Armenia is a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), but its membership has been questioned.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has repeatedly criticised the CSTO for not providing sufficient assistance during military escalations with Azerbaijan, announcing the “freezing” of CSTO membership. In July 2024, Yerevan became more resolute in its assertions, suggesting Armenia was bracing to withdraw from the organisation altogether. As of January 2025, there were no steps to begin Yerevan’s withdrawal. 

To review the current status of Armenia’s CSTO membership, Caucasus Watch spoke to Suren Sargsyan, the founder and director of the Armenian Centre for American Studies and formerly a foreign affairs advisor to the Speaker of Parliament.   

Over the last two years, the Armenian government has questioned the effectiveness of CSTO as a multilateral security umbrella. A year ago, Yerevan said its membership was being frozen. What does that mean in practice? 

Armenia’s Prime Minister announced freezing Armenia’s membership in the CSTO in February 2024 during his interview with France 24. Though the CSTO does not stipulate such a status, Armenian leadership has consistently referred to its membership as “frozen.” Even before Armenia’s participation in the CSTO was dubbed “frozen,” one could observe the practical implications of Armenia’s unwillingness to engage with the alliance.

Armenia is no longer involved in the CSTO’s administrative and operational work, and the country’s permanent representative to the organisation was recalled on September 3, 2023. Armenia has also opted out of joint military drills and other cooperative defence activities conducted by the CSTO and refused to fulfil its financial obligations to the organisation. This is particularly problematic since Armenia remains legally bound to the CSTO and is still obligated to meet its financial commitments. 

The Russian side has, on several occasions, emphasised that the CSTO's Charter does not accommodate a "frozen membership" status. As a result, Moscow has called on Armenia to clarify its intentions regarding future cooperation within the organisation. 

One immediate consequence of Armenia’s actions could be the loss of voting rights within the CSTO for failing to meet financial obligations, as announced by Russia's Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova. In this case, Armenia may find itself excluded from decision-making processes within the CSTO, which would, in practice, mirror the “frozen membership” status that the Armenian leadership has aimed for.   

Armenia is no longer reliant on Russian procurement for its defence. However, its air defence and border security are fused with Russia’s. Do you see any steps towards a transition away from this reliance?

Russo-Armenian relations are defined as “close allied relations.” Russo-Armenian strategic cooperation involves military-political, economic, energy, transport, humanitarian and cultural fields. The cooperation in the military sphere has several directions, such as the 102nd Russian military base deployed in the territory of Armenia, the military-technical cooperation between the two countries, as well as border security and multilateral military cooperation within the framework of CSTO.

Military cooperation between the two countries is mainly based on treaties such as the “Treaty on the Legal Status of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the Territory of Armenia,” “Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Activity of the Border Guard Troops of the Russian Federation in the Territory of the Republic of Armenia,” and “the Treaty on the Russian Military Base on the Territory of the Republic of Armenia.”

However, the relations between Armenia and Russia started to sour starting in 2018 with the so-called “Velvet Revolution” in Armenia and strained even further after the 2020 44-day war in Artsakh (Karabakh). 

Armenia has long been reliant on Russia’s weapon procurement. However, after the war, Armenian officials have frequently criticised Russia for delivering the weapons that Armenia had already paid for. Later, it was stated that a batch of Russian armaments had finally arrived in Armenia. Recently, Armenia has started actively cooperating with India, France, Greece, and Cyprus in the military sphere. However, even though Armenia has already found alternative partners in the military-technical sphere, it does not mean it is entirely cutting its military-technical cooperation with Russia. However, it should be admitted that Russia is no longer the leading weapon supplier for Armenia. 

Another step towards a transition away from this reliance was Armenian authorities’ demand to withdraw Russian border guards from Yerevan's Zvartnots Airport after being stationed there for 32 years since 1992. The withdrawal was implemented on July 31, 2024. Previously, based on an agreement reached during a meeting between Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Putin in the Kremlin, Russian border guards withdrew from several Armenian regions. 

According to the agreement reached, Russian border guards and military posts located in the Tavush, Syunik, Vayots Dzor, Gegharkunik, and Ararat regions during and after the 44-day war will cease their deployment and withdraw from these points. Russian border guards, however, will continue their service on the Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Iranian borders. In addition, in December 2024, Russia withdrew its border guards from Armenia’s sole border crossing with Iran. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan states, “Only the Border Guard Troops of the Republic of Armenia will carry out border control at the Agarak border crossing point on the Armenia-Iran state border.”

Despite these withdrawals, the Russian 102nd military base in Armenia will remain operational until 2044, according to the treaty signed between the countries. This base, a key element of Russia’s military presence in Armenia, continues to be unaffected by the recent pullbacks, including the removal of Russian border guards from various regions and the completion of their withdrawal from the Agarak border crossing with Iran. While Russian border forces are leaving some areas, the 102nd base remains. 

There are some steps towards a transition away from this reliance on Russia. However, Russia had been cautious about this development and, for many years, tread carefully in matters that could lead to this scenario. One prominent example is the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkey, as this could potentially reduce Armenia’s reliance on Russia and weaken the justification for Russia's military presence in Armenia. This highlights the strategic importance of the Russian base in Gyumri in ensuring border stability. In the light of recent developments and the ongoing efforts between Armenia and Turkey to improve relations, Russia has found a new avenue to justify its military presence in Armenia. Specifically, Russia is now advocating for establishing the so-called "Zangezur Corridor," positioning itself to control traffic through this corridor with Russian border guards. This move reinforces Russia's strategic influence in the region amid the geopolitical realignments.

What comes after CSTO membership? Self-reliance, plurilateral alliances with other powers (Iran, India, France) or something else. 

As outlined above, at least for the foreseeable future, one likely scenario is Armenia’s exclusion from the decision-making processes within the CSTO, mirroring the “frozen membership.” However, even in such a scenario, Armenia remains legally part of the organisation. It seems unlikely that Armenian leadership will formally withdraw from the CSTO, meaning that, at least for legal reasons, its accession to other military alliances, such as NATO, would not be possible.

Overall, a country contemplating leaving the military alliance should have thoroughly analysed the situation. A specific plan should exist for joining or cooperating with other countries and organisations. Armenia did not do such work, and for such a small country, which is also located in such a volatile region, it’s hardly possible to navigate its security interests without a significant military partner. On the global stage, such military partners could be Russia, the USA (and NATO) and China. However, having no specific arrangements with either of the actors, leaving an army organisation such as the CSTO seems ill-advised. 

Following the downfall of the Assad regime in Syria, how reliant can Armenia be on Iranian security assistance, logistical or military?

Armenia considers Iran its ally, especially in countering Turkish and Azerbaijani plans of opening the "Zangezur corridor," a potential link between Azerbaijan and Turkey through Armenia's territory. In the past, the Iranian leadership, including the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, had repeatedly opposed such a corridor. However, following the downfall of the Assad regime in Syria, Iranian stance on the matter can be compromised. While Iran has traditionally maintained a significant presence in Syria, primarily through military bases and alliances with groups like Hezbollah, the recent ascendancy of Turkish-backed forces and the withdrawal of both Russian and Iranian forces from key positions in Syria, as well as Iran’s setback in Israel highlights the weakening of Tehran’s strategic position in the region. Withdrawal from Syria and Russia’s diminishing influence in the South Caucasus create a more complex environment for Armenia.

Iran has agreed to discuss this issue with Turkey, signalling potential concessions. However, as Turkey becomes more assertive under President Erdogan, Iran may become increasingly forced to compromise its positions, even on issues such as the “Zangezur corridor.” 

Consequently, Armenia's reliance on Iranian assistance could be unreliable, especially if broader geopolitical dynamics continue to shift. The country must diversify its security partnerships and engage diplomatically.

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis