Though Russia’s move to dispatch peacekeeping forces to Karabakh is hailed a strategic victory, Moscow is facing a number of problems ranging from the insoluble status of Karabakh, waves of refugees, and Turkey’s growing influence in Azerbaijan. In the longer term this could challenge Moscow’s position as a dominant force in the region. After all, great powers usually abstain from using direct military forces, but rather induce smaller states to follow established norms.

A victorious image of Russia has been widely circulated since the signing of the November 9 agreement which ended the Armenia-Azerbaijan hostilities. Though Russia’s decision to move its peacekeeping troops into the conflict zone is a definite retrenchment of its power in the South Caucasus, Moscow will face an unenviable task of maintaining peace, building a long-term solution which would not question its geopolitical position, fostering closer relations with Yerevan and Baku without causing resentment in either of the capitals, and last, but not least, containing Turkey’s pressure. 

One of the first problems Moscow will face is the lack of vision over the political status for Nagorno-Karabakh. This is bound to create uncertainties and insecurities for the remaining Armenian population. What kind of communal coexistence is possible between Azerbaijanis and Armenians is yet another question.

The November 9 agreement reads that “Internally displaced persons and refugees shall return to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.” The stipulation’s viability is unclear unless Yerevan and Baku willingly cooperate – an unlikely scenario. Concomitant competing property claims between both ethnic groups will further complicate the peace process.

Yet another challenge will be the division between Armenian and Azerbaijani sides which now goes right between Shusha and Stepanakert, Karabakh’s capital. Since the cities are only 10 kilometers apart, the defense of Stepanakert, which is downhill from Azerbaijani-controlled Shusha, will be particularly difficult. This makes Stepanakert militarily vulnerable – another source for tensions Russian troops will have to face.

The five-year term of Russian peacekeeping mission in the region is also an uncomfortable reality for the Armenians in Karabakh. As the stipulation says, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have a right to stop the extension of the agreement. Surely, Russia will work hard to make sure neither Baku nor Yerevan would want to have Russian peacekeepers return home. It is also clear that Yerevan is unlikely to be a side which would support the removal of Russian troops. Baku, on the contrary, could pedal this scenario. This would create problems for Russia and its geopolitical interests in the region. After all, with the euphoria around the war gains slowly dissipating, Azerbaijan’s political elites and the general public will start to realize that the conflict has not been resolved and that Yerevan still has a direct line to the truncated Karabakh territory. Besides the very perspective of Russian troops’ long-term presence on Azerbaijani soil undoubtedly would be an uncomfortable reality for Azerbaijani politicians.

Though thankful to Moscow’s reticent position during the war, resentment in Baku towards the Russian military presence, which is unwilling to leave Karabakh, could be slowly emerging. In Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, Russian presence was either negatively viewed from the very beginning or turned into such over a certain period of time. Azerbaijan is unlikely to be a different case. Navigating between its geopolitical needs to influence both Yerevan and Baku and the latter’s growing resentment, Moscow will have to constantly keep balance between the two states, remain as unbiased as possible as and lay out a realistic approach to the final solution of the conflict – an unenviable task for Russian policy-makers.

Another challenge for Russia is of a much bigger caliber. NATO member Turkey’s emergence as a direct military player in the South Caucasus after 100 years is a significant development which will influence Russia’s calculus. Though scholarly discussions on the results of the war vary, what is clear is that Azerbaijan allied itself with Turkey and won a war, while Russia's ally – Armenia – lost. This has been made possible through Azerbaijan’s decade-long military build-up and Turkey’s continuous logistical support and training.

Russia’s decision to station its forces in Karabakh is in a way an escalation of those options which were traditionally at the hands of Russian politicians since the end of the Soviet Union. As a dominant power, Russia ideally should have navigated the differences between Armenia and Azerbaijan without entering the fray. Acting as a power which dissuades from war based on its prestige, rather than acts out of necessity, is what constitutes the great power position. The Russian decision, however, signals if not an outright decline, then a limit of options, escalation of commitments. And Turkey is instrumental here. After all, if not the dispatch of forces, Ankara influence in Baku would have grown even further.

The inability to address Turkey’s role is also seen in the fact that the country has not been mentioned in the November 9 agreement. This creates a significant loophole. Ankara will try to gain its own military presence on Azerbaijani soil. Cooperation with Russia will take place but as long as it fits into Turkish interests. Otherwise, Moscow’s military position could be challenged through various means considering how intensive Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan are. Negative trend in Moscow-Baku relations would be an opportunity for Ankara to use.

Though Russian peacekeeping troops in Karabakh have stopped the war, the November agreement leaves numerous questions unanswered: safe return of refugees, humanitarian concerns, security of the Armenian community in the truncated Karabakh, Turkey’s fluid role etc. Moscow’s position is much more limited than it was before the conflict itself. The Kremlin will have to navigate between different actors, try to find a balance by not causing resentment in Baku, which could push it to embrace Turkey.

Emil Avdaliani (@emilavdaliani) is a non-resident fellow at the Georgian think tank, Geocase, and teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi State University and European University.