On Christmas Day 2024, an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer (Flight 8243) was enroute from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Grozny, Russia. Reaching Grozny, the crew reported losing their GPS navigational aids due to jamming. Passengers reported an explosion and shrapnel striking the aircraft. The pilots initially attributed it to a bird strike and requested an emergency landing. Subsequent investigation indicates a surface-to-air missile hit the plane, as the system probably reacted to the threat of a Ukrainian drone attack, a danger not unknown to Grozny Airport. Subsequently, the aircraft diverted to Aktau, Kazakhstan, crashing during the emergency landing but managing to save 29 out of the 67 passengers and crew onboard. Russian President Vladimir Putin apologized to the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, for the "tragic incident" but did not confirm any direct responsibility.

To understand the event's implications for Russian-Azerbaijani relations, we turn to Dr. Zaur Shiriyev, a nonresident scholar at Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, part of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The missile strike on the Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 over Grozny on Christmas Day does not appear intentional. This seems to be “collateral damage” of a war in Ukraine, putting a strain on Russia’s capacity infrastructure. What elements of this tragic event will likely leave a lasting shadow over Baku’s relationship with Moscow? 

Baku does not view the missile strike as an intentional act by Russia. There is no question about that. At the same time, Baku’s response has been assertive, emphasizing expectations of reciprocity in bilateral relations. Russia’s reaction to the plane crash was perceived as an attempt to downplay the incident, avoid responsibility, and delay a proper response. For instance, while numerous countries sent high-level condolences to Azerbaijan within the first days, Russia's came much later and had a limited scope. This tragic event will likely serve as a reference point in Azerbaijan-Russia relations while also reshaping the West’s understanding of the dynamics between the two countries.

In terms of Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia, this incident will likely influence Baku’s future dealings with Moscow. Moving forward, Baku will reflect on “lessons learned” given Russia’s reactions to the crisis. Shortly after the crash, Russia halved the duration of its visa-free regime for Azerbaijani citizens. Baku’s reaction was immediate, announcing similar restrictions on Russian citizens’ stays in Azerbaijan. This could serve as a pivotal moment, underscoring Azerbaijan's assertion of reciprocity in this bilateral relationship. This could also become a “remembrance point,” a moment of unresolved grievances seeking redress. Whether this tragic event becomes the latter will depend on Russia’s response to Baku’s core demands, namely identifying and punishing those responsible, providing compensation, and taking responsibility for the incident. If these demands are not met, Azerbaijan’s view of the incident may shift from being a practical reference point to a more emotionally charged remembrance point.

This incident already influences how the West assesses Azerbaijan-Russia relations, particularly in the post-2020 period, when there has been a growing misperception. The West has scrutinized Russia’s role during the Second Karabakh War, the deployment of Russian peacekeepers to the region, and their eventual early withdrawal. Many in the West have viewed these developments as part of a coordinated plan between Azerbaijan and Russia, dismissing Azerbaijan’s growing leverage over Moscow and underestimating Russia’s vested interests in the region—a region Russia has historically never left voluntarily.

Following the incident, people have a better understanding of Baku's assertive language. It is becoming more apparent to the West that Baku is neither a junior partner to Moscow nor part of its orbit. Instead, Azerbaijan is emerging as an independent actor, skillfully leveraging Russia’s vulnerabilities – particularly after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine – to advance its national interests. This includes compelling Russian forces to withdraw from the Karabakh region, demonstrating Azerbaijan’s growing influence and autonomy. This shift in understanding could open opportunities for Azerbaijan to reinvigorate its relations with the West, which have been strained with several EU members and, to some extent, with the United States.

However, this situation does not mean Azerbaijan will abandon pragmatism in its approach to Russia. While the plane crash marks a significant moment in Azerbaijan-Russia relations, Baku is unlikely to turn the relationship into a hostile one. Azerbaijan recognizes that escalating tensions with a neighboring country like Russia would neither align with its strategic interests nor lead to positive outcomes in the near or longer term.

⁠Following the plane’s hit, the pilot flew across the Caspian Sea to Aktau. Do we know why pilots – who saved several lives – would go that far? Is there a reasonable hypothesis as to why the aircraft could not land in Southern Russia? 

There are rumors and blatant lies spread about various aspects of the plane crash, some originating in the early days after the incident and still found in Russian pro-government media, evidently contributing to a cover-up of Russian responsibility. 

The question “Why was the plane not diverted to Mineralnye Vody or Makhachkala for an emergency landing?” (nearby cities in Russia) is standard. One wonders whether the Russian side intentionally prevented these options. Some observers will suggest that the Russian side deliberately instructed the pilots to fly over the Caspian Sea to ditch the aircraft. The definitive answer to this question must be fact-based, addressed after the results of the public inquiry are published, drawing on the “black box.”  Kazakhstan’s authorities said preliminary results will be shared with the public soon.

After this preliminary investigation, we may understand that Aktau was the obvious choice or the pilot's choice. That remains plausible. If a crash occurred, the pilot may have thought landing here would have had less impact on the ground and aircraft. Additionally, flying over the Caspian Sea allowed the pilot to burn off fuel, minimizing the risk of an explosion on impact and increasing the likelihood of survival for passengers. 

However, why the plane didn’t land in the closest Russian cities is not the only or most critical question when analyzing the crash. The most obvious questions are: “Why was the plane not informed of an emergency in Grozny in advance?”  “Why was the plane shot down?” and “Who is responsible?” These are the crucial questions that must be addressed.

If Ukrainian drones and missiles strike as far as Chechnya, what are the implications for civil aviation more broadly in the region? Will this incident have broader ramifications for the region's insurance or logistics costs?

Since the start of the Russian war in Ukraine, there has been a residual and lasting impact on civilian aviation and insurance. Certain insurers have withdrawn or limited their coverage for flights to and via Russia, leading several airlines to suspend flights there or alter their routes. So, this is not a new development. One major challenge was Russia's 2022 seizure of hundreds of foreign-owned aircraft following Western sanctions, resulting in significant insurance claims and disputes. As we know, the legal battles over compensation for these "lost" planes are still ongoing.

The same concerns about insurance coverage were evident for Azerbaijan Airlines in March 2022, when the airline suspended all flights to Russia, citing the lack of comprehensive insurance for international operations. However, by June of the same year, the airline resumed operations. At that time, no explanation was provided, but it is understood that Azerbaijan Airlines’ decision was a preventive measure, likely assessing the ongoing uncertainties in the insurance industry. Whether resuming flights happened because Azerbaijan Airlines resolved the insurance issue for flights to Russia remains unanswered. However, after the Azerbaijan Airlines plane crash, we see that one of Azerbaijan’s demands is compensation — not just for passengers and crew but for the plane itself,       indicating that insurance coverage for overflights may remain unresolved.

After the latest incident, the ramifications for civilian flights to and over Russia are more significant. Several airlines have subsequently suspended or cancelled flights. This includes Azerbaijan Airlines halting flights to several Russian cities, Kazakhstan’s Qazaq Air suspending some routes, El Al pausing Tel Aviv-Moscow flights, Turkmenistan Airlines cancelling Ashgabat-Moscow routes, and Flydubai suspending services to Sochi and Mineralnye Vody. Ultimately, this list will likely expand, which could be costly for Russia and its citizens. Logistically, this limitation further complicates connectivity and may drive up prices for flights and goods.

Azerbaijan experiences a similar impact. Many flights to and from Russia operated by Azerbaijani Airlines are heavily relied upon by people living in various Russian cities who lack other transportation options. Since 2020, starting with COVID-19 restrictions and later citing "security reasons," Azerbaijan has kept its land borders closed. After the plane crash, there have been more voices in Azerbaijani public discourse demanding the reopening of land borders, including with Russia. This has negatively affected those living in Russia, seasonal workers, and people in border areas who used to sell goods in nearby Russian cities. Whether these public demands will resonate with the Azerbaijani government remains to be seen. However, with Ukrainian drones now reaching the Northern Caucasus and growing instability in the broader region, the government may refer to these factors as additional justification or argumentation to keep the borders closed. That is a further “security”  factor that could be evoked. 

⁠Is there a concern about political or security instability in the North Caucasus? What are the primary implications for Azerbaijani national security if that is the case?

The political and security instability in the North Caucasus has long been recognized as impacting Azerbaijan. The two Chechen wars and concerns over terrorism primarily shaped them in the 1990s. Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the North Caucasus has gained significance as a hub for radicalization and the recruitment of fighters, fueled by established networks of Islamist militants. These networks attracted individuals with promises of religiously motivated causes as well as a desire for revenge against Russia.

These channels also recruited some Azerbaijani citizens. Although religiously driven, their motives often differed from— and extended beyond — the local grievances of the North Caucasus population, whose desire for "revenge" was primarily directed against the Russian state. The Azerbaijanis who joined these radical and terrorist cells aimed to challenge the civic and secular nature of Azerbaijan, promoting a governance model rooted in religious ideology. This vision threatened to destabilize the social and political fabric of the state, thereby posing a direct threat to Azerbaijani national security. In response, Azerbaijan introduced provisions to strip citizenship from individuals who joined terrorist organizations. Additionally, Azerbaijan has occasionally been targeted by jihadist terrorist attacks and incursions into its northern regions bordering the North Caucasus. 

From an Azerbaijani national security perspective, the North Caucasus has represented a subtle security concern that requires attention but lacks immediate urgency.  This is in contrast to formerly occupied territories in and around Karabakh, for instance, which represented a critical and immediate security threat, demanding urgent resources and decisive action due to their direct impact on national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The North Caucasus remains and is perceived as a security threat. Russia's war in Ukraine has various destabilizing effects on the region, ranging from economic hardship to the strengthening of radicalisation. A potential political destabilization in Moscow, leading to a vacuum of power, would bring political fragmentation and conflict, including separatism. The region is a mosaic of many ethnicities; some anticipate or even hope for Russia's “decentralization” or collapse. However, such a chaotic scenario would be a security nightmare for neighboring countries. 

The aftermath of the Syrian civil war and the collapse of the Assad regime raise the possibility of radicalized returnees to the region, thereby broadening the spectrum of radicalization for both Russia and the region at large. The resurgence of concepts like a "Caucasus Caliphate" could directly challenge Azerbaijani security.

⁠Russia is Azerbaijan’s third biggest trade partner. Moscow is no longer the leading security provider in the region. However, there are over 120,000 Russian citizens in Azerbaijan and hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis in Russia. Many Azerbaijanis will study in Moscow’s elite academic institutions. Diplomats on both sides of the Caucasus reiterate that the relationship will continue to be “important” and even “strategic.” Do we know how these assertions resonate with Azerbaijani public opinion?

First, simply calling a relationship "strategic" or "important" doesn’t necessarily make it so, and the meaning of such terms can resonate differently for each side. Due to Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine, the connotations of such terms are harmful in the West. This often creates more noise than clarity, evident in discussions surrounding Russia-Azerbaijan relations.

The characterisation of Moscow-Baku relations as "strategic allies" is often linked to the 2022 Declaration on Allied Interaction, which has been misunderstood and misrepresented in public discourse, locally and internationally. When Azerbaijan signed the agreement in 2022, referring to both countries as "allies" within the framework of this declaration, Baku’s primary goal was to create leverage for regaining full sovereignty over the remaining parts of Karabakh, which were under the control of Russian peacekeeping forces. The document includes several articles emphasizing respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, aligning with Azerbaijan's objectives at the time. This agreement also served as a diplomatic tool for Azerbaijan to protest and demand an end to actions by the Russian side in Karabakh, such as the use of Armenian toponyms by Russian peacekeepers, the deployment of humanitarian aid directly to Armenian-populated areas without Azerbaijani oversight, and the organization of celebrations for significant Russian national events in the region. 

Furthermore, Azerbaijan used the agreement to object to Russia’s allowance of Armenian military forces to remain in Karabakh under the guise of security concerns despite their presence being deemed illegal. Azerbaijan also criticized Russian peacekeepers for engaging with the self-proclaimed representatives of Karabakh Armenians in ways that appeared to treat the region as a sovereign or independent entity, an attempt to create a "mini patron state" under Russian influence. Azerbaijan saw these actions as undermining its sovereignty, favoring Russian and local Armenian interests, and a sign that Russia was trying to assert its role as a security provider for the local Armenian population — thereby laying the groundwork for a prolonged Russian presence in Karabakh. Baku intended the 2022 agreement to diplomatically frame and challenge such actions, simplifying the process of classifying them as hostile and demanding their cessation.

At the time, no one anticipated that the war in Ukraine would break out, significantly weakening Russia and shifting the West’s approach to the region. Had these events occurred a year earlier, it isn't easy to imagine Azerbaijan signing such an agreement with Russia.Subsequent discourse has primarily overlooked this nuance. The war in Ukraine altered the calculus, weakening Russia and increasing Azerbaijan’s leverage over Moscow. This shift allowed Baku to begin gradually but firmly pushing Russian forces out of Azerbaijani territory before the end of their first five-year mandate as peacekeepers.

It is also important to note that when each side refers to the relationship as "strategic," it carries different implications. For Baku, the relationship is "strategic" in maintaining direct and reciprocal ties with Moscow while safeguarding Azerbaijan’s core interests, particularly security. Azerbaijan has consistently resisted closer integration with Russia’s security and economic alliances, such as the CSTO or the Eurasian Economic Union. Membership in such partnerships traditionally signified a country's reliance on Moscow. After the Ukraine war, Russia’s definition of "strategic partnership" has become more fluid and minimalistic, focusing primarily on not joining Western sanctions or providing military support to Ukraine.

In the West, relations with Russia after the Ukraine war are often oversimplified into binary categories, dividing countries into "Russia’s allies" or "pro-Western" based on how hawkish they are toward Moscow. This approach fails to consider the complex strategies employed by countries in the Caucasus or Central Asia—particularly those bordering Russia—to manage bilateral relations while minimizing the risk of potential hostility from Moscow. Each country has its approach to balancing these risks, with varying levels of success, but the principle remains the same: to protect their independence and core interests.

Azerbaijan’s public perception of Russia as a "strategic partner" defies this taxonomy. Russia is framed in terms of a colonial past and a new national identity following the disintegration of the USSR. Moscow’s actions during key events— such as the First Karabakh War and the subsequent occupation of Azerbaijani territories – have fueled such perceptions. Public dissatisfaction deepened further when Russia deployed its forces as "peacekeepers" in Karabakh. As a result, the idea of Russia as a "strategic partner" does not resonate with the Azerbaijani public.

However, the necessity of maintaining pragmatic relations with a powerful neighbor has led to the widespread perception of Russia as an important country.  Economic ties and trade relations further reinforce this view, as many still see Russia as a key market and partner despite broader geopolitical shifts. Turkey is the faithful “strategic ally” of Azerbaijani public opinion. Other important partners are Israel and Pakistan, which are valued for their actions during the Second Karabakh War. Their military and political support strengthened Azerbaijan's position and contributed significantly to the war’s outcome.

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis