Tensions between Tehran and Baku highlight widening geopolitical differences in the South Caucasus. Though the region is far from witnessing a major military escalation, there are reasons to think that tensions between the two states will resurface, drawing Turkey and Russia into the game. The era of great power competition is in full play.

Relations between Azerbaijan and Iran have soured in October. They somewhat subsided following the phone call of the two countries’ FMs. Nevertheless, both long-term and more immediate reasons weigh upon both sides. This is especially true for Iran, which seems to have initiated a series of moves which unnerved Baku. This underlined the existing frictions in the region amid renewed talks on the 3+3 initiative which aims at uniting the three South Caucasus states and their three larger neighbors and shutting the region off from the West.

Therefore, tensions are likely to resurface as deeper geopolitical undercurrents underline Iran’s and Azerbaijan’s different visions for the South Caucasus. By extension Iranian-Turkish ties too will remain frail as Tehran is concerned with growing Turkish military ambitions in the South Caucasus and the Caspian basin. As a result, Iran might become more willing to help beleaguered Armenia sustain its weak regional position.

Reasons behind the tensions range from the more immediate to grand strategic. In September Azerbaijan obstructed the crossing of Iranian trucks heading northwards to Armenia through the road which partly crossed the newly reclaimed lands. The road had been consistently used by Iranians since 1990s when the official border between Armenia and Azerbaijan was blurred.

In September Azerbaijan-Pakistan-Turkey military drills kicked off near Iran’s northern border. This was regarded as an immediate catalyzes behind Tehran’s decision to respond with similar move on September 21 when massive exercises were held near Azerbaijan’s border. What worried Baku was a specific place for the drills – along the very section of the border the control over which Azerbaijan re-claimed as a result of the second Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev stated during his interview with the Turkish Anadolu News Agency – “Why now? Why exactly on our border?”

In early October Iran launched the second phase of the drills named “Fatehan-e Khaybar” (“Conquerors of Khaybar”), alluding to Battle of Khaybar (628), when Muslim fighters defeated Jewish fighters. This leads us to the second reason the Islamic Republic seemed to nourish – Israel’s growing influence in the South Caucasus and burgeoning partnership with Azerbaijan.

Indeed, the trucks incident, trilateral drills, and the Israel factor weigh significantly on Iranian foreign policy toward South Caucasus, but these reasons are nevertheless more immediate. First, the drills were hardly aiming against Iran with which Azerbaijan has enjoyed a fairly stable relations during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency.

Alleged Israeli intelligence gathering from Azerbaijani soil would constitute a threat to Iran. For Tehran, Azerbaijan’s use of Israeli-made armed drones, which tipped the balance in the 2020 conflict, is also menacing. Tehran has also alleged that Israeli military advisers were active in Azerbaijan. But the timing for brandishing this perceived Israeli threat is nevertheless surprising. Reports on Israel’s close ties military and energy with Azerbaijan have intermittently resurfaced over the past decade or so but have never caused Iran to stage large scale drills.

This is where long-term reasons matter. The 2020 war changed the status quo in the South Caucasus leaving Iran out of the new arrangement. Turkey and Russia were leaders in constructing a new order. In comparison with growing Russian influence, because of the dispatch of some 2000 peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh, it is the re-emergence of Turkish major military power in the region which worries Iran. Azerbaijan and Turkey now regularly hold military exercises. The one held near the Lachin Corridor, which links Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, was especially noteworthy as it is the route both guarded by Russian peacekeepers and intensively traversed by Iranian trucks heading to Karabakh.

For Iran Turkey’s expanding influence is also dangerous in terms of internal stability. From Tehran’s perspective, since millions of ethnic Azerbaijanis reside in the northern provinces of the Islamic Republic, larger Turkish military presence along the northern borders with burgeoning ties with Azerbaijani could pose a long-term challenge.

Turkey is also a power which now sees Azerbaijan as a base for a more ambitious plans in the wider Caspian Sea and perhaps Central Asia too. The Caspian basin is of special interest to Iran and recent Azerbaijani-Turkish naval drills there caused Iranian concerns. Indeed, Iran together with Russia regards the sea as a space closed to external players.

The Iranian-Azerbaijani tensions and by extension growing differences with Turkey may also signal a possible shift in Iran’s foreign policy thinking. Aligning with Russia might be an option as Moscow too sees Turkey’s move as disturbing the regional power balance. The Turkish factor is the single biggest motivator behind Baku’s rather ambitious rhetoric and serves as a major reason behind recent difficulties in Azerbaijani-Russian ties – Russian military presence in Karabakh pushes Baku to seek ever closer relations with Ankara.

Iran may also slightly shift its stance on Armenia. Tehran might become more vocal in its support for Armenia’s sovereignty and indeed infrastructure projects through Armenian territory. Recently Iran actively engaged in the works to find an alternative route to Armenia through the town of Tatev. In early October Iran’s Deputy Minister of Transport and Urban Development Kheirollah Khademi visited Yerevan to oversee the work over a 15km stretch of an alternative road.

Iran-Azerbaijan tensions will likely resurface as Tehran is increasingly unhappy with its rather weakened regional position. For instance, following the diffusion of tensions, Tehran accused Baku of deliberately holding Iranian trucks at Astara checkpoint. As argued, in the long term, differences with Turkey will also push Iran to seek larger understanding with Russia. This will surely remain short of official alliance but could become more pronounced through diplomatic activism. But Iran will have also be careful to maintain a certain balance – the larger tensions with Azerbaijan, the bigger incentive for Baku to build ever closer military ties with Turkey.

Contributed by Emil Avdaliani