Caucasus Watch found Lieutenant General Ben Hodges at his adopted home in Frankfurt. The subject of our discussion was less the ongoing war in Ukraine and more on its bearing on the relationship between the “Collective West” and the post-Soviet space.

A native of Florida, General Hodges is the former Commanding General of US Army Europe (2014-2017), serving in a crucial post as Little Green Men marched for the first time in Ukraine. He previously served as Commander of the NATO Allied Land Command in Izmir (2012-2014), Turkey. These were high profile executive roles following a career that followed steady steps from his graduation in 1980 to combat and commanding roles in Iraq and Afghanistan.  

Having served in both Iraq and Turkey, General Hodges has an unusually detailed understanding of the Black Sea and the Middle East. An experienced soldier with a grasp of the big picture, General Hodges continues to serve as NATO’s Senior Mentor for Logistics even after his retirement in 2018. With a grasp for logistical detail, a deep understanding of the diplomatic context, and an eye for political detail, his commentary is in high demand in major European and US networks. We joined a considerable queue to discuss the economic context of war, the post-Soviet space and the emerging collective security landscape.   

They say that being a general is very much about handling logistics. You have handled both war and currently serve as NATO's mentor on logistics policy. Focusing on logistics. The global economy remains reliant on Chinese rare earths and so is the defence industry. China announced an embargo vis-à-vis the US on rare earths; rare earths supplying the German defence industry still transit through Russian territory. Do you feel the balance between western industrial policy and military considerations need to be renegotiated? Has the West lost its ability to run a war economy?

That’s a matter of political will. For sure we could build or expand capacity if the political will was there. Artillery ammunition production trebled within a year, just by putting more money through the existing system.

Where we do have shortages is in certain materials. It is about access or long-term outsourcing. For instance, we quit making gunpowder because we find outsourcing more cost-effective. I am not an expert on what China has and we don’t. But it goes without saying that we need to find new sources or come up with alternatives, which I think the Biden Administration is doing.

There used to be an informal organisation in the Congress named the “Depot Caucus,” made up of Members who represent districts with state-owned depots, arsenals, and other facilities that can produce ammunition, equipment, and weapons.  They have not been as visible in recent years but thankfully they ensured that the Congress required the Department of Defense to maintain this capability. The idea was to have state-owned in addition to merely commercial capability, thereby retaining a production baseline. That is why we can scale up ammunition production.

A short answer to your question, therefore, is we don’t have enough industrial capacity and we don’t as yet have the political will.

Georgia’s recently announced strategic partnership with China; this goes against the trajectory in the Baltic States, leaving the 16 plus 1 initiative, for instance. The jury is still out in Germany, which has its own close partnership with China. The point is, if one wants to criticise the Georgian deal, on which leg do we stand?

Of course, it is the right and prerogative of any nation to make their own choices: who they do business with.

It’s been a mistake of the US that we don’t have a consistent view of the whole region, viewing Georgia-Azerbaijan as the portal for Central Asia for instance. Looking at the map, we should get why this is important for the East-West trade route, for instance. If you had the deep-water port of Anaklia, many companies would rush to invest there, not least because this would open the China-Europe trade route. Constanta and the Danube trade would benefit. We have failed to see the potential.

Because we have not competed on a policy level, Georgia will turn to whoever provides what they need. But they should be aware of the debt-trap China presents. Look at the experience of African countries. Be that as it may, before I criticise Georgia, we have to compete better.

Considering the significance of the war in Ukraine on-post Soviet Europe. Right now, we see volunteer battalions in Ukraine – Georgian, Belarussian, and even Russian. How much of this is of military substance and how much is it about the moral high ground in this war?

I think the fact that soldiers from Georgia and Belarus are volunteering to fight with the Ukrainian Army is more than symbolism. People volunteer for different reasons. But when engaging in a war of attrition, getting soldiers to Ukraine is always a plus.

If they go against the will of their government, even if we have not always competed on a policy level, that is positive.

But we are dealing with a policy vacuum. We still don’t have a master plan for the region. I understand why countries – including even Turkey – worry about Russia. They are not confident the US will be there to help. If the US had more of an emphasis on the region, we would be more effective in focusing minds. And nations would be willing to step up.

If you are in the Caucasus, should you fear or wish for another Wagner-type implosion in Russia’s security landscape? One may recall the fear expressed by the Clinton Administration of a Russian meltdown, and what would happen to biological or nuclear weapons.

The Wagner incident was mutiny and was indeed important for two-three reasons.

First it reminded everyone of the kind of hatred that prevails in Russian leadership circles. Prigozhin hated Shoigu, who in turn was at loggerheads with Gerasimov. All of them hate the Chechens. That can only be good for Ukraine.

The second thing is that Prigozhin made a business move, 100%. He is not a dissident. He was unhappy that the Minister of Defence was getting control over his business. When I heard about the Wagner incident and a convoy of about 400 vehicles, I thought that would be lost in Moscow traffic. This was a mutiny not a coup. Wagner’s boss was unhappy with the proposed business model. This is happening in Africa too. Wagner are losing some of their business, although that is yet to be confirmed by other-than-Russian sources.

