By Davit Muradyan (Armenia) & Polad Muradli (Azerbaijan)

Despite some notable exceptions, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is not being actively covered in either Armenia or Azerbaijan at this time. And the reason is not only COVID-19. Unfortunately, no significant development in the negotiation process has recently been observed with regards to the said conflict. The last couple of years can be characterized by the absence of consistent negotiation processes followed by the consideration of clear terms and deadlines, as opposed to the previous decades.

As Tatul Hakobyan, a Yerevan-based author and journalist stated, ‘lack of any developments in negotiations have led to a vacuum-like situation in Armenia, where no public or media debate is going on with respect to the conflict’: “You can debate on something you know is good or bad. How can you have a debate now, when there is no negotiation? The experience shows that the exploitation of a topic by the media requires the existence of any kind of ground. Accordingly, the discourse around Karabakh was repeatedly exploited by the media whenever there was a development in the negotiation process. Currently, however, there is no manipulation of this topic by the media. There was some when the new government came to power leading to a discourse that “‘Nikol Pashinyan came to give up the lands’, however those ideas were so primitive that just did not last long.”

Unfortunately, history has remained the primary battlefield in the information war between two countries. This has proved to be the case during the discussions held between respective leaders at the Munich Security Conference held in February 2020. As Rauf Garagozov, the Baku-based independent expert put it, “the Munich Conference demonstrated, that the leaders of two countries were more willing to go back to the 2nd century [BCE] rather than discussing the future.”

According to Garagozov, the painful collective memories of these two nations have remained among the major factors contributing to the conflict. This factor in itself can also be characterized as a common trait between these two nations, which, in turn, has led to the “competitive victimhood” between the sides: put simply, both nations are competing to present themselves to the international community as the real victims of the conflict. Armenian painful collective memory goes back to 1915, while the Azerbaijani one is associated with the hundreds of thousands of IDPs of the 1990s following the loss in the war around the Nagorno Karabakh. Thus, as stated by Garagozov, “with their schematic template of ‘a lonely nation surrounded entirely by enemies’ and their century-long experience of disseminating and sharing their history and narratives with the outer world, the Armenian side seems to have a natural advantage regarding the notion of ‘competitive victimhood’. A similar tradition of disseminating their narrative has just recently begun to take ground in Azerbaijan, so they seem to be far behind the opposite side in this regard.”

Following the Velvet Revolution in Armenia in May 2018, Nikol Pashinyan, the opposition leader, became the prime minister of Armenia. In December 2018, his “Civil Contract” party, along with other parties brought him a large win in new parliamentary elections. Nikol Pashinyan formed a new cabinet and started large economic and administrative reforms. The Nagorno Karabakh issue, in turn, was announced as one of his government’s priorities.

During the first year since the Velvet Revolution, the Azerbaijani side maintained certain expectations from the new government in Yerevan. Several measures aimed at reducing violence along the borders were taken by both sides within that period, followed by a markedly positive rhetorical shift from the senior Azerbaijani officials with regard to the prospects of the negotiations.

According to Ahmad Alili, the head of the research department, of the Caucasus Policy Analysis Centre: “During this period one could notice a certain level of sympathy towards Armenia from the Azerbaijani population, mainly due to the fact that N.Pashinyan was the person who managed to oust the former president S.Sargsyan, whose personality was deeply despised in Azerbaijan as “a war criminal” and one of the main figures obstructing peace.” “Another reason why the overall atmosphere was less negative during that period”, - Alili believes -, “was that the new government in Armenia was prioritizing dealing with the socio-economic problems and trying to keep the Nagorno Karabakh problem in the background without any radical statements.”

As stated by Tatul Hakobyan, “following the revolution in Armenia, the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev had to change his rhetoric respectively, as the situation in the region transformed in a way that Armenia was perceived by the international community as a democratic country. Accordingly, Ilham Aliyev tackled this challenge by taking specific measures aimed at reducing the Armenophobic feelings of the society in Azerbaijan in an orderly manner. These measures, in turn, proved fruitful as for a certain period following May 2018, one could observe a significant fall regarding the intensity of Armenophobic statements disseminated by the Azerbaijani media.”

Indeed, the developments in Armenia, sparked hope in many segments of the Azerbaijani public for genuine, result-oriented dialogue and negotiations.

Meanwhile, one of the major flash points between the official narratives within the said period was associated with the fact, that since the Velvet Revolution Armenian PM Pashinyan directed substantial efforts towards establishing the "actorness" of Nagorno Karabakh. He openly demanded that the legitimacy of the “Nagorno Karabakh Republic” as an independent side in the negotiations be recognized.

When Pashinyan came to power, he promised to bring Nagorno Karabakh to the negotiation table and offered a new thesis for the conflict resolution: “Any solution for Nagorno Karabakh conflict must be accepted by the peoples of Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan.” This was a new attitude and a new formulation for a leader of Armenia. During his speech in Parliament  on November 1, 2018, Pashinyan said he was expecting that the same sentence would be delivered by any Azerbaijani official.

According to Tevan Poghosyan, the President of the International Centre for Human Development: “This is a diplomatic formulation, which means the solution will be a document, which can be signed by all the parties. The most obvious example of such a document is [the] Bishkek ceasefire agreement, which was signed by Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan in 1994, which also is the only functioning document so far. Many people understand that this formulation means the solution is not foreseen in the nearest future, as Azerbaijan is not ready for the terms that are acceptable for Artsakh. From the other side, conditions demanded by Azerbaijan are not accepted by Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh.”

In the meantime, the coverage of Pashinyan’s aforementioned statements by the Armenian media, according to Tatul Hakobyan, provided diverse messages for the society, “because of the underdeveloped Armenian journalistic community and lack of professional journalists who could organize really serious debates on Pashinyan’s theses.” Hakobyan accordingly provides three different levels of interpretations for Pashinyan’s messages by the media. At the first level, some media institutions focused on PM Pashinyan’s attempts to certify the legitimacy of the “Nagorno Karabakh Republic”, by bringing them back to the negotiation table for the first time in more than twenty years.

Meanwhile, other observers would claim that by declaring the “Nagorno Karabakh Republic” as the third party to the negotiations, Pashinyan was essentially trying to pass the responsibility of the resolution process to the latter, thus relieving himself and his government from criticisms for potential unilateral blunders around the negotiations. The previous twenty years has been characterized by an abnormal situation where the representatives of Nagorno Karabakh kept declaring their trust and allegiance towards the former presidents of Armenia, Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, yet having never accepted any compromises or versions of the resolution process negotiated by the latter with the Azerbaijani side. Accordingly, this formulation was interpreted as an invitation by PM Pashinyan for the Nagorno Karabakh to join the negotiation table and share the burden of resolving the conflict.

Finally, the third interpretation of Pashinyan’s statements referred to his confidence that the introduction of Nagorno Karabakh to the negotiation table will never be accepted by the Azerbaijani side. According to Hakobyan, “any solution will create opposition in 94 percent of the Armenian population, who themselves brought Pashinyan to power, thus he does not want any resolution process to take place.” “I justify Pashinyan’s position”, Hakobyan goes on, “because Azerbaijan wants everything or nothing.”

Yet according to Ahmad Alili, PM Pashinyan’s rhetoric was not a new thing in itself, as this topic had been bouncing back ever since the 1994 Bishkek ceasefire agreement. However, Pashinyan’s lack of affiliations with the Nagorno Karabakh’s leaders provided him a legitimacy to re-actualize this issue, - a condition which the previous leaders of Armenia could not enjoy due to their associations with the Nagorno Karabakh “clan”.

Alili asserts, that “the major source for the twist of words around this topic was about the question whether the Bishkek ceasefire agreement was bi- or trilateral, as there was no mention of the “Nagorno Karabakh Republic”, with the alleged third side instead referred as the “combatants” within the document.” “All this confusion around the interpretation of the wording of the agreement”, to Alili, “is an indication of the fact that this particular controversy between the narratives will continue to remain in the active phase for the near future.”

