Introduction

The modern stage of Azerbaijan-Syria relations dates back to the rule of the Soviet Union in Azerbaijan, when Hafiz Asad, the head of Syria, had consistent meetings and sophisticated bilateral relations with Heydar Aliyev, then-head of the Azerbaijani SSR and afterwards the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and it was followed by the diplomatic visits by both leaders in 1972 and 1984. After independence, the father Asad continued to collaborate with the Azerbaijani leader, and he was informed about the recent situation in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh; however, the head of the Middle East country avoided taking sides in the war afterwards during the negotiation, building a delicate balance in regard to both parties. 

Interestingly, several media sources close to the Azerbaijani government and citing officials highlighted the presence of the Armenian terrorist groups in Syria and training grounds for them, claiming that they were sent to Armenia in the 1980-1990s to participate in the war against Azerbaijan. When son-Assad came to power in 2000, the very state of the bilateral relations and Syria's position in the Karabakh conflict did not change; Azerbaijan opened an embassy in the Levantine country; nonetheless, the country was not involved in any platform for the peaceful resettlement of the conflict and made no signal to take any side.

In 2009, Bashar Asad himself tried to strengthen and broaden relations with official Baku, and following the normalisation process by recognising Turkey's borders, including Hatay, he visited Azerbaijan and held negotiations about gas supplies from the resource-rich Caucasian country, yet these efforts were unsuccessful. After the agreement with Moscow, the protectorate of the Assad regime in Syria regarding the Tartus naval base, his aggressive vision of the Arab Spring-inspired protests, and subsequently territorial disputes with Turkey paved the way for the commencement of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and the closure of the Azerbaijani embassy in the Arabic republic the following year.

Another factor was the spillover effect of the Syrian civil war on Azerbaijan, where 65% of the population follows Shia schools, while there is also a significant number of Sunni followers despite the population's overall secularity. This split the country in two when it came to the conflict, and some followers of radical Islam went to Syria to fight as "Defenders of the Shrine," a term used in Iran to describe people who fight to protect Syria Shi'a shrines from radical Sunni groups. They were fighting on both sides, which created the risk of breaking down religious unity in the country. According to several statistics, nearly 20 citizens of the country died in the Syrian civil war, while 200 were still fighting alongside both government and opposition forces.

Second Karabakh War: Peak of Discontent in Bilateral Relations

Despite all the above-mentioned factors, Azerbaijan-Syria relations were stable, with Baku taking a cautious stance with regard to the development of bilateral relations. However, starting in 2015 and peaking in 2020, Assad started to shift the neutral stance to support Armenia, albeit not openly for some time, in the Karabakh conflict and strengthen its relations with the Christian country. One of the factors for this turn with regard to its policy in the South Caucasus would be Iran's pressure on the Assad government, as this period witnessed the deterioration of Iranian relations with Azerbaijan and Tehran's strategic coordination of goals with Russia. Notably, under the pretence of humanitarian help for Syria, and coordinated with Russia, the Armenian government gave Damascus military support by sending a "military-humanitarian" mission to the country; nonetheless, the Armenian authorities claimed several times they had no intention to participate in the conflict militarily and mission has nothing to do with the military support. A resolution acknowledging the Armenian genocide was adopted by the Bashar al-Assad government in February 2020 in exchange. Azerbaijani and Turkish officials believe that the majority of the members of the terrorist group Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), were also Syrian Armenians, and they were strengthened in particular by the Assad government. Baku closely monitored all these developments, which further inflamed discontent among the Azerbaijani elites.

However, it was still not at its peak.

In 2020, when the war over the Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding districts erupted, Syria, unexpectedly in Western elites, but expectedly in Azerbaijan, openly supported Armenia. After the further deterioration of bilateral relations with Erdoğan's Turkish government, Bashar Assad noted that it was Turkey that started the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. "He [Erdogan] supports terrorists in Libya, (and) he was the main instigator and initiator of the recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia," Assad said. The Syrian leader confirmed the earlier remarks by Emmanuel Macron, the French president, first accusing Turkey of sending Syrian jihadists to fight in Karabakh, a claim that Baku and Ankara have refuted while claiming vice versa that it is Armenians who utilise Kurdish fighters sent from the Middle Eastern countries to fight against Azerbaijan.

Government-sponsored media in Azerbaijan reported that there are undeniable facts, albeit not presenting any proof, about the transportation of weapons from Syria to Armenia in both the First and Second Karabakh Wars. In September and October, Syrian mercenaries were sent from the Russian-controlled Khmeimim air base in the country's Latakia province to fight alongside Armenians in the war against Azerbaijan. According to Azerbaijani sources, in addition, dozens of flights of Armenians of Syrian origin from the airports of the Lebanese capital Beirut, and the Syrian capital Damascus to Armenia were confirmed, and the first two groups were sent to Armenia on October 21. According to a claim from the Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) group, Russia recruited hundreds of Syrians to fight with the Armenians against Azerbaijan with the assistance of the Bashar al-Assad regime. Nonetheless, several media outlets claimed the same stating that the Azerbaijani government used the mercenaries from the region, especially Syria to fight against Armenians. 

