The normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, long characterized by closed borders and unresolved bilateral disputes, remains one of the central issues shaping security and regional cooperation in the South Caucasus. Far from being merely a bilateral matter, it has become an important component of the broader global geopolitical landscape. 

Armenia and Turkey do not maintain diplomatic relations, and the border between the two countries has remained closed since 1993 at Ankara's initiative. Relations between Armenia and Turkey remain deeply influenced by a range of historical and political factors, most notably Ankara's unwavering support for Azerbaijan's position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the fundamental disagreements surrounding the recognition of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire and its historical-political interpretation. The current normalization process between Armenia and Turkey began in 2021. In December of that year, the two countries appointed special representatives to negotiate the normalization of their bilateral relations. To date, the special representatives have held four rounds of negotiations. The first meeting was held in Moscow, followed by three subsequent rounds in Vienna. 

At present, freight transportation between Armenia and Turkey is carried out primarily via Georgia. According to 2022 data, Turkey exported 3.1 tonnes of cargo to Armenia by air, while 24,903.8 tonnes were transported by road through Georgia. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of Turkish exports to Armenia—99.9%—were shipped via the overland route through Georgia, whereas only 0.01% were delivered by air. Should the border reopen, cargo transport between Armenia and Turkey could be conducted via three border crossing points: Akhurik (Shirak Province), Margara (Armavir Province), and Hushakert (Armavir Province). However, it is not yet known which of these crossings will be put into operation. The final route configuration will become clear only after the relevant transport corridors have been agreed upon and the border has been officially opened. 

Moreover, no final assessment of the potential economic benefits of reopening the border is yet available, as the relevant studies are still ongoing. 

Meanwhile, the Armenian expert community views the reopening of the Armenian-Turkish border as presenting both significant opportunities and substantial risks. According to the assessments of various economists, reopening the border could substantially reduce transportation costs, stimulate transit trade, and create access to new markets for Armenian businesses. However, it could also expose domestic producers—especially those in the agricultural sector—to intensified competition from lower-priced, mass-produced Turkish imports.

To assess whether Armenia's economy is ready for the reopening of the land border with Turkey at the current stage, Caucasus Watch interviewed a number of experts.

Hrant Mikaelyan’s Assessment: Armenia’s Economic Vulnerabilities and the Geopolitics of TRIPP

Economist and political scientist Hrant Mikaelyan expressed skepticism about Armenian producers’ ability to enter the Turkish market, pointing to Armenia’s limited export performance in Iran. He noted that despite the EAEU–Iran Free Trade Agreement, exports remain largely unchanged, with electricity accounting for 84% of the total. According to Mikaelyan, Armenia lacks the production capacity, market networks, and business partnerships needed to expand exports.

Regarding Turkey, Mikaelyan argues that Armenia must address two key issues ahead of a possible border reopening: protecting the domestic market and developing a competitive export strategy by studying the Turkish market and building producer networks. However, little progress has been made in these areas, with attention focused mainly on logistics. According to the political scientist, Armenia currently lacks the necessary competitive capacities, and without investing in production, adaptation to new markets, and meeting different standards, economic benefits from new partnerships will remain limited.

Addressing the economic impact of border reopening, Hrant Mikaelyan argues that lower logistics costs alone would reduce prices by only 2–3%. He stresses the need to assess which products Turkish imports could replace and whether Armenia is prepared for market competition. According to him, Armenia has made progress mainly in logistics, while broader efforts to improve competitiveness and economic readiness remain insufficient.

According to Hrant Mikaelyan, the reopening of the Armenian-Turkish border may also have implications for trade flows along the Armenia–Georgia route. Nevertheless, he believes that existing bilateral trade relations will largely remain intact, since Georgia’s position would not fundamentally change: At the same time, Mikaelyan emphasizes that Georgia is not in a position to compete with Turkey in sectors such as light industry, where Turkish producers already have a much stronger position.

While discussing the political dimension of Armenia–Turkey normalization, Hrant Mikaelyan argues that recognition of the Armenian Genocide has never been a formal precondition for Armenia in the process and has remained largely within the sphere of public discourse. He notes that Armenian authorities have made concessions by removing the issue from the political agenda, meaning that if Turkey considers it a precondition, this demand has effectively been addressed.

Regarding Azerbaijan, Hrant Mikaelyan notes that the main obstacle to border reopening is not Baku itself, but Turkey’s broader strategic interests in the South Caucasus. He believes Azerbaijan seeks influence over the process due to its close dependence on Ankara, while Turkey aims to strengthen its regional role. According to Mikaelyan, Armenia has already completed the necessary preparations, and the remaining barriers stem from Turkey’s geopolitical calculations rather than the Armenian side.

In Mikaelyan’s assessment, the TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) project has a significant impact on the Armenian-Turkish border normalization process. He explains that the idea of the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” was initially promoted by Turkey during early 20th-century negotiations but was not included in the 1921 Treaty of Kars. The issue resurfaced after Armenia’s independence and gained renewed attention following the 2020 war, when Azerbaijan actively advanced the concept.

Mikaelyan maintains that Baku initially sought Russia’s involvement, with Moscow later attempting to pressure Armenia over the corridor proposal. However, he argues that Russia mainly acted as an intermediary for Azerbaijan and Turkey, while its role declined after U.S. involvement increased.

“It is clear that Turkey and Azerbaijan would prefer the United States not to be involved in this process, which explains their current reservations. The United States has significantly modified the concept of the so-called ‘Zangezur Corridor’ by introducing restrictions on Turkey and Azerbaijan. Within this framework, Turkey and Azerbaijan view the TRIPP project as a way to secure unhindered transit or a regime with minimal obstacles and inspections. This is a crucial issue for Turkey. Ankara sees border reopening as possible only if TRIPP is implemented and operational, or once all necessary arrangements are in place and the process becomes irreversible,” concludes Hrant Mikaelyan.

Between Economic Pragmatism and Political Constraints: Armenia–Turkey Normalization Through Nelly Minasyan’s Perspective

Our other interlocutor, Turkologist, PhD, Associate Professor Nelly Minasyan, believes that any process—including the reopening of the Armenian-Turkish border—inevitably entails both certain opportunities and potential risks and challenges, especially given the nature of the political relations between the two states.

“In my view, the agricultural sector would be the most vulnerable area for Armenia, as Turkey itself faces challenges related to agricultural exports. As a small country, Armenia is unlikely to gain major opportunities from the Turkish market alone. The main benefits should be viewed in terms of broader integration with external markets, particularly through improved transport and logistics connectivity. At the same time, the challenges will depend largely on the policies and mechanisms Armenia develops as a state.”

Like our previous interviewee, Nelly Minasyan notes that Armenia was not the party that closed the border. She argues that, amid current geopolitical changes, closed borders are increasingly inconsistent with 21st-century realities, with the main obstacle being political decision-making. 

“The historical context, particularly Armenia–Azerbaijan relations, is used by Turkey as a pretext to delay normalization. However, Armenia is not putting forward any demands or preconditions, and Turkey needs to make a political decision,” she argues. Minasyan notes that Armenian governments have consistently expressed readiness for normalization, while using historical issues as barriers to relations is no longer realistic.

 “The Azerbaijani factor continues to influence the process, but I would place greater emphasis on the broader geopolitical dimension. Armenian-Turkish relations have always been shaped by geopolitical considerations, and Turkey needs to reconsider its policy toward Armenia. Without such a political decision, normalization cannot realistically move forward,” Minasyan concludes.

Turkologist Minasyan believes that economic cooperation provides the most pragmatic foundation for Armenia–Turkey normalization. In her view, a mutually beneficial project such as TRIPP could serve as a key driver of bilateral relations. 

“TRIPP has the potential to reshape the geopolitical and geo-economic landscape of the South Caucasus and beyond. Turkey has a strong interest in the project, as becoming a transit hub and strengthening its role as a bridge between China and Europe are central to its strategic vision. As part of the Middle Corridor, TRIPP also creates opportunities for Turkey to expand its economic and geopolitical engagement in the region. Therefore, I believe TRIPP is the pragmatic factor that will influence Turkey’s policy.”

Nelli Minasyan does not believe that the opening of the Turkey–Armenia border would alter Turkey–Iran relations, arguing that they operate on an entirely different level and are shaped by a different set of strategic considerations.

“Neither Turkey nor Iran places Armenia at the center of their bilateral relationship. Their ties are characterized by both competition and strategic rivalry. However, there is one issue—just as there has been over previous decades—on which their interests can converge, causing other differences to recede into the background: the Kurdish factor. Just a few days ago, we heard the Iranian Foreign Minister state in an interview that Turkey had provided support to prevent Kurdish groups from entering Iranian territory. Similar reports have continued to circulate in recent days. Therefore, I believe that, on the contrary, Turkey is supporting Iran on certain issues and will continue to do so in the context of future developments. The TRIPP is viewed primarily in the context of cooperation with the United States, which is, naturally, one of Turkey’s foremost strategic priorities—to maintain the strongest possible relations with the U.S. and elevate them to a higher level,” Nelli Minasyan concludes.

