Some gaps in the conceptual documents of Georgia's strategic security

| Insights, Security, Georgia

Contributed by former Chief of J-3 Operative Planning Department of the General Staff, Brigadier General Giorgi Surmava.

The state security of Georgia is mainly ensured (should be ensured) on the basis of three documents. These are: The Constitution of Georgia, the Law of Georgia "On the Procedure for Planning and Coordination of National Security Policy" and "The Concept of National Security of Georgia". The rest of the conceptual and executive documents (strategies for areas of activity, plans, orders, etc.) should proceed from the above. This article will focus on the Concept of National Security of Georgia (further in the text - the concept). This document was adopted on December 23, 2011, replacing the document of the same name from 2005.

What can we say about this document in general? – First of all, a concept is not a strategy. It can serve for further elaboration of the strategy, if it specifies the necessary initial parameters for this, which will be discussed below. But Georgia's national security strategy has not been developed. It is true that, in early 2020, the chief of staff of the National Security Council announced that work in this direction would begin. But when? – It is unknown.

As we noted, the concept was adopted in 2011. Over the past eight years, the situation in the World, in the region and in Georgia itself has changed significantly. Without mentioning global and internal changes, following events are enough: the crisis in Ukraine, the crisis in Syria, changes in the Russian - Turkish and American - Turkish relations, which are directly related to the security environment of Georgia.

In 2016, the section of the concept about threats, risks and challenges facing Georgia was updated. But, the content of this document has not been published in open sources. Let's admit, that it fully reflects the changes in the security environment of Georgia, but even in this case, is there really no necessity to change the concept of their actions? And if you need to change something, then how to do it without changing the basic conceptual documents. It is true that, during this period the new Constitution of Georgia and the new Law of Georgia "On the Procedure for Planning and Coordination of National Security Policy" were adopted, but the adoption of these documents was mainly dictated by internal changes and did not reflect any external changes at all, moreover, did not give any instructions on how to react to them.

The concept contains the following sections: 1. Georgia's security environment; 2. national values ​​of Georgia; 3. national interests of Georgia; 4. threats, risks and challenges facing Georgia; 5. main directions of Georgia's security policy.

In the relevant section of the concept, the national values ​​of Georgia are listed in the following order: 1. sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2. freedom; 3. democracy and the rule of law; 4. safety; 5. Prosperity (well-being, welfare); 5. the peace. You can argue about the meaning of these values, how national and relevant they are, and in general, whether they belong to the category of values, but they are listed and formally exist(are) in the document. Although, one can argue, for example, whether territorial integrity is a value.

The section of “The national interests of Georgia” lists as many as fourteen national interests (for comparison, there are only four of them in the US National Security Strategy). These are: 1. ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2. development of state institutions and strengthening of democracy; 3. development of an effective national security system; 4. strengthening of national unity and civil accord; 5. European and Euro-Atlantic integration; 6. ensuring stable and long-term economic growth; 7. ensuring energy security; 8. ensuring regional stability;  9. strengthening the transit function of Georgia; 10. ensuring the environmental(ecological) safety of Georgia and the region; 11. ensuring civil integration, national and cultural identity; 11. strengthening cyber security; 12. ensuring demographic security; 13. relationship with diasporas.

Some of them cause feelings of uncertainty, for example - it is clear that regional stability and environmental security of the region are in the interests of Georgia, but the word “ensuring” is inappropriate here. According to this logic, it was possible to add to this list “ensuring stability in the World”.

A large number of national interests are listed. One gets the impression, that they were recorded using the brainstorming method, that they left the least important ones on the list and missed the more important ones. For example, where can one find here a direct link to welfare, which is a national value?  Yes, it is related to ensuring stable and long-term economic growth, but indirectly. For example, in China everything seems to be fine with the provision of stable and long-term economic growth, but the welfare of the population is very far away. Strange as it may seem, but the welfare was mentioned only in the explanation of national interests about “European and Euro-Atlantic integration” and “ensuring energy security”. A large number and excessive detailing of national interests hinders focusing on the main interests and scatters resources. It was possible to group some national interests in hierarchically subordinate concepts or strategies to focus on them in more detail.

National interests (and national values ​​as well) need to be determined along the chain “personal - group – national”. This is a very painstaking and difficult job. There are many groups (and accordingly, group interests). They are divided according to the following criteria, such as: age, gender, nationality, attitude to religion, social affiliation, area of ​​residence, etc. Several groups can be distinguished for each criteria. All of them have their own specific interests, which are determined by the personal interests of the members of these groups. The interests of some groups do not always coincide with the interests of others and sometimes contradict. For example, ensuring energy security by creating large artificial reservoirs for hydroelectric power plants may contradict the interests of the ecological safety of the region or even the state. Transforming personal interests into group interests and vice versa - group interests into national ones while maintaining a balance between them - is a difficult analytical task. Appropriate personnel and methods are needed to solve it.

