Armenia’s pre-election environment, particularly the campaign phase already in progress, is characterized by high political tension and growing polarization.

The opposition and several observers contend that the authorities are exerting pressure on political opponents through administrative and law-enforcement instruments, including arrests, criminal prosecutions, and information pressure tactics, whereas the government frames these measures as necessary steps to maintain the rule of law and public order.

Since March 30, law enforcement agencies have been issuing statements accusing representatives of the “Strong Armenia” party — the opposition force currently regarded as the ruling party’s main rival — of violating laws related to charity, bribery, and the offering or promising of inducements.

A new wave of arrests began in April, when the country’s law enforcement agencies carried out large-scale searches at the homes of supporters of the “Strong Armenia” party, as well as at its regional offices. More recently, during the election campaign, authorities detained ten supporters, claiming that they had “obstructed the normal course of the ruling Civil Contract party’s election campaign. On May 12, the Anti-Corruption Committee announced additional charges in a case involving the “Strong Armenia” alliance, along with new arrests in connection with an alleged vote-buying scheme.

On May 19, Speaker of the National Assembly Alen Simonyan, who is also included on the electoral list of the ruling Civil Contract party, questioned whether Narek Karapetyan, the leading candidate of the “Strong Armenia” alliance, holds Russian citizenship. Simonyan published a document which, according to his claim, identified Karapetyan as a citizen of the Russian Federation. Karapetyan promptly denied the claim, stating that he has never held any citizenship other than Armenian, and that he has spent less time living in Russia than, for example, in the United Kingdom or Switzerland, dismissing the reports as fake news. In this regard, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued a denial, stating that Narek Karapetyan has neither held nor currently holds Russian citizenship. 

Despite these denials, on May 20 the Investigative Committee of Armenia filed criminal charges against Narek Karapetyan, accusing him of “intentionally concealing information regarding his possession or past possession of foreign citizenship. In the same period, the exiled Russian investigative outlet “The Insider” published a purported document alleging that Samvel Karapetyan, leader of the “Strong Armenia” party, had his place of employment listed as the “FSB Information Center” in his 1999 passport records. Karapetyan swiftly denied the claim, stating that he had obtained his passport in 1993–1994 rather than in 1999, and alleging that the report was commissioned by Nikol Pashinyan.

Politically Motivated Arrests and Disinformation Campaigns Under the Guise of Democracy.

In an interview with Caucasus Watch, regarding legal persecution and repression allegedly carried out by the authorities, David Ghazinyan, a board member of the “Strong Armenia” party and one of the alliance’s key candidates (ranked fourth on its electoral list), stated that these actions are not new and began with the unlawful arrest of their leader, businessman Samvel Karapetyan.

“If Samvel Karapetyan was imprisoned over just a few words, then I believe anything can be expected from these authorities, and nothing about it is particularly surprising. “This is simply a manifestation of weakness. I believe they already see themselves as defeated, which is why they are resorting to various forms of repression. The ongoing disinformation campaigns, including the dissemination of forged documents by pro-government media outlets and government officials, are also part of this same logic. Everything is clear here — they currently hold power, and law enforcement bodies act like obedient instruments, carrying out even their most unlawful orders,” Ghazinyan says, arguing that such actions have nothing to do with democracy, are characteristic of authoritarian rule, and undermine the democratic perception of the electoral process.

“This is a clear case of political persecution: our supporters are being arrested simply because they disagree with the policies being pursued by the authorities. The same logic applies to the cases launched over alleged vote-buying, which lack any legal basis and therefore cannot be substantiated in court. Instead, they merely serve as instruments in the hands of the authorities to create obstacles ahead of the elections. This is an outright authoritarian regime operating under the guise of democracy,” Ghazinyan concludes.

Opinion Polls and the Opposition’s Challenge of Surpassing the Electoral Threshold

Pre-election opinion polls in Armenia indicate that the ruling Civil Contract party remains in the lead, though without a clear absolute majority. For instance, a March study conducted by the “Armenian Electoral Systems Research Center” (ArmES) concluded that “if elections were held tomorrow, the ruling Civil Contract party would secure a relative majority of votes; however, depending on voter turnout, it might fail to form a single-party government. The study also examines the opposition landscape, suggesting that “Strong Armenia” is likely to secure second place in terms of vote share, with the Prosperous Armenia Party ranking third. According to the survey findings, the “Armenia” alliance led by Armenia’s second president, Robert Kocharyan, would not surpass the electoral threshold required to enter parliament. 

According to polls conducted in Armenia on May 22 by the International Republican Institute (IRI), only the ruling Civil Contract party manages to surpass the electoral threshold. Accordingly, when asked which political force they would vote for on June 7, 38% of respondents indicated the ruling Civil Contract party. The “Strong Armenia” alliance was chosen by 7% of respondents, while 4% said they intended to vote for the “Armenia” alliance.

It should be noted that, under Armenian law, the electoral threshold for parliamentary elections is set at 4% for individual parties, 8% for alliances of up to two parties, and 10% for alliances comprising three or more parties. A total of 19 political forces—17 parties and 2 alliances—have registered to participate in the upcoming elections in Armenia. The “Armenia” alliance consists of two parties and must therefore surpass an 8% electoral threshold, while the “Strong Armenia” alliance must secure 10% of the vote, as it is composed of three parties.

The main intrigue of these elections lies in whether any opposition force will be able to form a meaningful counterweight. The main contest is currently taking place among several political poles. The “Civil Contract” seeks to frame the elections as a choice between “stability vs. the former authorities.” The “Armenia” alliance relies on a harder opposition stance and a security-focused agenda. The “Strong Armenia” aims to attract disillusioned voters who do not wish to return to the “old system.” In many polls, it is viewed as the strongest opposition force.

Opposition Forces Amid Political Fragmentation

A key feature of these elections is that the opposition is competing not only against the ruling party, but also against one another. For example, the Prosperous Armenia Party, Bright Armenia, smaller pro-Western forces, and newly established parties are all competing for the same segment of the electorate, resulting in a fragmentation of opposition votes.

According to the latest polls conducted by Gallup International Association, the ruling “Civil Contract” party has the support of 26.7% of voters, a figure that appears far from sufficient to form a single-party government. However, the specifics of Armenia’s electoral system—particularly the electoral thresholds and the redistribution of “wasted votes”—significantly alter the dynamics of the race.

Here lies the central paradox: the opposition may command a numerical majority yet still end up losing due to its fragmentation. The 8% electoral threshold for alliances established by the Electoral Code emerges as the most decisive factor. In particular, according to the survey results, the “Armenia” alliance stands at 8.2%, placing it in a vulnerable position near the threshold. Meanwhile, Arman Tatoyan’s “Wings of Unity” party has 4.2% support, which likewise situates it in a critical, uncertain zone. This means that even a small fluctuation could effectively “erase” these parties’ votes from the political map.

Thus, against this backdrop, three scenarios may emerge. If both forces fail to pass the threshold, only three political forces would enter parliament, and Civil Contract would secure around 55% of the seats. In other words, a majority of society may vote for the opposition, yet the ruling party would remain in power. The second scenario may be considered the most critical. If “Wings of Unity” fails to pass the threshold while the “Armenia” alliance succeeds, the opposition would collectively obtain around 52.7% of the vote. This would represent the only realistic window for a genuine change of power. Conversely, if the “Armenia” alliance fails to pass the threshold, Civil Contract would again secure around 51% and retain power.

This creates a situation in which the outcome of the elections is shaped less by voters’ preferences and more by the opposition’s organizational capacity and technical calculations. In effect, a 0.5% drop for a single alliance could determine the fate of the country’s entire governing structure. Meanwhile, “extra” opposition parties end up competing not against the ruling party, but against one another.

