The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) is the largest and most influential Armenian American grassroots advocacy organisation. Through lobbying, public awareness campaigns, and grassroots mobilization, the ANCA advocates for policies that advance Armenian interests in Washington, D.C. and across the U.S. Like any diaspora lobby, the organization engages with lawmakers, supports pro-Armenian legislation, and empowers Armenian Americans to participate in civic life. The ANCA's executive director, Aram Suren Hamparyan, notes that it is no longer a purely American organisation, but a broader alliance that includes "Allied Americans", individuals and organisations associated with the Armenian-American human rights agenda and political goals. In Washington, he has for years been a point of reference for ambassadors, the Congress, the Senate, and elected officials of every stripe and persuasion where Armenian Americans live nationwide. His position on the draft peace treaty with Azerbaijan is not favourable, and the Armenian-American diaspora is unlikely to get behind it.

Let us begin with the significance and bearing of the American-Armenian vote. When outsiders speak of the Armenian Diaspora, we think of California as a denser community. Is that where the Armenian-American vote was more significant this time around? If the Armenian vote primarily turned Republican this time, what was the problem with the Biden-Harris ticket?   

The seven swing states that mattered the most in this election. Of those swing states, Armenians are represented in sizeable numbers in Nevada, Michigan, Pennsylvania and possibly Wisconsin. The three first were competitive, and going into the elections, we thought they would be much more contested. Ultimately, they did not prove as competitive as some folks thought. However, as everyone thought these states could swing the final result, they were highly watched and contested. Michigan was considered a linchpin for various reasons and attracted a lot of attention, followed by Pennsylvania. So, yeah, those states were the most significant for us.

And did Armenian American voters vote primarily Republican? 

Mostly, Armenian Americans are pretty well represented across the American political spectrum. There's a left-to-right bell curve. They generally fit into the bell curve and reflect the local voting patterns of the neighborhoods that they live in. So, Armenians are not an exceptionally left-leaning or right-leaning community. 

However, they are a community that will cross party lines when issues that are important for Armenians are on the ballot and, in this case, the manifest failings of the Biden-Harris administration means the Democrats forfeited vast support that they might otherwise have gained. A lot of Armenians could not vote for an administration that armed Azerbaijan as it wiped out the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh – Artsakh. Like many Americans, for many reasons, many Armenians could not bring themselves to vote for Joe Biden, even if their leaning was Democratic or even if they were not enthusiastic about the Trump Vance ticket. However, the takeaway is that Armenians were not the only group the Biden-Harris let down. We were not alone. 

In Europe, this White House is seen as more transactional in scope. But there seems to be an ideological commitment to Christian minorities around the world, not least Armenians. That is relevant in Syria and the Lebanese context. How significant was that element in these elections?

Armenians have been through enough election cycles and know on their skin the very distinct difference between campaign rhetoric and actual governance. Campaign promises don't hold a lot of water in our world. This time, the fundamental issue is that the Biden-Harris ticket, for better or worse, represented continuity in American foreign policy, reflecting, reinforcing, and aligning with the DC consensus on a broader range of issues, whether it's Russia, Israel, or Iran. There's a whole foreign policy theology.

Trump folks are viewed as disruptive. For Armenia, during the Trump-Pence Administration, the Administration was negatively disruptive. Foreign policy was run by traditional neoconservative circles like John Bolton, Victoria Newland and Fiona Hill. They were mainstream, in line with policies dating back to Bill Clinton and George Bush. Where they deviated, it was not in Armenia’s favour. This time around, the Trump-Vance ticket might be the opposite. But only time will tell.   

One takeaway from the last elections is that foreign policy mattered more than usual. I hear the voice of Arab and Muslim Americans, especially in the Upper Midwest, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and especially Michigan. An unusual degree of voters are moved by foreign policy, or were in this cycle. That's not always the case in American elections, where the economy and other domestic issues usually drive votes.

This time around, policymakers saw that foreign policy does move votes. This is no longer a sphere insulated from political pressure. Rest assured, when politicians see that decisions being made in their name are costing them elections, they will very quickly work to revise those policies. Foreign policy weighs heavily on vested interests. Ultimately, we're a democratic system, and politicians will not suffer political losses due to foreign policy. So, robust democratic scrutiny of education, taxation, and the environment is suitable for policy because it heightens attention and responsiveness. That's not always been the case in foreign and defense policy, where various subsets of the US elite were given free rein. More democratic scrutiny over these policies can only be a good thing. I'm sure the people who manage Foreign Affairs would prefer that it remain their private property, but they're speaking in our name and spending our money. They represent our values and reputation around the world. 

Refocusing a bit on the old country. On March 13, there was an announcement of an in-principle peace agreement draft on which Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed. The text is not public but is said to amount to 17 provisions of what will be the Peace Treaty. This was welcomed by the State Department, with the White House urging the two sides to sign it and calling for the release of Armenian prisoners in Baku. What’s your view on what has been agreed and the reaction in DC?