We will not touch the section of “Threats, risks and challenges facing Georgia”, as its new edition is not available in open sources.

The section "Main directions of Georgia's security policy" lists main priorities. These are: 1. de-occupation of the occupied territories of Georgia and relations with the Russian Federation; 2. development of state institutions and strengthening of democracy; 3. implementation of the inclusion policy; 4.  development of the defense and security system of Georgia; 5. NATO membership and EU integration; 6. cooperation in the South Caucasus; 7. strengthening of external relations; 8. the fight against international terrorism and transnational organized crime; 9. economic security policy; 10. energy security policy; 11. education policy; 12. social security and health protection policy; 13. cyber security policy; 14. environmental safety policy; 15. protection of cultural heritage; 16. demographic policy;  17. civil integration policy;  18. diaspora relations policy.

 In the text of the first paragraph "de-occupation of the occupied territories of Georgia and relations with the Russian Federation" (among other things, as well as in other paragraphs) there are many general phrases, such as: The Georgian government is called upon, Georgia welcomes, more activity of the international community is needed, Georgia wants, very important for Georgia, etc. There are few specific instructions to the executors of this policy. In general, this section retains the same shortcomings as in the section of national interests - a large number and excessive detailing of topics prevents focusing on the main ones and scatters resources. But, from this section, you can still squeeze out some instructions for the creators of hierarchically lower conceptual documents.

Finally, about what is not in the concept. There are no goals - not immediate, not medium-term, not further. There are no actors who will implement this concept, i.e. - national instruments. Most likely, this means departments, but this is not entirely true. It should be noted that there are a number of departmental strategies (e.q - the Military Strategy), but it is not very clear how these departmental strategies will ensure synergistic interaction between the performers, if there are no common goals, responsibilities are not assigned, methods of interaction are not specified, etc. In this case, the performers will put departmental interests ahead of the general ones, which are not indicated anywhere. This is how it really is. For example, after the 2008 war, the remnants of the Naval Forces were transferred from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (more precisely to the Coast Guard, as part of the Border Police). Ministry of Internal Affairs existing at that time had great influence and wanted more forces and resources. Even today it remains same. Nobody wants to reduce their own share of the budget. The tasks of the Naval Forces and the Coastal Defense are different, therefore, the latter is developing in the direction it needs, meanwhile Georgia - a maritime state, has large gaps in defense.

Summing up, we can list the main shortcomings of the "Concept of National Security of Georgia": The concept is outdated. After its adoption - the situation has changed dramatically in the world, in the region and in Georgia itself. The fact that the section "Threats, risks and challenges facing Georgia" has been updated (and even then, in 2016) does not make much difference without updating the concept itself. If threats have changed, the response to them must be changed.

In the document - the national interests of Georgia are indicated with unnecessary specification (too much details) and without highlighting the most important ones, which makes it difficult to focus on the main tasks.

The document does not define the instruments and elements of national power. This interferes with the definition of responsibility, resources and their rational distribution. The document does not specify short, medium or long-term national goals. Without this, it is impossible to create strategies in areas or directions. Strategic documents are created using a hierarchical ladder. If at the higher level there are no goals for the lower ones that will contribute to the achievement of common goals, there will be no synergistic effect. Some are likely to interfere with others. In support of the document, we can say that this is just a concept, not a strategy. But there are no strategies. The above gaps are not filled in by other documents at the national level. These gaps remain in the national security system of Georgia. Because of this, the state will continue to work in a prompt response to threats, risks and challenges, and not in a planned manner.

Consequently, it is not surprising that the Georgian state is in such position. Internal and external threats, dangers, risks and challenges, such as: violated territorial integrity and occupied territories, strong political and economic influence of external players, tense military-political situation in the region and directly at its borders, imperfect political system, loss of confidence in justice , a weak economy, large-scale unemployment and emigration, polarization of society and loss of faith in the future, unfair distribution of social benefits, inaccessibility of quality education and others, do not let the state sufficient freedom to develop and defend national interests. At the same time, to not have a clear strategy of national security is a greater risk for the existence of a full-fledged state. In this situation, one has to hope for the goodwill of powerful global and regional players. But, as you know, they act to please their national interests. It is good - if they coincide with the national interests of Georgia, if not - no need to guess what preferences will turn out to be.

In a word, figuratively speaking, Georgia is like a small raft in a big ocean, where big and small ships sail. Under water -  various predators are found. The raft has a weak rudder and even worse - the helmsman does not know the destination or where to sail. Two logs are split from the raft, which greatly affects speed and maneuverability. The current goal is to evade the nearest rusty but large ship and shelter (take cover) from it in the shadow of other ships. But even if this maneuver succeeds, what's next? Strategic documents at the national level do not answer this question.

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