All of these contradictions Syria's open support of Armenia in the 44-day War, the strong bilateral relations between Armenia and the Arab Republic, Assad's closeness with the Kremlin, and its unfriendly stance in its relations with Turkey made Azerbaijan put Syria in line with the Armenia-Russia-Iran axis and further merge its strategic look into the region with Turkey. It is not surprising that Azerbaijan unconditionally supported the Turkish aggressive offence on the northern border with Syria and accused the Arabic Republic of aggravating the situation in the region. 

New Phase and Regional Impacts: The  Fall of the  Assad Regime

At the beginning of December, the Assad regime fell after the offensive by Turkish-backed opposition forces, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), making the northern neighbour the main actor and decision-maker in the country afterwards. After the ousting of the former regime, Azerbaijan was one of the first countries to hold contacts with Syria, where Erdoğan and Aliyev congratulated each other on the recent developments in the region and discussed further normalisation of the situation in the country. Following the meeting, the Azerbaijani officials openly expressed their previously suppressed discontent.

Hikmet Hajiyev, the Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan and Head of the Foreign Policy Department of the Presidential Administration, pointed out that the former Syrian regime caused significant issues for Azerbaijan in numerous international organisations, spoke without reservation about matters pertaining to Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, and even had its representatives make statements in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation that went against the Islamic Solidarity principle. After the first contacts with support and coordination from the Turkish side, the Azerbaijani officials visited Syria several times and expressed their intention to help the new regime to rebuild the country and send humanitarian aid.

Reversing their stance on Syria's involvement in the Karabakh conflict, the new regime clearly repositioned itself in the country, expressing support for Azerbaijan in conflict resolution and praising Aliyev's leadership in upholding the territorial integrity of the Caucasian country. This marked the end of the phase where Syria had sided with Armenia against Azerbaijan. 

What is important here is that one cannot consider Azerbaijan's involvement in Syria without coordination with their Turkish allies, as the country does not have enough resources and interest to act independently in the region. All of Azerbaijan's actions and contacts with the new government in Syria      are bandwagoning the Turkish stance on the issue. Therefore, the country's intention to help rebuild the society and infrastructure in Syria should not be analysed separately but rather in the context of its relations with its western neighbour. Moreover, the direct participation of Azerbaijan in this geopolitical confrontation among Israel, Turkey, and other leading countries of the region is undesirable. Therefore, Azerbaijan should act jointly and in coordination with Turkey on the Syrian issue. This is also necessary for the two nations' partnership. First and foremost for Turkey, and later for the entire region, it is crucial to maintain peace, security, and tranquillity in Syria.

However, there are also independent geopolitical and political implications that Azerbaijan would take advantage of. Following the overthrow of the Assad regime, Iran's standing in the region has considerably deteriorated. Iran had previously been actively helping Bashar al-Assad with Russia. The loss of Syria and the deterioration of Tehran's standing in the region were caused by the recent rise of Turkish-backed forces and the withdrawal of Iranian and Russian forces from strategic locations in Syria. In a subtle attack on Turkey, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei charged that an unidentified "neighbouring country" was plotting with Israel and the United States to overthrow the Assad government.

As the foreign policy of Azerbaijan and Turkey integrates with each other, it is also a negative signal expressing Iran's discontent with Azerbaijan, as the latter continues to develop its relations with the new government that Iran refuses to cooperate with. Armenia also may face difficulties as a result of Iran's waning dominance in the area, particularly given the current controversy over the so-called Zangezur corridor, making it vulnerable to the pressures from Azerbaijan. Iran has already indicated that it may make compromises by agreeing to hold discussions with Turkey on this matter.

However, this line of development does not mean the complete destruction of relations between the Syrian and Armenian governments, as the former hosts a considerable Armenian ethnic community, which has played a major role in the country's development and participated in local governance throughout history. On January 27, Vahan Kostanyan, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, met with Asaad al-Shaybani, reiterating Armenia’s readiness to provide humanitarian aid and support the implementation of reforms. Turkish influence does not completely undermine bilateral relations between the two countries but rather limits them to social, economic, and cultural collaboration.

What Azerbaijan Can/Cannot Do?

As mentioned above, Syria was one of the few countries in the Middle East to make plans to cooperate with Azerbaijan in terms of energy resources. If implemented, Syria should have received 1 to 1.5 billion cubic meters of gas from Azerbaijan. One of the key pipelines that makes it easier to purchase Azerbaijani natural gas is the TAP pipeline, which exports gas from Azerbaijan and passes via Georgia and Turkey. In this instance, Syria will benefit by providing its people with inexpensive energy and advancing its economy, and strengthening energy links may result in long-term agreements between the two nations. Additionally, this will provide Azerbaijan a chance to boost its income and influence in the area.

Furthermore, Turkish businesses like TPAO and BOTAŞ are well-positioned to lead Syria's future oil and gas production and development, and Turkish power firms are probably going to have a significant impact on the country's electrical industry. Fuel supplies are among the substantial help that Azerbaijan has previously given to Syria. Owing to its strong ties with Turkey, Azerbaijan is probably going to collaborate with the Turkish government and energy firms in Syria to provide and develop energy. Recently, Elchin Ibadov, the CEO of SOCAR Türkiye, said that when the Azerbaijani government makes a final decision on the matter, the business might begin delivering power and natural gas to Syria. SOCAR's involvement in emerging areas like Deir ez-Zor province's Al-Kashma might provide the framework for strong commercial ties between the two countries. SOCAR may also help rebuild processing plants, increasing Syria's output and export potential. 

Additionally, Azerbaijan, albeit not the same but similarly, experienced the devastation before and after the Second Karabakh War in its Karabakh region. Many Azerbaijani construction enterprises are currently active in the Karabakh, and these businesses are able to participate in building projects in Syria and reconstruction initiatives, including the restoration of roads, oil and gas pipelines, and infrastructure. The Azerbaijani president and other officials have expressed this intention and plans on several occasions.

One of the important factors connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey with  Syria is the presence of Turkmens living in this country. Another opportunity for Azerbaijan would be building cultural, political, and economic relations with the Syrian Turkmens, with whom Azerbaijanis have historical ties. It is no surprise that Hikmat Babaoglu, one of the prominent and influential members of the ruling regime, noted that Syria is the "cultural motherland" for Azerbaijanis and that one of Azerbaijan's primary steps should include defining new ideological policies concerning the region, citing Aleppo as a continuation of Azerbaijanis' ethno-cultural and religious geography. Therefore, another opportunity for Azerbaijan would be to build cultural, political, and economic relations with the Syrian Turkmens, with whom Azerbaijanis have historical ties.

Turkey has consistently used the Turkmen minority in the country to build a network against the Assad regime and establish a new type of soft power within its southern neighbour. Turkmen are considered the second largest ethnic group in Syria and played a significant role in the collapse of the Assad regime. They have been subjected to serious pressure from the Assad regime and forces supported by Iran, and they have also fought against attacks by armed groups such as ISIS and PYD/YPG. 
Azerbaijan would take the Turkmen factor into account in its future Syrian policy and become one of its main patrons alongside Turkey. This approach could be a strategic step to increase Azerbaijan's soft power factor in the region. Azerbaijan's participation in the reconstruction of the regions inhabited by Turkmen would both strengthen its geopolitical position and deepen unity and solidarity among Turkic-speaking peoples. Paying special attention to the reconstruction of Turkmen regions could increase Azerbaijan's influence in the international arena, making it one of the main guarantors of stability in the region. Notably, several MPs and opposition members already voiced their support for engaging with the Turkic-speaking people in Syria; however, it is not probable that it will evolve into the official policy of the government.      

Azerbaijan alone does not have enough resources, regional expertise, and networks to implement all these ideas, and therefore, it has to coordinate these steps with the Turkish government. Moreover, Azerbaijan's involvement in establishing and strengthening relations with Syrian Turkmens and building soft power in the region would drag the country into future possible conflicts in the Middle East, which official Baku has been trying to avoid since its independence. Last but not least, these attempts may also lead to discontent among the elites of the new regime in Syria, considering that HTS is trying to minimise foreign pressure in the country and destabilisation of Syria's ethnic minorities and misuse of them as a soft power. 

Additionally, Azerbaijan also played a major role in the mediation efforts between Turkey and Israel after the recent developments in Syria. Following a day of turmoil in Syria, Hikmet Hajiyev urgently traveled to Israel, where he held several high-level meetings with Jewish leaders, including Israel's Foreign Minister, Gideon Sa'ar, and Israeli President Isaac Herzog. The main focus of the discussions was recent developments in the Middle East and the Caucasus, as well as regional security. Following these meetings, the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister, Defence Minister, and President held phone conversations with the Turkish leaders, probably to explain the results of the mediation and Israel's stance on the issue. It is important to understand that the recent developments in the region also played into Israel's hand, and there was an urgent need to cooperate with Turkey and discuss the next steps. Azerbaijan will persist in its mediation efforts between Israel and Turkey, particularly in relation to the Syria issue.     

About the author: Ziya Kazimzada is a board member of the Milliyyet Research Center and is currently pursuing his master's degree at Masaryk University.