As the US' position worldwide evolves leaving much uncertainty, Georgia starts to feel the geopolitical reverberations. There is a growing anxiety in Tbilisi over how the US would contain Russia in the South Caucasus particularly in the light of Washington's shift in attention to Asia-Pacific. Moreover, Tbilisi also fears that the West (EU in particular) is starting to gradually soften its position towards Moscow. This demands reconsideration of some aspects of Georgia’s foreign policy: direct dialogue with Moscow and reliance on other neighbors and maybe even distant China.

The US is reconsidering its global position. China's economic and military growth has attracted much of Washington's attention. All global military and economic trends indicate that a competition between China and the US will increase in the coming years. This means drawing the US resources to the Asia-Pacific and or other vital places in Eurasia which are open to China's influence.

Small states across Eurasia who so far have enjoyed occasional US economic and military aid, are most vulnerable to Washington's shifts in position. For Georgia this major geopolitical change could cause long-term geopolitical troubles as the country's aspirations for NATO membership have traditionally hinged on close relations with Washington.

The first signs of the US’ waning attention towards Georgia became apparent this year when problems grew around the port of Anaklia (west Georgia). Despite the US' clear strategic interest in having the port built (as was well reflected in Mike Pompeo's June 13th speech in Washington), it is likely that troubles around the port will continue to indicate a lack of resolve on the part of the US.

Added to this is US president Donald Trump's occasional praise of Russia, its president Vladimir Putin, and stating that there is a need to find a common ground with Moscow. For example, during the latest congressional testimony in Washington, it was reported that a Navy freedom-of-navigation operation in the Black Sea with visits to Georgian ports was cancelled earlier in 2019 after Trump complained to then-national security adviser John Bolton that the operation would go counter to Russia.

Though finding a compromise with Russia would be a natural development to cool down the existing confrontation, many in Georgia fear that possible improvement of US-Russia relations could involve Washington’s abandonment of larger aid to Georgia and the latter’s hopes for NATO aspirations.

Tbilisi's fears are aggravated by the developments in the EU too. Since the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Brussels and Washington have been working in concert to impose and keep economic sanctions against Russia. This combined western resolve also meant the gradual increase of NATO troop presence in eastern Europe.

However, the recent return of Russia into PACE and the restoration of military cooperation between France and Russia (frozen since 2014) indicate that changes in EU’s Russia policy are being widely discussed.

Moreover, over the past couple of months French president Emanuel Macron's statements were another sources of concern for Tbilisi. In several successive interviews Macron stressed the need to find a compromise with Moscow as soon as possible so that not to lose Russia to China’s rising influence. These discussions also coincide with general problems in the transatlantic ties where Washington often criticizes European states for not spending enough within NATO.

These divisions in the west quite naturally cause fears in NATO/EU aspirant Georgia and causes reconsideration of some parts of the country’s foreign policy. It is no wonder that Georgian and Russian FMs (David Zalkaliani and Sergey Lavrov respectively) just held (September 26th) a meeting for the first time since the Russian-Georgian War of 2008.

Though little is known about the discussed topics, the timing of the Zalkaliani-Lavrov meeting is telling as it coincides with the big geopolitical trends discussed above. Considering the shifting balance of power, it is likely that similar meetings will continue in the future. Bilateral Georgian-Russian contacts will remain short of a full re-establishment of diplomatic relations, but limited cooperation on security and economic issues is likely to continue.

Though there are clear signs of decreasing US attention to Georgia, this is not to say that there will be a radical break in Washington’s close relations with Tbilisi. The US will continue to constitute Georgia’s major source of financial and military aid. Since 2010, US non-military aid to Georgia has totalled around $64 million a year on average, in addition to a five-year Millennium Challenge Corporation grant of $140 million to support education. And this support is likely to continue for the next year.

In 2018, US military aid to Georgia totalled $40.4 million. In addition, in November 2017, the US State Department approved a Foreign Military Sale of over 400 Javelin portable anti-tank missiles, as well as launchers, associated equipment, and training, at a total estimated cost of $75 million.

In fact, many in Washington now think that the US should send more military and economic aid to Georgia as the country could serve as a good pillar for the US’ containment of Russia. There is also a continued belief in Washington, as reflected by a bill — the Georgia Support Act — passed in late October, in the need to support the territorial integrity of Georgia. Moreover, Georgia's prime minister, Giorgi Gakharia, in a number of his recent statements stressed the importance of US support as critical to thwarting Russia's encroachment in Georgia and the region overall.

However, the current level of US support and divisions within Trump’s administration and general western resolve to contain Russia, forces Tbilisi to talk directly to Moscow to limit growing insecurity in Georgia’s Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region as a result of increase of Russian troops there.

Moreover, it is also likely that in order to balance Russia’s increased influence as well as the US’ attention shift from the South Caucasus, we will see Tbilisi seeking deeper security relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Surely this will not be enough, and Georgia might look even further afield, for instance, China, to attract investments and thus cause larger Chinese attention to the country.

Contributed by Emil Avdaliani, Georgia