The West and the Need for Black Sea Strategy

| Insights,
Bildrechte: Nutzer NormanEinstein, WikiMedia
Bildrechte: Nutzer NormanEinstein, WikiMedia

Problems in Georgia, ongoing Ukraine-Russia tensions as well as the growing militarization of the Black Sea by Moscow calls upon a comprehensive Western strategy for the wider Black Sea basin. The alternative could be an order of exclusion where the collective West’s ability to penetrate the region would be significantly curtailed.

Since the Ukraine crisis of 2014, the security situation in the Black Sea has significantly deteriorated. The Russian annexation of Crimea, as well as the latter’s military moves around the Kerch Strait and in the Azov Sea, destabilized the post-Cold War status quo where Turkey’s military capabilities and generally NATO member states’ potential superseded Russian capabilities.

Since the annexation, however, the balance of power tilted in Russia’s favor, which presently has the most powerful navy in the sea. Moscow has not only increased de-facto control over the northern Black Sea shore, but also poured significant resources into constructing new vessels, allowing it to escalate when and where it deems necessary and potentially even deter non-Black Sea powers from actively cooperating with the littoral states.

Complicating this reality is the fact that so far, the collective West has not produced a viable military and security strategy for the Black Sea area. However, calls for building such a vision has increased over the recent years.

Indeed, the events in the wider Black Sea region throughout the year of 2021 indicate that now is the time to have a new Western approach for deterring Russia’s militarization of the northern Black Sea. Ultimately, the failure to come up with a comprehensive strategic vision risks shutting the region from the collective West. This will have significant impact on the way how NATO and EU would be able to extend their influence into the South Caucasus, which serves as a major economic and energy artery from Turkey to the wider Caspian basin and further to Central Asia.

Presently the urgency for formulating a strategic vision for the wider Black Sea has grown especially as several interlocking crises rage in and around pro-Western states. In Georgia unabating internal political troubles signal the country will remain a flashpoint where illiberal trends are gaining momentum, the country’s resolve to pursue pro-Western policy is constantly tested and malign external influence grows in scope.

In eastern Ukraine Russia’s military activities pose a major challenge to the Ukrainian statehood. Chances for either large or a limited Russian military campaign are presently greater than in any other period since 2014. To put it simply, the constant escalation Moscow has lately been pursuing could be impossible to control at one point.

Therefore, the need to address the hole in the Western strategic vision in the Black Sea is also about supporting Ukraine and Georgia. The alternative could be a return of Russia-led order, especially damaging for Tbilisi and Kyiv, which face Russian troops on their sovereign territories.

The Vision for Economic Cooperation

So far this all was about the Black Sea as a geopolitical flashpoint where tensions are constantly rising, peace is fragile, and the potential for a major confrontation is increasing. Russia largely benefits from this interpretation as it limits other players’ willingness to engage the region.

The West therefore, needs to build a vision which would present the Black Sea as a sea of economic cooperation. Indeed, few remember that the region often was the center for economic activity. Examples of Russian-Turkish wars of the 18th-19th centuries are often used to portray the Black Sea as a space of competition and intermittent confrontation among major powers.

Wars indeed were waged, and at least two powers were consistently competing for influence across the sea. In reality, though, seen from a centuries-wide perspective, wars between Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea lasted a small fraction of time in comparison with the periods of peace in the 18th-19th centuries.

Moreover, the Black Sea, though always surrounded by rival powers, was nevertheless a space of economic exchange. Trade flourished, which contributed to close contacts between littoral states. Take, for example, the period of Greek colonization starting in the 8th century BC. Colonies in what is now western Georgia and in the Crimean Peninsula enabled the exchange of goods in the region. During the Roman or Byzantine periods (until the 7th-8th century AD), the coastline of modern western Georgia was closely integrated with great cities in Asia Minor and Crimea.

Under the unified Georgian monarchy (late 10th-15th centuries), despite patchy information in historical sources, there was a wide range of economic activity which connected western Georgia to Byzantium, Crimea, and later to the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, this period saw such a large economic interconnection that Georgian traders even visited Constantinople, Thessaloniki, and from the late 13th century onwards, were in close contact with Italian merchants who were operating ships and had colonies in Crimea and some Georgian cities.

Even the period of great empires from the early 18th century around the Black Sea cannot be considered solely as a time of continuous confrontation. In fact, the Black Sea served as a good merging point for connecting different economic systems represented by Russia and the Muslim world (the Ottoman Empire). By the early 20th century, just before the outbreak of World War I, there was a lot of economic activity, seeing Russia sent most of its coal and grain through the Bosporus and Dardanelles to different parts of the world. Georgia, too, was connected to the rest of the world by the early 20th century, with Batumi operating as a main conduit.

Surprisingly, the Soviet period too can be characterized as a period of economic cooperation. Ukraine, Georgian, and Russian ports transported oil, coal, and other natural resources through the straits to the Mediterranean.

Thus, despite the wars we know in history, there are even longer periods of much deeper economic cooperation which the countries (empires) around the Black Sea have enjoyed over the past several centuries.

Back to the current deterioration of the security situation in the Black Sea, it potentially could undermine the existing economic activity as the flow of foreign investment can be curbed and diverted elsewhere. In a way, the geopolitical situation in the Black Sea nowadays is more chaotic and unpredictable than it was before. To correct the troubles in the wider Black Sea region a comprehensive Western strategy would be a powerful signal to Russia which aims at blocking the space for non-littoral states.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase. He tweets at @emilavdaliani.

See Also

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