Thomas Graham is a distinguished fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations. Since 2011, he has lectured on US-Russian relations and Russian foreign policy at Yale, where he co-directs the Russian Studies program. 

His academic career is a reflection of his service record. Professor Graham was a career diplomat, serving in the US Embassy in Moscow during the Cold War and going on to assume key roles in policy planning in Washington. Rising through the ranks, he became the Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State (2001-2002) and, thereafter, served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia on the National Security Council during the Bush Administration (2004-2007). He was a managing director at Kissinger Associates from 2009-2019. 

His latest book, Getting Russia Right, has been called a post-mortem of US foreign policy towards Russia over the last 30 years. Graham reconsiders the post-Soviet development of this relationship prior to delving into the forthcoming developments, subsequent to his departure from Ukraine. He argues that while focusing on defeating Russian aggression against Ukraine, Washington must be preparing for a polycentric order in which Russia must be strong enough to control its nuclear capability and to serve as an element of various regional balances of power. A novel deal with Russia is required, and it should encompass the cessation of additional expansion of NATO towards the east. With this admission in mind, we find Professor Graham at home to discuss where the Caucasus lies in this world. 

Until 2021, Russia occupied and indirectly supported a series of statelets in the Caucasus, but the region seemed little more than the backwaters of the Near Abroad. Since the war in Ukraine, the Caucasus has appeared to be a logistics hub critical to Russia’s war economy. That has seen a major boost for the economies of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Would you say that the new significance of the Caucasus for Russia is here to stay? Will it be a constant factor? Would you, for instance, give much credence to the notion of a “Crimea B” in Abkhazia?

I would have a different take on this. The Caucasus has been an important security consideration for decades or centuries. The question really is Russia’s ability to project power in the region now and in the years ahead, particularly during the war in Ukraine. 

The war in Ukraine is sucking up Russian resources. Growth in Russia stems from the war economy, and the country is materially overstretched and has less time to meet other security challenges. So, the Caucasus is a priority, but is not the top priority. If you look at Azerbaijan’s recent overrunning of Nagorno-Karabakh, I would suggest this reflects lesser influence in the region, and Turkey may have more at this point. Armenia is beginning to consider reorienting its own security, and if you look further afield, in Central Asia, Russian rhetoric has become more detached, and more conflicts may arise in the future. 

Russia will have trouble maintaining its presence in the South Caucasus, particularly as the war in Ukraine drags on. “Abkhazia as a second Crimea” relates to their calculation of whether they can defend Russian naval activity further west. Ukrainians have taken the battle to the Black Sea, that do threaten Russian naval assets. If they are thinking of relocating assets, I think the focus will be Novorossiysk rather than Abkhazia. The Russians would need to invest a lot to reshape the coastline and they don’t have many resources to invest. 

Is Russian “soft power” proving more politically effective than its raw muscle? Throughout the region, the South Caucasus appears to be having a good war and getting closer to Russia. Would you agree with that assessment?

It depends on what one means by soft power. It is clear that there is an increase in economic activity between Russia and the South Caucasus. That, in many ways, is a side effect of American sanctions. Countries in the South Caucasus have not been enforcing sanctions, and the region is becoming a remarkable conduit, as Russia is using the region to source what it needs. The refrigerators coming through the region to Russia is remarkable for instance, possibly because of the microchips in these refrigerators. That makes this region important, to the extent these countries allow this kind of dependence.

That said, “soft power” is more associated with media and cultural influence and, I would argue, that has deteriorated. In terms of communication, influence is waning. Putin’s rhetoric on rebuilding the Russian Empire and Russian patriotism raise anxieties in the Caucasus and Central Asia. 

If Russia is still a significant presence, it is partly because Western presence has receded for a host of reasons: US energy independence, withdrawal from Afghanistan, European and American political domestic issues, etc. The relative weight or Russia is greater because the US commitment in the region is somewhat diminished. 

In your latest book, “Getting Russia Right,” you are preparing us for a polycentric world in which Russia remains a constant factor. To build a relationship with Russia, you suggest that NATO membership for Georgia or Ukraine should be out of the question. Would you say that making the future of these states a dependent variable in Washington’s relationship with Moscow is reasonable? If that is the case, is there more continuity or change in American foreign policy? Has this ever been different? 

Well, I do not know if it is a “dependent variable,” but it is an important factor. Managing relations with Russia is important and will continue to be going forward. When we calculate relations with Georgia or Ukraine, we have to calculate the resources we will deploy in relation to Russia’s reaction. 

Washington is not dooming these states and that is certainly not the case with Ukraine. I cannot see now a clear path forward to ascertain Ukrainian security and, perhaps, with Georgia as well. There is also the practical question of securing the unanimity required to secure a country’s entry in the Alliance. You see the difficulties with Finland and now with Sweden. With Ukraine and Georgia, this will be more of a problem. The question will be how you navigate this problem in a more complex geopolitical environment in the years ahead. 

The emphasis should be on Ukrainian and Georgian security beyond NATO membership for the next five to ten years, because building a consensus for membership will be hard, if not impossible. One should not assume that NATO is the only option. 

