Ukraine wants to tap into the differences which exist between Russia and the three South Caucasus countries. The latter will however tread carefully not to make brusque moves which could cause Moscow’s reaction.

Ukraine’s growing engagement with Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia marks an expansion of Kyiv’s diplomacy beyond the immediate Euro-Atlantic arena. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visits to Baku and Yerevan, combined with renewed contacts between Ukrainian Georgian officials, show that Ukraine is increasingly looking into military cooperation and transport connectivity.

Moreover, Ukraine wants to see the South Caucasus as another area where it can pressure Russia. This does not mean Kyiv expects Armenia, Azerbaijan or Georgia to become overtly anti-Russian actors. All three have different threat perceptions, domestic constraints and their dependencies on Moscow vary. In that regard, Zelenskyy’s visit to Baku was important because Azerbaijan is one of the few post-Soviet states that has demonstrated both military autonomy and strategic patience in dealing with Russia. Baku has maintained working relations with Moscow, but it has also shown that it can act independently when core interests are at stake. But it is not only about Russia. In fact, for Ukraine, Azerbaijan is attractive because of its energy resources, multi-vector foreign policy and Baku’s willingness to buy into Ukraine’s drone capacities.

Indeed, security cooperation sits at the center of this relationship. Ukraine has accumulated battlefield experience in drone warfare, air defense improvisation, electronic warfare and protection of critical infrastructure. Azerbaijan, in turn, has its own experience from the second Karabakh war, including the integration of drones, precision systems and military-industrial partnerships. The two countries’ discussions on defense cooperation and joint production point to a new phase in their bilateral relations.

Energy is the second pillar of the Ukraine-Azerbaijan relationship. Azerbaijan’s support to Ukraine’s damaged energy infrastructure reinforces the idea that Caspian energy actors can contribute to European energy resilience. Cooperation with Azerbaijan strengthens the EU’s argument that the Black Sea-Caspian corridor should be treated as part of Europe’s strategic security architecture.

The Armenia track is more symbolic but potentially more transformative. Zelenskyy’s visit to Yerevan was important because Armenia had long been viewed as Russia’s closest security partner in the South Caucasus. Yet the decline of Russian credibility after the 2020 war, the 2023 fleeing of Armenians from Karabakh, and Moscow’s unwillingness or inability to protect Armenian interests have created a deep strategic reassessment in Yerevan. Ukraine’s engagement with Armenia takes place precisely at this moment of reorientation. For Kyiv, Armenia’s foreign policy is evidence that Russia’s alliance system is no longer reliable even for states that once depended on it. Armenia remains a delicate partner for Ukraine. Yerevan still has economic, energy, social and security linkages that Moscow can exploit. Russia also retains influence through media networks, business structures, diaspora channels and opposition forces. Ukraine understands these limits and does not expect a major jupture in Yerevan-Moscow ties.

Georgia is the most complicated aspect in Ukraine’s South Caucasus policy. Unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia has traditionally had a strong record of pro-Ukrainian public sentiment especially given its own experience of Russian occupation of two Georgian territories. Yet official relations between Kyiv and Tbilisi deteriorated sharply after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Georgia’s cautious and pragmatic approach toward Moscow surprisingly complicated the ties between Kyiv and Tbilisi. Despite this, both sides now see the need to reopen channels.

Ukraine’s activism in the South Caucasus takes place amid the United States’ and the European Union’s efforts to reinsert themselves into the South Caucasus through connectivity, peace mediation, and energy diversification. The planned TRIPP and the intensity of political contacts between Washington and the three South Caucasus countries signal a renewed interest in the region. Kyiv wants greater bilateral cooperation, European efforts to develop connectivity, and security diversification in the South Caucasus. 

Yet, Ukraine’s South Caucasus strategy also faces constraints. None of the three South Caucasus countries will fully follow deep cooperation model with Ukraine given Russia’s still big military and economic influence over the region. Moreover, despite Ukraine’s recent military successes on the battlefield against Russia, it is still far from clear how the war will end. Though Russia’s military weakening is achievable, its Russia’s total defeat is for the moment an improbable scenario. All three South Caucasus countries do not want to take sides in the ongoing war in Ukraine. But they will nevertheless apply a transactional approach meaning that they will be increasingly selective when it comes to the cooperation with Kyiv. Priorities will be given to to some parts of military and political cooperation with Ukraine but it will fall short of making brusque moves on international arena.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.