On June 12, Grigol Liluashvili, the Head of Georgia’s State Security Service, delivered the agency’s annual report to Parliament.

During his presentation, Liluashvili stated that in 2023, various internal and external factors attempted to destabilize the political situation in Georgia and prepare for a potentially violent change of government. He claimed that foreign intelligence services were particularly interested in the ratings of political parties in Georgia and their chances of winning the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2024. One of the primary objectives of unnamed foreign intelligence services, he argued, was to gain influence among Georgia's ethnic and religious minorities for 'destructive' purposes.

Liluashvili also noted that the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG) continued to provide counter-intelligence services to Georgia’s defense forces and law enforcement agencies, which were of significant interest to foreign intelligence. He highlighted the SSSG’s efforts to prevent foreign intelligence activities in economic processes, mentioning the growing interest from foreign groups regarding new transport routes amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.

Expressing concerns about Russia's intentions to construct a naval base in occupied Abkhazia, Liluashvili suggested that such a facility would provide Russia with additional leverage for military-strategic control over the Black Sea region. However, he noted that deploying and operating large warships in occupied Ochamchire was currently improbable due to limited water area and challenging infrastructure conditions. He emphasized that no significant infrastructure developments occurred during the reporting period in the occupied Ochamchire port and its surrounding area.

In this context, Liluashvili mentioned the Russian occupation regime's decision on the 'comprehensive reconstruction' of the Sokhumi airport. According to him, Georgia viewed this decision as part of an annexation policy, which would give the Kremlin additional leverage to strengthen its economic and political positioning in the region.

Regarding Russia’s war in Ukraine, Liluashvili noted that the population of Georgia's occupied territories was actively used in the Russian aggression. He stated, "The facts of assistance in various forms from the occupied regions of Georgia to the annexed regions of Ukraine and the visits of the representatives of the occupation regime were recorded."

Addressing the illegal transfer of the occupied Bichvinta Dacha to the Russian Federation, Liluashvili noted that this was "of principal importance" to the Kremlin. He recalled the local Abkhazian protests against the transfer, emphasizing that "by ending the mentioned process in favor of Russia, Moscow has demonstrated that any protest against its will and interests in the occupied territories is futile."

Additionally, he mentioned the narrative spread by the occupation regime in occupied Abkhazia that canceling the transfer of Bichvinta would damage relations between the Kremlin and the occupied region and serve the interests of the Georgian government. 

Liluashvili also reacted to the 2023 information that the de facto representatives of occupied Abkhazia were allegedly ready to restore the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM). He noted that no real steps had been taken by the de facto authorities.