Typically, the United States is less interested in the details of a peace agreement and more about getting it done and taking credit for it at the policy level. Maybe it opens the door to some of our interests in the region. So, it is no surprise that the U.S. government welcomes this agreement. ‘Great, let's move on’ is the message. If you look under the hood, this is a vastly asymmetrical deal. It amounts to Armenia accepting Azerbaijan's terms and then Azerbaijan adding more terms and doing so under threat of violence or use of violence. We think it's coercive. There was a gun to Armenia's head. So, the rights of the Armenians of Artsakh {Nagorno Karabakh} and their right to return to their homes are not mentioned. The prisoners are not mentioned. The occupation of Armenian sovereign soil is not mentioned. Azerbaijan added that Armenia has to provide a corridor through its territory, revise its constitution, or even its Coat of Arms. So, it's not an agreement but more of a forced signature signed under coercion. Azerbaijan makes no secret of it. 

But you do have parts of this administration that are well-read on the issues of Nagorno-Karabakh. If I am not mistaken, Tulsi Gabbard did visit Nagorno Karabakh and was on Azerbaijan’s persona non grata list for some time. Besides pressing for the signature of the agreement and the release of prisoners, what would you expect? 

We expect that the U.S. gets on the right side of all these issues, and that starts with the return of Armenians to Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) with pressure from the UN under the General Assembly or a Security Council resolution. The right to return to where they were forced from is an idea the world subscribes to, in principle, whether they act on it or not. That principle is, I think, universal. The U.S. should demand Azerbaijan's withdrawal from sovereign Armenian territory. The US, as Waltz did, should speak out and put pressure on Azerbaijan to release hostages. I mean, I could go down the list. There's a whole range of ways the US can get on the right side.

Should we expect that? You know, we understand that not everything that we want we're going to get. This is a very complex system. We're just a piece of it. We're a set of voters weighing in and up against many other groups who feel differently. But these are our requests. These are our expectations from our government. And so far, the US administration has responded to the third request, releasing the hostages. This is on the radar screen. 

The Jerusalem issue is also on the administration's radar screen. This is all a work in progress, and we remain engaged. We make our geopolitical case, we make our moral arguments, and we, like every citizen, weigh in as voters as well. There are folks inside the various government establishments and elites that somehow think that you know voters interfering in their affairs is somehow an unhealthy thing. Scrutiny over American foreign policy is a healthy, healthy dose of democracy.

Talking about expectations, in January, Armenia and the United States signed the charter of strategic partnership. That partnership builds on the most significant investment of USAID in the region, to the tune of $250 million a year. And I understand that although USAID has suddenly evaporated, these funds will not. Do you have a picture of what Armenian Americans should expect?

It was unfortunate that the Biden administration waited until just a few days before leaving office to sign anything with Armenia. It signals a lack of seriousness and is regrettable. A child could have told you that the Trump and Biden people view international affairs differently, and the commitments of one are not the commitments of the next. The notion that the Biden people could oblige the Trump people is not accurate. Given the dramatic changes at the State Department and USAID and on various issues, it's clear that any commitment will be revisited. We will see. 

Looking a bit back. The Republican Party has deep relations with the Armenian people, and if I am not mistaken, Ronald Reagan first spoke of the Armenian Genocide. However, the current Republican Party is a very different party. 

Even before Reagan, Eastern European ethnic groups were part of a ‘Captive Nations Movement’ associated with the Republicans: White Russians, Poles, and definitely Armenians and others. So, there was an affinity to the Republican Party as the group was trying to roll back the Soviets. And Armenians were part of that. The genocide statement certainly helped a lot. And then since then, you know, I think that the persecuted Christians focus has been one of the main bridges between the Armenian community and the Republican Party.

Almost all Diasporas in the United States have a moment of friction with their home country. The Greeks had it during the Colonel’s regime. Israel had it with critics in the United States. What is the current state of play in relations between the Diaspora and Yerevan?

I would say that there's a broad consensus among Diaspora Armenians, especially legacy diasporans – two or more generations – that the current Armenian Government is on a suicidal path, one that believes that they can trade land for peace, ending up with less land and less peace. So that's a profound and broad consensus. And you know, our job is to try to manage that. We like to find areas of common ground. I would say, though, that there's a short-sighted approach coming out of Yerevan that views the leverage of the Diaspora not as an asset but a liability, which we think is very short-sighted. The Diaspora is Armenia’s greatest asset. 

Part of the peace deal is court cases. Now, there are international court cases upon which the Armenian government may have direct leverage, relating mainly to Nagorno Karabakh. And there are civil litigation cases in the United States that focus primarily on property. Is it right that what the two states agreed is not likely to constrain litigation action in the United States? 

Yes, this is where the government is going. They can decide on court cases that they control. They are signaling withdrawal, but it hasn't happened yet. As for the cases litigated by individuals, it is for individuals to decide. I guess time will tell. The government controls what the government controls, and they don't control what they don't control. That’s pretty much it. 

It’s campaign season in Armenia and the United States is negotiating over Ukraine, with Russia. What do you hope will happen? What do you want to see coming out of this process? What would be best for Armenian Americans? 

We would like the US to be more discerning about the details of the peace process and to work with the Armenian government to resist concessions forced on Armenia. Now, that depends on the government of Armenia adopting a more constructive approach, but that's what we'd like to see. Right now, this is a deal being agreed to at the point of the gun, and we don't think that's the way sustainable peace is made.

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis