After the 2018 Velvet Revolution in Armenia and inevitable domestic changes, many people argued about what could happen with the country’s foreign policy. On the one hand, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated country’s readiness to maintain a positive relationship with Russia; on the other hand, he has been actively promoting cooperation with Western countries, changing the dynamics with the Commonwealth of Independent States and the EU. This article will examine how exactly the new Armenian Government has transformed foreign affairs of Yerevan, what uniqueness it brought and what it has mimicked from the former regime. Without paying too much attention to technicalities, the article will turn to key events and actions, which characterise Armenia’s foreign policy, emphasising that the latter does presume some degree of novelty, but as well some extent of succession from the former type of external positioning of this South Caucasian republic. It is rather problematic to cover the exhaustive number of aspects of the new foreign policy; nor is it the main task for the current research. Instead, the article will touch upon only those essential elements, which do constitute and shape the new reality for Armenia, as such with a special emphasis on 2019.

Primum non nocere

Any revolution, even peaceful and non-violent, is accompanied by some degree of radicalism, which appears in the very nature of executed actions. This principle was particularly vivid in the personnel policy of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who decided to displace a vast majority of former incumbents with the new generation of young and ambitious decision-makers.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not an exception in this sense, however, Pashinyan decided not to tempt the fate of the Ministry by giving the chair to a poorly experienced newbie. Instead, Pashinyan took, perhaps, the most optimal decision by suggesting and supporting the candidacy of Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, a career diplomat with a years-long experience who had served as the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations in New York. Undoubtedly, Mnatsakanyan is an accomplished diplomat, who knows by far the many features and peculiarities of diplomatic service, difficulties and peculiarities of presenting Armenia at international arena, in dialogue with its allies and partners, as well as in relationship with the states who are troublesome with Armenia, like Azerbaijan, Turkey, or Pakistan. At the same time, Mnatsakanyan is a careful diplomat, who is rather guided by ‘non nocere’ principle, the evidence of which is his approach to take not so vocal, but thoughtful and informed decisions to build pragmatic relationship with countries of utmost significance for Armenia, as the latter understood both in positive and negative senses. 

It is exactly this principle – non nocere – which is a key for Armenia to build on some added significance in its foreign policy, taking into account how quickly the geopolitical reality around this country changes. Prime Minister Pashinyan and his team have often emphasised that the country would not take rapid u-turns in foreign affairs, being satisfied with internal changes, i.e. implementing revolutionary decisions towards inside and having no revolutionary plans in foreign agenda whatsoever. On the one hand, some declarations made by the Prime Minister prove his statement, just like his first official foreign visit, which was to Russia on the Summit of Eurasian Economic Union in May 2018; Pashinyan’s acknowledgement to preserve and evolutionise the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as his statement that Russian-Armenian allied relations have no alternative and the Russian military base in Armenian Gyumri is the core component for security system of the country. 

On the other hand, prosecuting former Secretary General of Collective Security Treaty Organisation Yuri Khachaturov for his alleged involvement in the March 1st 2008 events devaluated the organisation in the eyes of its critics and proponents, even though the situation with the new Secretary General of CSTO seems to be settled now. 

Referring to the latter, many people did believe that Pashinyan reoriented Armenia towards more Western-centred world. Such opinions were again underpinned by recalling his new staff and personnel, many of whom have been consistently perceived as people generally affiliated with the larger West: those were either graduates of European and American higher education institutions, or had a background of working for ‘Western organisations’, under which it is international organisations that are usually referred to. Even if it is so, Pashinyan is still successful in constraining ‘Westernisation’ of Armenia by recognising the necessity of rational justification of new and advanced relationship with all interested sides and states. This justification makes him appeal to more substantivity in Russian-Armenian relationship in particular. The new foreign policy is also seeking to escape a stalemate in the relationship with Kazakhstan and Belarus, as both countries openly support Azerbaijan when it comes to the matter of territorial integrity of countries and the question of Nagorno Karabakh. However, an added value to Armenia’s willingness to enhance relationship with its EEU partners will be some concrete measures, taken by Armenia and the EEU countries to sense the necessity and importance of each other from utilitarian, material perspective, thus, fearing to lose stable and economically important ties. That is why Armenia’s new policy with the countries of the former Soviet Union can be characterised by the term optimistic pragmatism. This presumes an effort for stable, consistent betterment of relationship, deriving not only from past traditions of cooperation but, what is even more important, oriented towards making this relationship more material, costly to lose and tangible.