So, what happened now was a public execution and a lot of people in Moscow and St. Petersburg are probably reflecting on the fact they did not show sufficient public loyalty, taking a public stand. And Putin values loyalty more than competence. The Siloviki could fear ending up in jail or worse, like Gerasimov.

Yes, but should we fear an implosion?

There is no recent historical evidence suggesting the Russian people will take to the streets. I don’t expect a popular uprising. But I think the oligarchs might rise up. But we should think ahead and indeed ask “what if they do?” At the end of the USSR, the nukes were in control. I don’t expect a total loss of control of weapons or energy resources, something China might fear more than the West now, as they would lose their cheap energy. But we should think ahead.

Georgia just commemorated the 15^th anniversary of its own Russian invasion. Ukraine had Chinese security guarantees that did not quite work. Georgia’s relationship to NATO was once described as “membership minus Article V.” In truth, witnessing the war, can one blame post-Soviet regimes outside NATO of standing by watching Russia timidly?

It’s true that at the end of the day that if you are not in NATO, you are at risk. Russia will use force to change borders and they will disregard international law. No one can feel completely safe without NATO membership or the large presence of US troops on the ground. When I think of my friends in Georgia, of course I worry. Thankfully for the region, Russian troops are now driven to Ukraine. However, I understand what’s happening and their fears. The West needs a strategy for the region.

Speaking of that strategy. Little over a year ago, in the summer of 2022, the Senate passed the bipartisan Saheen-Romney bill, demanding from the Biden Administration to develop a strategy. How closer are we to having a strategy today? 

What passed was very weak. That was followed by Turner, Keating Bill in the Congress earlier this year.

The current effort is about setting a benchmark for this requirement. I am interested to see who drives this process: inter-agency, State Department or Pentagon? So, I would expect an interagency approach, as we need an economic and diplomatic context around the military component.

Speaking of the process and the politics of it all. The first Republican primaries debate is a good example of distending voices on the US position on Ukraine. Vivek Ramaswamy is joining Trump in opposing continuous commitment to Ukraine. We are heading towards European elections and the pro-Russian far-right is projected to gain power. Do you worry at all about how politics impacts on the battlefield?

Fortunately, the vast majority of the US Congress favour continued support to Ukraine. Yes, there are candidates and incumbents against continued support, but they present no alternative.

It is up to the President to make the case that continued support is in our national interest and that of our allies. It is up to us to protect a rules-based international order of the kind we have become accustomed to. And the Chinese are watching if we are going to protect what we value.

The Russians are hoping we will quit. When they see people, leaders, or candidates declare “this is not our war,” this gives oxygen to the Kremlin. They don’t care how many people will die, so long as time works in their favour. The West giving up gives them a winning theory and a reason to fight on. So, it makes a difference.

Is the war in Ukraine moving the centre of gravity of the Euro-Atlantic partnership? Is Warsaw the new Berlin?

I would say that within the Alliance the credibility of Central Eastern Europe and the Baltics is much higher than a few years ago. It turns out they were right all along. They were right saying the Russians are a danger, a fact dismissed by people in Canada, our Southern Flank, and others. And they invested in their own resilience, while some of us look foolish.

But I don’t know that the centre of gravity has shifted. Poland is far more significant to the Alliance and the United States and has the opportunity to play a bigger role. But they are hurting themselves as the ruling party is viewed with concern across the EU. They spend a lot of time criticising Germany which is unhelpful.

Back to logistics, supply chains, and security.  As we move into the second year of conflict, do you fear an escalation of home-front to home-front warfare? We saw the arrest of a Russian sleeping cell in the UK, the foiling of a sabotage network in Poland (second this year). What else should we fear? Do you fear cyber-attacks with kinetic consequences for instance?

I think the Russians have been trying to do this all along. I am surprised at how poorly they have done it. I would expect they would try to disrupt the flow of ammunition from Poland to Ukraine and they have done nothing. The famous Gerasimov doctrine with all this traditional-asymmetrical warfare streamlined planning seems less convincing. We are seeing the limits of their capacity.

Thanks to Ukraine and Western support for Ukraine, they are less able to act on their threats. I saw a WWII tank going to war. Their navy fears approaching the Ukrainian coast, a country that hardly has a navy. Russians do have capabilities, including air power, but the key is the cohesion of NATO. Russia respects the collective strength of NATO’s soon-to-be 32 member states. I do not fear they will go after a member to a degree that would trigger an Article V response. They will go after infrastructure but not to a scale we may frame as an attack. They will want to find what the limit is…. Remember the drone incident in the Black Sea? That was testing the limit. That was a test, in the Black Sea, where lines matter. But no further.

Growing up during the Cold War, one expected the conservative right to be the Euro-Atlantic political power. Living in Germany, are you surprised that the most fervent supporter of the Euro-Atlantic partnership are the Greens and everyone fears where the Republicans stand?

I do not know how much of this is the product of external influence. I do know that certain institutions are unrecognisable. The Heritage Foundation today is not one that Ronald Reagan would recognise.

We have always had isolationists in the US. They were people wanting to keep the troops home during WWI and were against arms deliveries during WWI. Today’s America is committed overseas but part of our DNA is isolationist. People like Trump tap into that. And they find people that feel left behind. I can’t understand it all. I can’t articulate or fully understand why today’s Republican Party does not resemble the party I or my parents would recognise.

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis