The political arena in Armenia has been marked by minor political shocks such as resignations, speeches, announcements, and misdemeanors since the outbreak of fighting along the Armenia-Azerbaijani border in September 2022 and the subsequent ‘Azerbaijani incursions’ into Armenian territory.

The recent territorial advance reported by Armenia’s National Security Service (NSS) again sparked a twofold public debate. First, it incited the Armenian opposition leaders’ heavy criticism of PM Nikol Pashinian over “the loss of yet another portion of Armenia’s internationally recognized territory." Armenian politician and former PM Hrant Bagratyan blamed Pashinyan for treason, hailing the recent “Tegh-Kornidzor” action as an act against the Russian peacekeeping contingent. Bagratyan deplored the "possibility of eliminating the Armenian army and transferring its powers to the NSS in the run-up to a full-scale war.”  

Moreover, an uproar was caused in Yerevan about the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s (CSTO) protective role in the region and the effectiveness of the EU Monitoring mission in Armenia. 

Minor public discontent was raised over the words of the EU monitoring mission’s head Markus Ritter who answered the German Deutsche Welle news agency’s question about the likelihood of a large-scale Azerbaijani offensive by stating: “We cannot intervene; we only have binoculars and cameras at our disposal.”

This was contrasted with the CSTO Secretariat’s recent statement about the constant readiness of the military bloc to send a mission to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border to ensure the security of Armenia.This contrast was reflected in a few experts' concerns over the government's lack of response to this proposal. 

International relations expert Grigor Balasanyan finds it unclear why Armenia hesitates to accept help from its strategic ally while relying on the EU civilian mission, which is only "in possession of binoculars and cameras." He suggests that there may be an internal force in Armenia preventing from seeking CSTO aid, which Azerbaijan is taking advantage of to advance its positions. Alternatively, there may be an agreement between the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides that Armenia will delay applying for CSTO aid. Meanwhile, Balasanyan argues that the EU monitoring mission in Armenia has a different purpose: to reduce the alertness of the Armenian public so that Armenia does not seek assistance from the CSTO.

Against this background, fury erupted among some politicians and experts in Armenia’s foreign policy balancing between the West and Russia amid the recent issue related to the ratification of the Rome statute. The country put brakes on the treaty ratification process in the wake of Russia’s chilling warnings about highly negative consequences in bilateral relations if Armenia joins the International Criminal Court (ICC). Following these threats, Armenia’s Parliament speaker Alen Simonyan stated there is no urgency regarding the ratification process. Meanwhile, he expressed the parliament’s reluctance to rush into the matter at this point. 

“Although there may be some dissatisfaction with Russia on certain issues, I do not believe that the proposed step would be a correct course of action,” Simonyan highlighted, referring to the possibility of arresting Russian President Vladimir Putin based on the warrant issued by the ICC. 

According to Ruben Mehrabyan, the deputy chair of the “For the Republic” pro-western party, the impulses coming from the government give Armenia a big reputational blow. Mehrabyan argues that Armenia should understand that every decision in this problematic situation comes with a certain level of risk. However, he says, the country should choose an option that balances risks and opportunities. 

“The recent developments in Armenia, including those around “Tegh-Kornnidzor," are all part of different tactics that align with a single strategy: Russia’s hybrid war against Armenia. The ultimate objective of this strategy is to undermine Armenia's democracy and its democratically elected authorities completely," he added. 

An expert of the ORBELI analytical center, Artak Khachatryan, contends that Armenia's current foreign policy appears to be complementarian. However, a more precise position is essential in the face of significant geopolitical processes. 

“Complementarity does not offer wide prospects in this situation. A definitive decision needs to be made regarding whether Armenia will ratify the statute and what direction it will take regarding its security component,” he concluded. 

Political expert Edvard Antinyan finds Russia’s apprehension very strange, given that Armenia ratified the Rome Statute in 1999, even before Russia and the United States. He also outlined that Armenia took the matter to the Constitutional Court for legal assessment before the ICC issued a warrant for Putin’s detention.

Read also: Armenia's Constitutional Court Approves Rome Statute Ratification