At the same time, Pashinyan perfectly recognises the West’s inclination towards the Velvet Revolution, the desire of the Western countries to consider the latter nothing but a pure manifestation of democracy. In fact, this tendency has found its place in the updated reports about democracy levels in different countries, where Armenia made a giant leap to the top of the list. Pashinyan, understanding Western willingness to view and interpret these changes as democracy, uses his foreign policy instruments to give a new impetus to the relationship between Yerevan and Europe, Yerevan and the United States.

There are many examples of how the Armenian-Western relationship intensified right after the Velvet Revolution. One of Pashinyan’s first initiatives after becoming Armenia’s Prime Minister was to invite Western experts of Armenian origin (like the MIT professor and economist Daron Acemoglu) to reform the country’s economy. In 2018, Armenia successfully held the Summit of Francophonie (the preparations of which, to be quite honest, were initiated by the previous administration). Using the Summit platform, Armenia successfully utilised its tools in non-formal and public diplomacy, worked towards betterment of connections with more than 50 participant countries, including France and Canada. The latter were particularly eager to improve further their business and economic ties with Armenia. 

Highlights of 2019 

2019 was the year when Armenia needed to maintain the level and, simultaneously, further improve its foreign ties in all dimensions. The first post-revolutionary year was the year of challenges and opportunities for the Armenia’s foreign office. In many respects, the country focused on the most urgent, pressing matters and attempted to gain the momentum.  

In 2019, there was not a single EU state that stood up against the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement. National Parliaments of the EU member states were consistent in approving Armenia’s betterment with Europe in various fields. At the moment, 18 countries ratified the agreement with more to come in 2020.  

European optimism about Armenia was evident. As the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini stated, "The European Union has been and will continue be the biggest supporter of the Armenian government's ambitious reform plan, which is consolidating democracy, the rule of law and promoting human rights in the country. Armenia is an important partner for the European Union, and together we are focussed on implementing our wide-reaching bilateral agreement, as well as delivering concrete results within the Eastern Partnership.” In return, Armenia also sends signals to intensify cooperation. The country welcomed the Trio Plus Strategy 2030 – a new flagship initiative for EU associated/DCFTA countries, which by the decision of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, suggests, amongst other things, “more comprehensive and enlarged strategic format Trio+1 with the inclusion of Armenia - based on the principles and positions reaffirmed in the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership agreement between Armenia and the European Union.”

Hence, as long as Armenia utilises the positive impression of Europe on domestic changes, one can assume that the country’s government does know how to use of the opportunity to transform Western interest into a more practical realm and to attract foreign investments and capital to the country. At the same time, the positive vision of Armenia after the Velvet Revolution is not unlimited, and, as it will be discussed below, already faces notice of European colleagues, who signal the issues in the confrontation between Pashinyan and Constitutional Court of Armenia.      

The questions of recognition of Armenian Genocide and independence of self-recognised Nagorno Karabakh Republic were traditionally amongst the most important topics for Armenian diplomacy. Thanks to unprecedented activism of the Armenian Caucus in the United States as well as rapid worsening of US-Turkey relations, in 2019 the American House of Representatives and, a month later, Senate made a historic decision to vote for recognition of the Armenian Genocide. However, American President Donald Trump, who is believed to have a good relationship with the Turkish vis-à-vis Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was reluctant to approve the decision and rejected it. In the face of current US-Turkey tensions in the geopolitical field, America’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide would have only heated them, possibly involving and seriously damaging other fields of cooperation between U.S. and Turkey. The decision to recognise the genocide could also be linked to domestic politics in the States, particularly, putting more pressure on Trump. Nevertheless, this has been a historic moment for Armenians all over the world, as both Houses in the United States declared explicitly their willingness to support the process of recognition. Having said that, Armenians can expect that the United States will eventually recognise the Genocide at presidential level, realistically, sooner than many would expect.

The situation over Nagorno Karabakh did not improve much in 2019, however, it has also had some historically important moments. Following the joint declaration of the ministers of foreign affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan, taken after the OSCE meetings, to “further reduce tensions in the conflict zone and prepare the populations for peace”, mutual visits of journalists from both sides happened in November 2019. It is quite noteworthy that the visits were kept secret until completed, and that Azerbaijani journalists had an opportunity to travel not only to Yerevan, but also to Stepanakert – the capital of Nagorno Karabakh. Clearly, it was a sign of readiness to continue peaceful talks, made by the Armenian side, which was accepted by the Azerbaijani journalists. However, the future of Armenian-Azerbaijani de-escalation is still unknown, as, alongside the historic visit and formal declarations of countries to prepare peace, the situation on the ground remains hostile. Shots made from both sides are not done, the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan is under constant pressure. Nevertheless, small steps in this conflict may create a difference in the long run. However, as long as ordinary citizens are not mentally ready to meet and co-exist with each other, formal declarations will not significantly improve the context. Hence, the key to settle the conflict is not in capitals of some foreign powers: it is in Yerevan, Baku, and Stepanakert. 

Speaking of those foreign powers, Armenian-Turkey diplomacy was also under a serious test in 2019. The reason was the leaked plans of Turkey, which seemed to have concrete intention of open military attack against Armenia in 2000s. “According to the short memo drawn up by the inspectors to brief the General Staff, the secret plan was finalized on July 13, 2001. It was prepared by the 2nd Tactical Air Force Command as part of the OĞUZTÜRK air offensive plan of the Turkish Air Forces in order to complement the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) directive codenamed “ALTAY” for an offensive against Armenia”, said Abdullah Bozkurt, the author of Nordic Monitor, in his report. Needless to say what an impact the reveal had on the Armenian-Turkish relationship and beyond: while the Armenian foreign ministry gave rather composed reaction, calling to follow the matter, the country received a strong incentive to tighten relations with Greece and Cyprus – the countries historically allied with Armenia over the doubtful foreign policy of Turkey. Although Pashinyan publicly expressed Armenia’s readiness for “unconditional reconciliation” with Turkey, it is very doubtful that Ankara will accept this offer leaving Azerbaijan on its own. Hence, Armenia’s willingness to improve its relationship with Turkey can be considered a merely formal declaration, as geopolitical realities of the region, including and especially in light of Turkey’s recent actsin Syria and Libya, are much more complex than presented by Pashinyan.      

At the same time, Armenia was prompt to intensify the relationship with another geopolitical contestant of Turkey, Israel. 2019, being to some extent unprecedented for Armenia’s foreign policy, was memorable for the decision to open first-ever Armenian embassy in Israel. The Armenian-Israeli relationship had a long and ambiguous history, as the latter does not officially recognise the Armenian Genocide and supplies multimillion military equipment to Azerbaijan. However, during the last years there were many signals that the ice should melt and both countries ought to make corresponding steps towards each other. As the expert of the Armenian Research and Development Institute Sergey Melkonian states, the decision to open an Armenian embassy should be considered nothing but positive. “Objectively, Armenia is more interested in [the] betterment of [the] bilateral relationship. The Armenian market is too small for Israel. The latter is interested rather in technical and intellectual potential of the South Caucasian state. At the same time, Yerevan’s decision was against odds, as many stereotypes about Israel still exist in Armenia”, says the expert. As Melkonian argues, the decision to open embassy is revolutionary. “Before, we have been thinking about the reaction of Iran on such [a] step. The fear of Iranian reaction over such [a] decision has constrained the spectrum of Armenian manoeuvre. Now the logic has changed. There is an understanding that the establishment of necessary platform for dialogue with Israel is a matter of national security. Armenia is rethinking its foreign policy.” (from an interview recorded on 28.12.2019)      

If Armenia is rethinking its foreign policy with Israel, on the side of Armenian-Georgian relations there is gradualism and consistency. According to Johnny Melikian, Yerevan-based expert on Georgia, 2019 was a good year to deepen further Armenian-Georgian connections. “The year was good but not a breakthrough. There were two major happenings in 2019: the Armenian-Georgian Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation resumed after an eight-year pause, and the Armenian-Georgian Business Forum, which happened in parallel to the meeting of the Commission. This will allow both countries’ ministries to improve economic dynamics, institutional ties, enhancing the atmosphere of trust under different external integration models of Georgia and Armenia.” Melikian expects Armenian President and Prime Minister to visit Georgia in 2020 after the successful visit of the Georgian high officials to Armenia in 2019. According to the expert, even politically volatile domestic situations in Georgia will not affect country’s attitude towards Armenia (from an interview recorded on 27.12.2019). Additionally, given the recent dispute on Georgian-Azerbaijani border, for Armenia strengthening political and economic ties with Georgia remains crucial.  

Finally, yet importantly, 2019 was the year when Armenia had more opportunities to be vocal on a global scale. The country successfully held the Summit of Eurasian Economic Union in Yerevan. The questions of further interstate economic integration, balanced trade regulations, creation of a common energy market, standardisation of prices for gas were among the most intensively discussed matters. The Summit platform was also used to enhance the Union’s ties with non-member observer states, like Moldova, Iran and Singapore. If Iran already benefits from Free Trade Agreement with the Union, Singapore is on the verge of signing it. The free trade regime, especially with bordering countries like Iran, is of special importance for Armenia. Even though Yerevan is a fully-fledged member of the Union, it does not share a common border with Iran and probably no one else feels the advantages of reduced barriers for export and import with the Union’s partners as strongly.

2019 was memorable also for the World Congress on Information Technologies, which was held in Yerevan for the first time. Together with other international events held in Armenia in 2019, it witnessed the country’s claim to become the regional hub for innovation and IT.        

Having said this, 2020 should become a year when Armenia begins the groundwork to improve its foreign connections. If 2018 and 2019 served as indicators of what the country could offer immediately after the Velvet Revolution in terms of stability and democratic attractiveness, 2020 will become the year of demand by the country’s partners to show some practical work and results achieved in the realm of real improvements. If the current tendency prevails, one can expect further enhancement of Armenia’s ties with the European Union, the Eurasian Union, as well as countries of East, like China. China abolished visa requirements with Yerevan and is about to significantly raise its regional presence with public diplomacy and economic tools. Overall, 2020 can become another successful year for Armenian foreign policy, should the country continue to utilise its geopolitical, cultural and democratic advantages wisely. At the same time, there can be certain degree of scepticism, associated primarily with issues that are not yet solved. The last meeting between Pashinyan and Aliev in Munich only underpinned the sensitivity of the conflict and its complexity. The Armenian Prime Minister and Azerbaijani President met in what seemed to be an open face-to-face dialogue, but instead of trying to find a common ground for it, both worked to impress their domestic constituencies. Arguments and counter arguments from history and references to international law were utilised, which, however, did not help the leaders to shape an atmosphere of constructivism. Many pundits, including in Armenia, criticised Pashinyan, noting that the meeting was not productive and only highlighted the vast difference that exists between declarative statements and reality on the ground. Evidently, Pashinyan’s attempts to offer an olive branch to Aliev, stressing that Armenia’s Velvet Revolution and Pashinyan himself can re-launch Armenian-Azerbaijani dialogue, failed. Nevertheless, the very idea to organise a vis-à-vis discussion and readiness of the leaders to attend it can be viewed as a positive sign. If this format of meetings continues, the sides, alongside trying to increase their domestic popularity, may eventually try to negotiate settlement. 

The Armenian post-Revolutionary euphoria also faces some serious systemic challenges, as the attempted reformation of the country’s Constitution met unprecedented hindrance from the President of the Constitutional Court Hrayr Tovmasyan and opposition. This obstruction seems to be more consolidated now. These tensions originated serious concern of the European rapporteurs, calling “the Armenian authorities to request as soon as possible, the opinion of the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s expert body on constitutional law”. The reaction of European observers confirm that Armenia’s European partners will no longer consider every decision taken by Pashinyan as a sign of pure democracy, and will react more deliberately, especially, when it comes to political clashes within the country. 

Armenia’s gradually transforming relations with Russia is also something to follow closely. The country’s closest ally also goes through the period of domestic changes, as the new Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, although already met Pashinyan and reaffirmed Russian’s intention to continue “constructive relations” with Armenia, may be very careful in terms of unconditional support to the country that seems to move further and further from its Northern ally.   

Contributed by Akop Gabrielyan, PhD (Armenia).