Initially the Azerbaijani side perceived Pashinyan’s comment that Nagorno Karabakh’s Armenian community should be a part of the resolution process as a destructive and a more radical approach towards the negotiations compared to that of the Sargsyan era. However, having initially resisted the idea, officials in Baku came to realize, as Rauf Garagozov put it, “that Pashinyan was ultimately right about the fact that the Azerbaijani government had to deal with the Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh separately.” Ahmad Alili also agrees with this point, asserting that “positive results might be achieved if the Azerbaijani side distinguished their approaches towards Armenians of Armenia and those of Nagorno Karabakh.”

Ultimately, PM Pashinyan's demand to introduce the “Nagorno Karabakh Republic” to the negotiation process forced the Azerbaijani side to adapt their narrative by revitalizing the idea that there are actually four sides to the conflict, the fourth being the Azerbaijani Community of Nagorno Karabakh, the members of whom resided in the region prior to the conflict.

Accordingly, since fall 2018, the Azerbaijani side began the process of “strengthening the institutional capacity” of the Azerbaijanis of Nagorno Karabakh, which would allow them to have an official representation in possible talks with the Armenian community of Nagorno Karabakh. In December 2018, the organization representing the Nagorno Karabakh Azerbaijanis “elected” its new head, Tural Ganjaliyev, then an employee of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, now a member of parliament, born in Shusha (Shushi in Armenian), in the Nagorno Karabakh region. The statements given by the said organization as well as by the Azerbaijani MFA proclaimed the willingness of the Azerbaijani side to establish contacts between the two communities of Nagorno Karabakh. “The appointment of a person with diplomatic skills as a head of the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno Karabakh”, according to Alili, “was a message by the Azerbaijani side that they were ready to begin supporting community-based dialogues as part of wider ethnic reconciliation.”

Eventually, the Azerbaijani propaganda began taking advantage of this tactical move by openly claiming that the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities are equal, and the latter should also join the negotiation process with the same rights as the former. In this regard, the promotion of the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno Karabakh, to Ahmad Alili, “has indeed become a neutralizing factor with regards to this matter.”

In Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, this move was perceived as an attempt to undermine the free and unrestricted exercise of the Nagorno Karabakh people’s right to self-determination. Thus, having not rejected the possibility of a civil dialogue between the communities, the Armenian side has not yet supported the idea of including the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno Karabakh in the negotiation process. According to Tevan Poghosyan, “announcing democracy narrowed the range of activities for the Armenian government. Azerbaijan now wants to play on that, as they have begun promoting the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno Karabakh.”

As of now, the Azerbaijani side keeps increasingly demanding that the rights of the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno Karabakh be recognized, while the Armenian side keeps strengthening their stance against the legitimacy of the said community, by stressing its dependence on the Azerbaijani government. This issue, in particular, seemed to remain the major point of dispute during the period of warming relations between the opposing sides.

As stated by Hakobyan, “surprisingly, the internal processes in Armenia also made a serious impact with regards to the internal developments in Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani society began realizing that the authoritarian regimes, or in their case, even the totalitarian ones could be easily overthrown, as with the case of Serzh Sargsyan’s reign: the Armenian president who was eager to rule twenty or whatever years more, was forced to say he was wrong and resign, following only a number of days of protests. This message, in turn, was terrifying for Ilham Aliyev, and he realized he had to take certain steps, or at least the imitation of them. The simple fact that the Azerbaijani president began taking selfies with his wife, was a direct echo of the developments in Armenia.” Hakobyan’s assertions embody the idea, that Aliyev’s reform agenda, having gathered pace since fall 2019, followed with a massive government reshuffle - which saw largely influential veteran apparatchiks replaced by young, often Western-educated officials, as well as the dissolvement of the parliament and snap parliamentary elections in February this year - can be characterized as an attempt of loss of face in front of the developments happening in Armenia.

This period of sympathy towards Armenia, however, lasted only until August 5th 2019, when PM Pashinyan during his visit to the de facto capital of Nagorno Karabakh stated, that “Karabakh is Armenia - period.” This explicit assertion caused an uproar from the Azerbaijani side, leading to the so-called “war of punctuations”. President Aliyev responded during his speech at the Valdai Club, Russia, in October 2019, with “Karabakh is Azerbaijan - exclamation point!.” The increasing tension in the official rhetoric between two countries quickly subsided the actuality of the mutual promise of “preparing the populations for peace”, replacing that discourse with a petty debate over history and ‘phrases’, which was also demonstrated during the Munich discussions between two leaders. In this respect, the inauguration of the newly elected de facto president of the “Nagorno Karabakh Republic” Arayik Harutyunyan in May this year in Shusha, a city in Nagorno Karabakh that has a substantial emotional meaning for the Azerbaijani community, was followed with significant resentment by the latter, unfortunately indicating a next step in the straining relations between two sides.

PM Pashinyan’s recoil from his peace-oriented discourse, in fact, stemmed from his realization that the Nagorno Karabakh issue had come to work against his interests, as in any resolution option after the agreement on mutual compromises, the Armenian side would be forced to make more practical concessions. This might ultimately lead to the exploitation of this topic by the opposition parties and media, followed by mass protests against the Armenian government. Eventually, Pashinyan opted instead for keeping the emotional stance of the population in check, rather than promoting himself as an advocate for peace. The Azerbaijani side, in turn, following a year-long expression of goodwill, seemed to run out of patience and reversed their expectations of any kind of developments in the negotiations.

Currently, the situation in the frontline is relatively calm. Shootings and deaths have decreased significantly, and the parties are fighting an internal enemy - the coronavirus. When the pandemic ends, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs will restart their visits to the region, meeting with the foreign ministers, the leaders of the countries, as well as the communities. We are in a situation that there is no upcoming election in the countries, and the co-chairs can restart negotiations, bring new documents or revive old ones.

Hereby Ahmad Alili suggests, that “one step to be taken is about the transparency of the peace talks. The lack of it leads to the national leaders manipulating the results of the negotiations undertaken behind closed doors, by exaggerating the moments where their interests are being upheld and understating the other’s. As a result, both sides attempt to convince their respective audiences, - without the latter seeing it -, that the documents signed during the talks are supporting their respective interests, thus further pushing for a more maximalist narrative against the opposite side. Achieving transparency should be an inevitable step to be taken in order to avoid the further manipulation of the leaders.”

To Tevan Poghosyan, however, “the Nagorno Karabakh problem is not an issue to discuss in [the] media. Nagorno Karabakh belongs to those who live there. Nagorno Karabakh people live their life, they hold elections, form government not paying attention [to if] anybody recognizes them or not. And the world applies double standards on this issue. Whatever decision is forced and negotiated outside, is not relevant for the people who live there. For instance, the USSR decision on Nagorno Karabakh in 1921 aimed at the ‘lasting peace between Armenians and Muslims’. How long did it last? Accordingly, how long will the decisions made by international institutions such as the OSCE or EU last anyway?”

Meanwhile, according to Alili, “the only valid solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict passes through the peaceful cohabitation of the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities of Nagorno Karabakh. Special attention should be drawn towards preventing narratives which can negatively affect this course.” Tatul Hakobyan, consecutively, maintains that “the Munich panel discussion indeed demonstrated that the two leaders are neither ready, nor willing to start a serious negotiation on changing the status-quo.” Rauf Garagozov, in turn, agrees with this point, contending that “the dominant narratives of today are not leading the way to peace. If peace is the ultimate goal, we have to begin working with the narratives.”

Here Rauf Garagozov goes on to suggest that “the painful collective memories of these two nations might actually become the uniting factor, instead of the dividing one.” “In this regard”, Garagozov proposes, “gradual reciprocal initiatives in tension reduction (GRITR) might be a useful method in downsizing the existing confrontation between these narratives.”