Anna Pakhlyan: Border Opening Requires Economic Adaptation and Strategic Balance

Ph.D. in Economics, Associate Professor, and Senior Researcher at the AMBERD Research Center, Anna Pakhlyan, believes that if the opening of the land border with Turkey is viewed solely in terms of direct Armenian–Turkish trade—without the involvement of intermediary countries—a substantial share of Armenia’s domestic producers, particularly agricultural producers, would most likely be unable to withstand competition from lower-priced imports of Turkish origin. She notes:

“At the same time, Armenia remains effectively deprived of the opportunity to conduct foreign trade with Turkey under the rules of the international trading system. The reason is that, since 2002, Turkey has maintained a reservation regarding the application of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules to Armenia and, apparently, has no intention of lifting it. This means that Turkey is free to apply any customs tariff policy it chooses to Armenian exports, unilaterally impose high tariffs and trade restrictions, and modify them at its discretion, without any obligation to uphold the WTO's principles of non-discrimination and transparency in its trade relations with Armenia. Nevertheless, Armenia would undoubtedly be prepared to take advantage of the opportunity to transport goods through Turkish territory in a more affordable and competitive manner, should such an opportunity become available.”

Anna Pakhlyan believes that the reopening of the Armenian–Turkish border presents both risks and opportunities for Armenia’s economy.

“Compared to Armenia, Turkey’s significantly larger scale of production and its state policy of targeted subsidies for the agricultural sector enable it to achieve higher competitiveness in a number of commodity markets. Studies show that for almost all categories of goods exported from Armenia to various countries (including agricultural products, textile industry goods, construction materials, and others), Turkey produces and exports similar products at more affordable prices. Naturally, under such initial conditions, it would be unrealistic to expect that even with the opening of the land border, Armenia would gain significant opportunities to expand its exports to Turkey”.

At the same time, Anna Pakhlyan emphasizes that the most tangible and significant positive impact expected from the opening of the Armenian–Turkish land border would come from savings in transportation and logistics costs. “For landlocked Armenia, ensuring competitive freight transportation to external, and particularly European, markets through access to the land and maritime infrastructure of neighboring countries is of crucial importance”, she is assured..

The economist is also convinced that the opening of the Armenian–Turkish border would indeed reduce freight traffic with Georgia, given that a significant share of Armenian–Georgian trade is, in reality, indirect trade between Armenia and Turkey conducted through intermediaries.

“For example, in 2025 alone, goods worth approximately USD 773.8 million were imported into Armenia from Georgia. Of this amount, only 19% (USD 146.2 million) consisted of goods of Georgian origin, while the remainder were products exported from Georgia but manufactured in other countries.

If Turkey unblocks Armenia and provides access to its transport and logistics infrastructure, Georgia’s transit monopoly role for Armenia will also be significantly reduced. As a result, the costs associated with the transit servicing of Armenian cargo will decrease as well”.

Addressing the political dimension of Armenian–Turkish relations and the existing obstacles to their normalization, Anna Pakhlyan believes that the issue of the Armenian Genocide is perhaps the most sensitive aspect of bilateral relations. However, even this has not prevented the continued growth of imports of Turkish-origin goods into Armenia despite the closed-border situation.

“Although the political obstacles to the opening of the Armenian–Turkish border have evolved over time, the key preconditions put forward by Turkey have also changed. While Ankara previously emphasized the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Armenia’s recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity as major conditions, these issues have now largely lost their relevance, and the focus has shifted to the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This list of conditions can continue to change and expand indefinitely as long as there is no genuine political will to open the border.”

Anna Pakhlyan notes that while the reopening of the Armenian–Turkish border could, from an economic perspective, contribute to the diversification of Armenia’s foreign trade, enhance its transit potential, and promote regional integration, from a geopolitical perspective it also entails a number of challenges. These include the growing strategic importance of Syunik, the strengthening of the Turkey–Azerbaijan axis, Iran’s security concerns, and the intensification of competition among major powers.

Pakhlyan argues that, within the framework of the TRIPP initiative and the broader development of regional connectivity, the opening of the border would enable Turkey to establish a direct land connection with Azerbaijan and, potentially in the future, with the Turkic-speaking states of Central Asia. In this way, Turkey would further consolidate its “Middle Corridor” strategy and enhance its influence in the South Caucasus.

At the same time, Anna Pakhlyan warns that Armenia faces the risk of becoming merely a transit corridor rather than a genuine regional hub unless it is able to effectively manage and derive economic benefits from the new flows that will emerge.

“Therefore, Armenia’s main objective should be to transform the unblocking process into a multi-vector economic opportunity while maintaining sovereign control over its communication routes and balancing the interests of Turkey, Iran, Russia, the United States, and the EU,” the economist argues.

Contributed by Anna Vardanyan, an Armenian political journalist and researcher with over 18 years’ experience in defence policy, international relations, and security in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, has worked for Armenian media and held advisory roles in the National Assembly of Armenia.