposed a railroad plan for the South Caucasus. The restoration of the old routes follows the Soviet patterns when there were two corridors running from Azerbaijan to Armenia and both guaranteed connection to Turkey via the Nakhchivan exclave. One route was from Ijevan, a town and urban municipal community in Armenia, and Yerevan, and the second – southern – one through Zangilan.

Economic and military conditions weigh heavily on which route Armenia and Azerbaijan prefer. Yerevan is more willing to work on the northern route, while Baku would support the southern alternative. The latter corridor would go through the reclaimed territories and a narrow swath of Armenian land.

Yerevan regards the restoration of the northern railway section more promising as most of the route is in working condition. The line runs through from Yeraskh, a village in Armenia’s Ararat province, into Nakhchivan then enters southern Armenia to then enter Azerbaijan proper and heads north into Russia.

For Georgia the potential gains are not as clear cut. The country benefits from being the only connection route between Armenia and Russia. Alternatives could naturally decrease transit revenues. To hold initiative Georgia might play the Abkhazia Railway card.

For Iran, the post-war arrangement seems less favorable than to other regional powers. The potential restoration of the railways limits the clout Iran held over Azerbaijan since the first Karabakh War ended in 1994. Azerbaijan depended on Iranian transit to reach its Nakhchivan exclave.

Turkey on the other hand comes out as a clear winner, though without official presence at the negotiating table. Both proposed railway lines give Azerbaijan a direct rail link to Turkey through Nakhchivan. Turkey has already announced its plan to build a new railway link to Nakhchivan.

Russia’s interests behind the railway revival project primarily lie in the military realm. Restored routes would allow Moscow to penetrate the South Caucasus at will. Russia’s ability to do this has significantly decreased since the end of the Soviet Union along with the deteriorated ties with Georgia. Mitigating the blocking power of the Caucasus range and the ability to reach Turkish and Iranian borders has been at the heart of Russia’s military strategy.

So far Russian efforts have failed to materialize, while present trends indicate the projects could remain unfulfilled for a long time. The reasons range from deep-seated distrust between Armenia and Azerbaijan to Russia’s suspected unwillingness to see progress. Though the war healed a national trauma in Baku associated with the defeat in the first Nagorno-Karabakh war, it has not led to the improvement of relations with Armenia. The Armenian public was also deeply wounded after the latest conflict and is highly distrustful of Azerbaijani side. Alongside these issues are the military moves along the official Armenia-Azerbaijan border, which causes daily frictions, occasional fighting, and deaths of soldiers.

All in all, both Yerevan and Baku seem unready to pursue a more peaceful line. Baku was victorious and seems to be pushing for gaining further advantages while Yerevan is more inward-looking because of the divided political class and disarray in the military.

Far more fundamental reasons behind failure to promote peace in the South Caucasus lie in the very nature of peace efforts led by Russia. Constructing a long-term peace requires genuine political willingness, prestige, and a record of untarnished leadership. Illiberal methods of peacebuilding spearheaded by Russia fail to produce tangible security results. The primary reason for this is the geopolitical component of Russian efforts. Moscow is not genuinely interested in conflict resolution. Geopolitics drive the Kremlin’s thinking. Military and geo-economic considerations prevail over regional security needs. Thence come simmering tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is even possible to suggest that the protracted discord between Yerevan and Baku allows the Kremlin to pick up on those benefits which have so far remained elusive. Tensions are a perfect tool to persuade both Armenia and Azerbaijan on the need to prolong the peacekeepers’ stay, and perhaps even increase the number of Russian troops. For instance, unable to resist the Azerbaijani army, Armenian government seriously considered the extension of Russian troops activities along the entire Armenia-Azerbaijan border.

Failure to build a genuine peace precludes the improvement of connectivity. For instance, inability to secure the long-hoped direct land connection from Azerbaijan proper to its Nakhchivan exclave then to Turkey means that traditional routes through Georgia are likely to retain their significance. These developments also benefit Iran, which for decades had served as a connection between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan.

But the downside for Russia’s geopolitical peace-making is that it worries Baku, where political elites, though victorious in the war, nevertheless genuinely, albeit silently, fear the continuous Russian military presence on Azerbaijani soil beyond 2025 when the first term of peacekeeping mission officially ends. It pushes Azerbaijan further into Turkey’s embrace. Both countries have enjoyed an allied relationship for decades, but it reached a qualitatively new level with the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. To offset Russian influence, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed the Shusha Declaration in June where both sides pledged to defend each other in case of an attack on one of the parties. The more Russia increases its influence, the greater Turkish willingness will be to support Baku.

Therefore, amity and the railway revival project remain elusive because of the illiberal nature of Russia’s peace effort. No less important is the mutual distrust between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Changes in the perspectives of the three countries are required, however it is an unlikely scenario that leaves little hope for a long-term breakthrough.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase.