Armenia, once Russia’s main ally in the South Caucasus, turns to dramatically shift its foreign policy, distancing itself from the unreliable security ally. After suffering diplomatic and security setbacks at the hands of Russia, Armenia is looking to the West for new allies. 

In the past several months, the Armenian government has appeared to have taken bold steps and made statements against its already close ally, Russia. Armenia has “de facto frozen” its Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) membership, announced the removal of the Russian border troops from the Zvartnots International Airport, and claimed ambitions for EU membership in just two months amid deteriorating relations with Russia. 

Speaking in Turkey in early March, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan announced that Armenia was seeking new allies and opportunities in the West, including membership in the European Union. On March 14, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling on the EU to consider Armenia's candidacy for membership in the 27-nation bloc. The Armenian government praised the resolution, with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan saying it was another opportunity to rethink Armenia's "vision" for the future and calling for nationwide consolidation around the new opportunities. 

Armenia's unprecedented rapprochement with the EU comes at a time when the country, following the path of its northern neighbour Georgia, is trying to push Russia away and seize the opportunity for European integration that it already missed once a decade ago, when the country, refusing to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in 2013, made an overnight decision to join Russia's Eurasian Economic Union. This decision limited Armenia's cooperation with the EU to the level of cooperation on democratic reforms and alignment with Moscow on security and economic issues. 

Bittersweet Relations

Armenia’s heavy economic and political dependence on Russia grew dramatically following Moscow’s mediation of a ceasefire agreement with Azerbaijan in November 2020. Russia’s involvement and the deployment of the peacekeeping forces to Nagorno-Karabakh made Armenia as reliant on Russia as ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

Additionally, with a pro-Russian stance, the Armenian government never publicly questioned the alliance with Russia up until 2022, when the country felt abandoned by its security ally amid Azerbaijan’s military offensive along the two countries’ state borders. Since then, Armenia and Russia have been on the verge of a complete fallout. 

Armenia, which is engaged in a verbal warfare with Russia and is seeking prospective alliances, remained mild in its steps directly against Russia in the first period, hoping for Russia to regain Armenia and Armenians’ trust. As the discord between Moscow and official Yerevan remained largely unchanged, Armenia initiated measures, such as ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which Moscow regarded as the initial significant anti-Russian step.  While Armenia claimed that it ratified the statute to take Azerbaijan to International Court should it attack the country’s sovereign territories, Moscow perceived it as a “hostile” and “unfriendly” step as the Court has ordered an arrest warrant against Russia’s President Vladimir Putin for the war crimes committed in Ukraine. 

In late February 2024, the Armenian Prime Minister announced that Armenia had de facto frozen its participation in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, expressing dissatisfaction with the treaty and complaining about its inability to fulfil its responsibilities. He said that if relations between the treaty and the country do not improve, and if they do not make clear their stance on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, Yerevan will formally suspend its participation in the alliance.

In a fresh turn, Armenia requested that Russia remove its border troops from Zvartnots International Airport that is located 15 km west of Yerevan. Armenian National Security Council Chief Armen Grigoryan stated that Armenia has the “full capacity” to provide security at its country’s main international airport. This move comes as Armenia and the EU announce their readiness to facilitate the visa liberalisation process and allow Armenian citizens to travel in the EU without acquiring Schengen visas.

Political analyst Eric Grigorian says that the direction that Armenia is taking is “very clear” and that the “pivot has already happened.” “The issue is the management of the pivot to have the least negative impact on Armenia,” he says, adding that Russia, in fact, “has been at war with Armenia since 2022”. “What I mean by Armenia is this particular government, which they want overthrown. For that purpose, they have weaponized Azerbaijan in its aggressions against Armenia and Artsakh with the hope of getting rid of this government and stopping the Western pivot”. 

Despite the war of words and the anti-Pashinyan propaganda by prominent Russian propaganda figures, the Kremlin still considers Armenia an ally. “That is what is important in bilateral relations,” Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated in late February. Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, while mild in his statements about Armenia, stated late last year that “it would not be in Armenia’s interests to leave” the CSTO. 

“Missing in Action” 

The two countries' relations started worsening in September 2022, during and after the deadly border clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia resulting in the advancement of Azerbaijani troops in certain sections of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. The security cooperation agreements between Armenia and Russia stipulate that Russia must provide military support to Armenia in the event of external aggression or if it requests assistance from Russia. Similar regulations exist in the Russia-led CSTO. Both, however, left Armenia’s requests for help unanswered, triggering the country to accuse them of “absolute indifference.” Russia justified its non-interference by arguing that the lack of border demarcation disputed the sovereignty of the territories Azerbaijan had captured. Statements by Russian officials further angered Armenia, which accused Moscow of questioning Armenia's territorial integrity. 

The United States emerged as a mediator of the ceasefire agreement back then, with the European Union deploying an observation mission to the Armenian section of the two countries’ borders, despite Azerbaijani reservations. Baku and Moscow have since blamed the EU mission for being counterproductive and not supporting resolution of the issues. Although the CSTO put forth a proposal to substitute the EU mission, Armenia insisted that the matter not be deliberated upon during the summit of the Treaty. Official Yerevan has since refused to take part in the CSTO military exercises and summits, turning down Moscow’s initiatives for peace talks. Official Baku, however, once keen on Moscow’s support, now looks for bilateral talks without any foreign interference. 

“Zangezur Corridor” and Russia’s Interests 

Another issue that adds to the existing tensions between Russia and Armenia is Moscow’s support for the opening of the “Zangezur corridor,” a stipulated extraterritorial corridor connecting Azerbaijan’s western regions with its exclave of Nakhchivan. As Armenia and Azerbaijan fail to agree on the main issues of the peace agreement, namely the problems of border demarcation and the opening of transport links, Russia’s role as a mediator and its overall influence in the region appear to be shrinking, with Armenia questioning the need for Russian troops’ presence in Armenia. 

Since Azerbaijan's military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia has lost leverage over Armenia and Azerbaijan, as the presence of peacekeepers in the region does not serve any of the parties. Russia sees the opening of transport links as an opportunity to regain control over the region. In recent months, relations between Moscow and Baku have been tender, with Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, stating in March that the cooperation between the two neighbours has reached “new heights.” The Kremlin has been one of the proponents of the so-called Zangezur corridor, an extraterritorial route linking the western regions of Azerbaijan with the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan via the southern Armenian region of Syunik, which is to be patrolled by Russian border troops. 

Yerevan-based political analyst Eric Grigorian says that the “Putin corridor,” as he calls it, is a “Russian instrument to have a permanent presence in the region.” According to him, after the mass exodus of ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, there is no justification for the presence of Russian troops in Armenia or the region.
To avoid the implementation of the Russian-Azerbaijani strategy over the corridor, Grigorian says Armenia should strive for a “closer partnership with the West as a counterbalance to the Moscow-Baku tandem,” meanwhile working on the acceleration of its military upgrades. The point of no return for Armenia, Grigoryan says, will be the removal of the Russian base from Armenia. Official Yerevan has not voiced such plans, but Nikol Pashinyan stated in October 2023 [folllowing Azerbaijan’s military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh] that Armenia does not see “any advantages” from the Russian troop presence in Armenia. 

The number of Russian troops on Armenian soil amounts to around 10,000, with over 5,000 of them based in the 102nd military base in Armenia’s second-largest city, Gyumri. 

It Is Not Just the Government     

As the Pashinyan government strengthens its ties with the West, the general public in Armenia also reconsiders its views on Armenia’s allies and their relationships with them. A recent poll conducted by the International Republican Institute revealed a significant deterioration in credibility towards Russia. Merely 30% of Armenians perceive the relations between Yerevan and Moscow as "good," representing a 60% reduction in comparison to the period preceding the Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2019. 

Along with the numbers, the public mood in the country also turned against Russia, with more and more people joining and organising anti-Russian protests in Armenia, along with the Russians residing in Armenia, as the war in Ukraine continues. 

Contributed by Ani Avetisyan