The Second Karabakh War influenced Georgia. The impact ranges from potential internal instability to changes to foreign policy and increasing military spending. The war showed the need to be better prepared for an increasingly fractured South Caucasus which has entered the age of great power competition.

The Second Karabakh War in 2020 differed in many ways from previous Armenia-Azerbaijan clashes. From the very start, it was obvious the conflict was extensive both geographically and militarily. It was also clear its results would have regional ramifications for all neighboring countries. While most analyses have concentrated on Turkish, Iranian and Russian interests, the neighboring Georgia has not been any less influenced by the new methods of warfare, internal challenges and the ensuing trilateral agreement signed by Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian leaders in November last year.

First comes an increased threat of internal destabilization. Some parts of the Armenian and Azerbaijani ethnic minorities in Georgia were engaged in various activities to provide direct support for the warring sides. Occasional protests erupted and some damages to the cross-border infrastructure were inflicted. As the conflict is far from resolved, the Georgian government has to provide a comprehensive strategy for limiting potential domestic upheavals in case a new round of hostilities arises (though it is unlikely to happen in the near future).

The potential for internal destabilization brought about Georgia’s active diplomacy. While since the 1990s Tbilisi has not been particularly active in Karabakh diplomacy, the scale of the last fighting pushed Georgia to play a positive role in alleviating the mutual distrust between Baku and Yerevan and limiting geopolitical threats to regional security. On September 30, Georgia’s PM Giorgi Gakharia issued a statement expressing the country’s readiness to facilitate the peace process and hosting a meeting in Tbilisi. The timing for diplomatic maneuvering was interesting as world leaders were notoriously absent from diplomatic activity around the conflict. Russia, Armenia’s ally and often a host to Baku-Yerevan talks, was hesitant to minimize the fighting, while Western leaders seemed preoccupied with the pandemic and the US elections.

The war also underlined Georgia’s geographic dilemma. As the shortest way for Armenia and Azerbaijan to receive armaments from abroad, Georgia’s relations with both neighbors were tested. Furthermore, Georgia’s political leadership also sees potential threats to the regional infrastructure such as pipelines and railways. The fighting in the Tovuz region in July 2020 serves as a good reminder. Therefore, a new approach on the Georgian side towards its geographic position should be elaborated. 

Related to the infrastructure, Georgia now sees the possible impact of the Nakhchivan corridor on the country’s trade powers. Though not directly threatening the country’s regional hub position, the development nevertheless showed the need for further development of the road and railway infrastructure to compete with the emerging route.

But perhaps the biggest change in Georgian calculus will take place in the military strategy, which in turn could influence Georgia’s foreign policy thinking. With a growing Russian military presence, the Georgian borders are now encircled by Russian troops. For Georgia this means a further limitation on NATO/US military projection into the region. This also means fewer chances for Tbilisi’s membership prospects.

For Georgia the war results also usher in a sharp decline in the quality of democracy in the South Caucasus. Armenia’s case is especially interesting as its dependence on Russia will grow, which would also bring in a period of diminishing Armenian democracy. The Russian non-democratic model is simply incompatible with the fledgling democratic vision.

Another long-term trouble for Georgia is a continuous absence of Western powers from the region. In a way, one of the reasons for the military solution of the Karabakh dispute was the inability of the Minsk Group to provide a viable diplomatic solution. This matters to Georgia as it also seeks Western support for the resolution of the two conflicts on its territory.

Furthermore, none of the actors involved in the latest war enjoys stable relations with the West, which makes Georgia's national security environment even more difficult – how viable is the West’s long-term support for Tbilisi’s territorial integrity and westward aspirations? 

A further note on Georgia’s post-Karabakh foreign policy could be made. Since the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus is increasingly fluid, Tbilisi could rethink some aspects of its foreign policy where more pragmatism and a result-oriented policy would dominate. Diversification of foreign policy ties – a “rebalancing” when the Western vector will be solidified by firmer political and economic ties with the neighboring states.

For Georgia the Karabakh war meant that the use of military force remains relevant to achieve foreign policy goals. As the aviation sector is weakly developed in Georgia and the war showed that drones are the main and decisive means of combat, the Ministry of Defense of Georgia already expressed its interest in buying drones of foreign production. As it turned out, dependence on obsolete Russian, Soviet-era weapons and systems, without modern technology, is fraught with big military losses. The case of Russian anti-aircraft systems (“Оса АКМ”, “Стрела-10”) in the Armenian armed forces showed the ineffectiveness of those technologies against the modern Turkish and Israeli ones.

Another change for Georgia is to speed up the purchase of French air-defense systems – announcement made several times over the past several years. Earlier in September 2020 an agreement on strengthening Georgia’s air defense capabilities between the Georgian MoD and Israeli based state company “Rafael” was concluded in September. The agreement involves rehabilitation and modernization of air defense systems.

As Georgia lags far behind its neighborhood in its defense capabilities and defense spending, the increase of defense budget is likely to follow (as it happened in 2018-2019).

Thus the Second Karabakh War tested Georgia internally, accentuated the country’s unfavorable geopolitical position and propelled the military and political establishment to adjust to the changing dynamics in the South Caucasus. As a result, changes to foreign policy might follow. Georgia’s political elites also recognized the need to speed up the purchase of modern technologies, modernization of air-defense systems and increase of the military budget. These measures will still represent only a portion of needs to be done to gap the differences in military capabilities with the neighboring states.

Emil Avdaliani (@emilavdaliani) is a non-resident fellow at the Georgian think tank, Geocase, and teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi State University and European University.