Criticism of Government Linked to Territorial, Economic, and Social Concerns

A member of the ARF Armenia Supreme Body and an MP from the “Armenia” alliance, ranked fifth on its electoral list, Arthur Khachatryan told Caucasus Watch that when addressing the challenges facing the alliance and the question of its main electoral competitors—whether solely Prime Minister Pashinyan’s party or also other opposition forces—he stated the following:

The “Armenia” alliance is fighting against the current authorities in order to prevent the complete erosion of the Republic of Armenia as an independent and sovereign state. Ultimately, when comparing the Armenia inherited by Nikol Pashinyan in May 2018 with Armenia in May 2026, the differences are stark: Artsakh no longer exists, thousands have been killed, a portion of Armenia’s sovereign territory is under Azerbaijani control, and Azerbaijan controls strategic heights while openly interfering in Armenia’s internal affairs. The country has accumulated significant public debt, and society has become heavily indebted to banks, with one in every six adults reportedly holding non-performing consumer loans, a substantial share of which is linked to gambling. The country has also been mired in a gambling crisis, alongside growing internal political tensions. Therefore, our goal is to save Armenia from Nikol Pashinyan, and accordingly, the primary target is Nikol Pashinyan. We are also firmly convinced that we are the political force with the most experienced team and the most viable policy agenda. 

There are also other opposition political forces that believe they are capable of achieving the same objective. In this sense, we are competing for the votes of the opposition-minded electorate, which is considerably larger than the share of support for Nikol Pashinyan. It should be recalled that in the previous two elections won by Pashinyan, voter turnout was below 50%, while he obtained just over half of the votes cast. In this respect, Armenia is no exception: the competition is directed both against the ruling authorities, while rival political forces also seek to capture the votes of opposition-oriented segments of the electorate. These are not unique elections in any sense—neither in terms of geography nor timing—but I believe that once at least three or even four major opposition forces enter parliament, and the choice effectively becomes one between Nikol Pashinyan and the opposition, these forces will ultimately make their final decision. The “Armenia” alliance has declared its readiness to support the opposition force that secures the largest share of the vote,” Khachatryan concludes.

Uncertain Path Toward Post-Election Stability

In the final stretch toward election day, Armenia’s political landscape appears shaped less by clear ideological competition and more by accumulating tension between law, politics, and electoral mechanics. The campaign period has unfolded in an atmosphere of deep mistrust, where the government and opposition offer sharply different readings of the same events—one emphasizing legality and anti-corruption efforts, the other pointing to political pressure and selective justice.

Beneath these competing narratives lies a structural reality that increasingly defines the outcome of the race. Armenia’s electoral system, with its relatively high thresholds for parties and alliances, transforms fragmentation into a decisive political factor. In this environment, success depends not only on voter support, but on whether that support can be consolidated and translated into parliamentary representation.

The opposition remains divided across multiple platforms, each seeking to position itself as the primary alternative to the ruling party. While this diversity reflects a broad spectrum of political sentiment, it also dilutes electoral strength. As a result, dissatisfaction with the government does not automatically translate into a unified political challenge, but instead risks being dispersed across competing actors.

At the same time, the ruling party retains an advantage in organization and institutional presence yet faces its own limitations. Polling data suggests a lead that is significant but not decisive, meaning that outcomes may depend heavily on threshold dynamics and the redistribution of votes that fail to enter parliament. In such a system, small shifts in support can produce disproportionate effects on seat allocation.

The result is an election defined less by certainty than by calculation. The balance of power will likely depend on marginal differences, turnout variations, and the ability of political forces to overcome fragmentation. Whatever the outcome, Armenia appears headed toward a post-election reality shaped by continued competition rather than consolidation. The vote may clarify parliamentary composition, but it is unlikely to resolve the deeper political divisions that have come to define the current period.

Contributed by Anna Vardanyan, an Armenian political journalist and researcher with over 18 years’ experience in defence policy, international relations, and security in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, has worked for Armenian media and held advisory roles in the National Assembly of Armenia.