The negotiations held in Baku on June 2-3 underscored that the relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union are moving out of the tense period that followed the 2023 fall of Nagorno-Karabakh. The two sides provisionally concluded the text of their Partnership Priorities for 2026-2030 and formally resumed negotiations on a new comprehensive bilateral agreement intended to replace the legal framework that has governed relations since 1999.

The talks demonstrate that both sides have decided to concentrate on areas in which their strategic interests increasingly converge: energy security, the Middle Corridor, regional connectivity, trade, investment and the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. This emerging relationship is unlikely to resemble the EU’s association frameworks with Georgia, Moldova or Ukraine given that Azerbaijan is not seeking EU membership or extensive political alignment with Brussels. Baku instead wants recognition as an influential Eurasian actor. The EU, for its part, has concluded that it cannot pursue its energy, connectivity and South Caucasus objectives without a functioning partnership with Azerbaijan. The result is a more transactional but potentially more durable relationship built around strategic interdependence.

The institutional relationship between Baku and the executive bodies of the EU began recovering in 2025. EU High Representative Kaja Kallas visited Baku in April 2025 and announced that negotiations on the bilateral agreement would resume. Technical negotiations followed, while both sides began preparing new Partnership Priorities. The process accelerated in March 2026, when European Council President António Costa visited Baku. Costa and President Ilham Aliyev issued a detailed joint statement describing Azerbaijan as a strategically important EU partner and committing both sides to the rapid completion of the comprehensive agreement. They also endorsed cooperation in energy, security, transport, digitalization, investment and regional connectivity.

Against this background, the June 2–3 negotiations were a continuation of a broader political reset. The parties provisionally agreed on the text of the Partnership Priorities and reviewed individual sections of the comprehensive agreement. The distinction between the two documents is important. The Partnership Priorities for 2026–2030 will serve as a political roadmap defining the sectors in which cooperation should concentrate over the next four years. The comprehensive agreement, by contrast, is intended to establish a more durable legal and institutional framework. Provisional agreement on the priorities can therefore produce practical cooperation even if negotiations over the legally binding agreement take longer. Baku wants the new agreement to support economic diversification by attracting European investment into renewable energy, transportation, petrochemicals, agriculture, digital services and industrial production. Brussels is interested in improved transparency, more predictable commercial rules, stronger protection for investors and gradual approximation to European technical standards.

Energy security is the most immediate reason for the EU’s renewed engagement. Brussels is implementing a phaseout of Russian gas, with Russian liquefied natural gas imports due to end by the end of 2026 and pipeline gas imports by November 2027. Although Azerbaijan cannot replace Russian supplies in volume, it has become increasingly important for Southern and Central European countries seeking diversified gas imports. Indeed, Azerbaijan exported approximately 12.8 billion cubic metres of gas to Europe in 2025. In early 2026, SOCAR began deliveries to Germany and Austria, expanding the European reach of Azerbaijani gas. Europe now receives roughly half of Azerbaijan’s total gas exports, while Azerbaijan accounts for approximately 4 percent of the EU’s gas demand.

The 2022 EU–Azerbaijan energy memorandum envisaged raising Azerbaijani gas deliveries to Europe to at least 20 billion cubic metres annually by 2027. That target has become increasingly difficult to achieve. Production growth has been slower than originally expected, while expanding the capacity of the Trans-Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic pipelines requires substantial investment. Baku has also criticized European financial institutions for restricting fossil-fuel financing and European companies for being reluctant to sign the long-term purchase agreements required to support new production.

The comprehensive agreement could help create greater predictability for energy investment, but it cannot by itself resolve the underlying commercial problem. The EU wants additional gas during the transition away from Russia while simultaneously reducing fossil-fuel consumption under its climate strategy. Azerbaijan wants long-term contracts and European financing before committing capital to additional fields and pipeline expansion. Energy cooperation will therefore continue, but the original 2027 target may be postponed or reinterpreted.

At the same time, the relationship is expanding beyond hydrocarbons. Azerbaijan is developing large-scale solar and wind projects and wants to export electricity to Europe through a proposed Black Sea green-energy corridor involving Georgia, Romania and Hungary. Offshore wind in the Caspian, electricity interconnectors and regional energy networks are becoming an increasingly important part of the bilateral agenda. Greater domestic renewable generation would also allow Azerbaijan to release more natural gas for export.

Connectivity has become the second major pillar of the relationship. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and instability around routes passing through Iran have increased European interest in the Trans-Caspian or Middle Corridor. The route connects Central Asia with Europe through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Türkiye and the Black Sea. Azerbaijan occupies an important place in this system. Cargo arriving from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan must pass through the Port of Baku and then move westward by rail and road. The modernization of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, expansion of the Alat port, construction of new logistics facilities and digitalization of customs procedures are consequently matters of direct European interest.

The EU is also considering support for the modernization of the railway network in Nakhchivan and its connection to the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity through Armenia. If implemented, this infrastructure could link mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan and Türkiye while creating new commercial links involving Armenia. Brussels views such projects as instruments for making the peace process economically self-sustaining.

No wonder that when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited Baku on July 1, she proposed an EU-Azerbaijan Connectivity Partnership and a High-Level Connectivity Dialogue covering transport, energy and digital infrastructure. She also announced up to €200 million in EU grants for South Caucasus connectivity, intended to mobilize as much as €2 billion in public and private investment.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of silk roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.