Well, if you are a Baltic state, you have an umbrella no one else does. If you are in Ukraine, you know security guarantees are worth a penny, as China’s promises meant very little when they mattered. And if you are a Georgian leader, you have spent a few years managing expectations from NATO Summit to Summit, and you don’t know whether the end of this road is cause for relief or cause for panic. I suppose the question here is whether anyone can believe in anything other than Article V guarantees.      

Turkey is clearly a growing influence and can provide some security guarantees. Making countries like Georgia more resilient must be the way forward. Dealing with corruption inside. Georgia, for instance, is a must if one is looking to create a more convincing fighting capability. 

NATO membership is difficult because it requires consensus, particularly as NATO gets bigger. The European members of NATO think of this organization as European. Would the French or the Germans see Europe extending to the Caucasus? If membership is the question, the work of Georgia needs to focus less on Washington and more on Brussels. 

The question you must ask is what drives American foreign policy: is it anti-Russian or pro-Ukrainian? There is no clear answer. We fought three wars in Europe, hence our mindset. Europe is committed financially and militarily to Ukraine in a more balanced manner than ever before. They took in refugees in substantial numbers, which we did not, for instance. There will be a new balance, which thus far is dynamic. 

You have lectured on cybersecurity dilemmas. Right now, the Caucasus is attracting tens of thousands of Russian IT workers, and Armenia has about five companies over the billion-dollar benchmark. Do you see the regimentation of the internet with regions like the Caucasus or the UAE being bridges, or are we moving towards digital borders?

I don’t know. I am not sure about the future. 5 to 10 years ago, we imagined a world without significant borders. Over the last ten years, barriers matter.

There is a restructuring of supply chains, some protectionism out of concerns for US technology leakage, and the fear of the Balkanization of the internet is present and real. Russians and Chinese are entrenching mechanisms to cut off themselves from the broader ecosystem, should that be required. The Chinese have their great digital wall, and the Russians create an array of similar tools. 

There are different attitudes to the flow of information in the US and more broadly the West, but Russia sees the flow of information as a potential risk, internationally and domestically. Russia prioritizes controlling the narrative, and domestic considerations of this kind take precedence. 

In 2017, Iran, Turkey, and Russia convened in Astana to discuss the future of Syria without inviting Washington into the fold. A few days ago, negotiations on a peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia took place in Tehran, without a seat on the table for Washington, much less Paris or Brussels. In the polycentric world you envisage, do we need to get used to the idea that the West does not get a seat at every table in every region? 

The short answer is “yes.” The US and the West, more broadly, cannot dominate the emerging world as it did the last 80 years, and certainly the world after the collapse of the USSR. There are major regional powers: India, Iran, China, Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa will have influence in certain regions. They will view for influence in their continent and globally. A seat at the table will require the US to prioritize issues for its own security and prosperity, and regional powers will be trying to act independently. 

I would note that the Chinese were not invited to decide in Syria or the South Caucasus either. The US will not be able to insert itself in all problems worldwide. It will play a leading role, an important role, but not the role it once played. 

Are we moving from a global rules-based order to regional transactional understandings? 

At a global level, that is true. There will be space for a rules-based order that will be more limited geographically. During the Cold War, we wanted such an order with universal application, and we made tremendous progress after the collapse of the USSR in establishing it. But, over the last decade, this has been challenged by China, Russia, and even other countries, like India. It is unclear that New Delhi wants to be part of a world regulated and overseen by the US. Between the US and Europe, East Asian, and Latin American allies, there will be a rules-based order. This will not be a universal order, and we must deal with that as best we can. 

So, “rules-based” becomes a synonym for “the West.”

The West will be the core, but other states will join, certainly when it comes to trade. So, larger than the West. 

What is the role of Turkey and Iran in that polycentric world? Can you see a world in which Washington rebuilds with Ankara the partnership of the 1980s or with Tehran the partnership of the 1970s? 

None of these things are irreversibly gone, but they do depend on decisions in Washington, Ankara, and Tehran. 

Turkey’s geographical and geopolitical location has not changed, and this is the reason we stuck with Turkey even when Ankara was not the most democratic domestically. Turkey’s regional ambitions do not overlap perfectly with those of the United States. Erdogan’s Turkey has authoritarian tendencies but remains an important country. Washington has not had an effective Turkey policy for more than a decade. With Iran, we have not had a relationship since the 1970s, and any successor regime could change our relationship dramatically. Any normal, non-theocratic regime would make a difference. That is not where we are now, but anything can happen over the next two decades. 

Russian, Georgian, and Turkish leaders studied at Yale, including people like Navalny. What is the difference between Russian and American-trained international relations elites? Is American realism any different from Russian realism, or are we reflecting on the old adage “might is right?” 

Well, that is a caricature realism. Foreign policy and realism are not immoral. It’s just that morality is not the sole driver of foreign policy. American pragmatic foreign policy, or realism, is intended to create an environment where liberalism and democratic values can flourish. And the question then is: how we create the environment in which these values can flourish, in America and in other countries?     

There is an idealist element in American realism. The values that underpin our realism have differed from Russia’s from the very beginning. Getting educated on foreign policy in the US will lead to a different set of conclusions and foreign policy practice. 

Realism is not cynical. Foreign policy is intended to advance US interest, and because we are a liberal democratic society, this advances liberal democratic values. Given the current geopolitical context, this requires some compromises. We cannot get everything at once. Values are important; they are central, but they must be advanced in the world we exist in.

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis