The Middle Corridor – also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) – is a strategic trade route connecting China to Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus, bypassing both Russia and the Suez Canal. The route spans 4,250 km of rail track and a 500 km sea route across the Caspian Sea. The infrastructure is operational. However, the interchange of land and sea routes adds to the cost, as infrastructure must be developed for the Caspian Sea, including ports and vessels.

However, distance and cost are not everything. Bypassing Russia and Iran is significant for security reasons – you don’t want air traffic where drones and missile systems operate. And a range of Western companies are unwilling to trans-ship critical sanctioned technology through Russia or Iran. In this respect, the world appears to be conspiring for the success of the Middle Corridor.

As the world changes, access to European markets is no longer the sole consideration for businesses. This route enables Central Asia and the Caucasus to reimagine themselves as a region connected by linguistic, cultural, historical, political, and economic ties.

To address the significance of this infrastructure, Caucasus Watch talked to Arzu Abbasova, a Research Analyst at the Centre for Finance and Security at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London.

There is increased focus on the Middle Corridor. What makes the focus on this logistics route particularly timely?

What we’re witnessing today is a geopolitical shift that would have been difficult to predict just a few years ago. For the first time, nearly all major east–west supply chains have become unreliable. The Northern Corridor is increasingly avoided due to sanctions on Russia. The Red Sea is no longer secure. The Strait of Hormuz is under growing uncertainty, and the airspace over Iran and Russia is considered unsafe. These are truly unprecedented times; even if that term is often overused and perhaps in most cases exaggerated, in this case, it is fitting.

Regions once viewed as geographically disadvantaged, in the sense of being sandwiched between big powers such as the South Caucasus, or landlocked like Central Asia, are now finding themselves at the heart of new strategic calculations, where geography’s curse is, for the first time, resembling something of a blessing.

Secondly, as global economic priorities evolve, so has attention to what these countries can offer. From energy to critical rare-earth minerals, the resources found in this region are increasingly essential to the global economy, and the potential in terms of critical raw materials is in some senses untapped.

Thirdly, there is now a genuine effort and willingness on the ground to turn the Middle Corridor into a viable and lasting route. We’re seeing a shift in national narratives across the region, a recognition of the Corridor’s potential and the momentum it has gained. So, in some sense, it feels like the right time, where most of the conditions surprisingly align. Not to forget, all of this coincides with Europe’s emerging renewed interest in Central Asia, something that it had long neglected, and China’s rising investments as well.

Given the changing nature of global trade, what is the Trans-Caspian trade route about? A second route for Chinese and Turkish products to Central Asia? Another segment for the Belt and Road Initiative? A project accelerating Central Asian regionalisation? All of the above?

Maybe all and more? Technically, it is the shortest overland route connecting China to Europe, bypassing Russia and the congested maritime paths. For Central Asia and the South Caucasus, the route represents something bigger: a chance to reclaim a place in global trade conversations. It is, in a way, a political and economic narrative of reconnection. I also believe TITR offers the region a new story, one where its states are not just crossroads (which was the perception for the longest time), but important players. Particularly for Central Asian countries, it’s a path to move from the narrative and reality of “landlocked” countries, where goods only pass through, to a land-linked one. For the South Caucasus, it is a fresh page for positioning itself as a stable region and a bridge between East and West. But at its core, for regional states, it is about better cooperation, diversification, and rebranding, or perhaps reimagining the geography shaped by a new route. For Europe, it is an opportunity to reduce reliance on the Russian route, and for China, a route that is not dominated by the US, which holds strategic value.

In reality, though, the Middle Corridor is still an idea yet to bear its main fruits and become a sustainable corridor due to its limitations related to fragmented infrastructure, hurdles on the road, high costs, and slower transit times.

The war in Iran and Ukraine bodes well for a Trans-Caspian trade route that connects Central Asia to Europe, bypassing Russia and Iran. Is the corridor ready to reap the geopolitical opportunity? If not, what are the main challenges?

Russia’s war in Ukraine has undoubtedly created a moment of geopolitical opportunity for the Trans-Caspian trade route. Rising instability in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea only reinforces a broader shift: a search for a safe alternative. Obviously, the Middle Corridor in the discussion rises quickly.

Since 2022, we’ve seen significant political momentum behind the corridor. The war in Ukraine obviously served as a trigger. We saw governments across Central Asia and the South Caucasus begin to push the corridor as a viable alternative, and global actors have started paying attention. There’s now a stronger political narrative and will (which was lacking before) and an emerging recognition (from the European side) that the Middle Corridor could help ensure critical goods avoid transit through sanctioned or unstable regions like Russia and Iran. Also, the numbers speak for themselves. In 2021, cargo volumes on the route stood at around 800,000 tons. Just a year later, that figure doubled, and by 2024, it reached 4.5 million tons. That’s a sevenfold increase in just three to four years. In short, what was once dismissed as a theoretical corridor is now starting to move real goods.

While I agree that in this case, a crisis creates opportunities, another question is whether those opportunities are seized and leveraged to create something bigger. Turning this momentum into reality demands collaborative reform, serious investment, and regional coordination. The challenges are both technical and commercial. From a viability standpoint, businesses care most about time and cost. The corridor continues to struggle to meet its target of fifteen days for door-to-door delivery. Delays in the Caspian Sea due to limited ferry capacity, coupled with inefficient customs and fragmented border procedures, continue to slow things down.

The cost issue is just as serious. Most of the trade along the corridor currently flows from east to west. There is not as much moving in the opposite direction. This is more of a problem for Europe and how much its trade goes in the opposite direction. This trade imbalance means many containers return empty, which significantly raises costs. There are also practical issues that are often underestimated. For example, drivers needing multiple visas and permits to cross several borders or enter the Schengen zone still face a hurdle that needs to be overcome.

At the same time, while investment is urgently needed, it must be carefully structured. If infrastructure upgrades or foreign involvement result in higher fees, the corridor may become less competitive before it even scales. This is all to say that the opportunity is there, but it needs to be matched by delivery, and the window for action is not indefinite. It will be interesting to see what happens if and when the Russia-Ukraine war comes to an end.

An island has just emerged in the North Caspian Sea. Given climate change, how scalable is this trade route? Can regional governments take any action to address the climate crisis? How climate resilient is existing infrastructure?

Climate concerns are increasingly central to the future of trade infrastructure, and the Middle Corridor is no exception. One of the most pressing environmental challenges is the shrinking of the Caspian Sea, which directly affects port operations in Aktau, Kuryk, and Baku. Without timely dredging and adaptation measures, these ports risk becoming significantly less functional, jeopardizing the route’s capacity. On the western end, the ports of Poti and Batumi also face challenges, with both being shallow-water ports. The planned expansion of Poti into a deep-water port would require regular dredging, which has its own environmental and financial implications. Water allocation in Central Asia further highlights the region’s ecological vulnerabilities.

Building a sustainable and climate-resilient Middle Corridor means decarbonizing shipping, investing in clean energy technologies, and transitioning rail systems to net-zero operations. We are already seeing signs of this transformation. For instance, the electrification of railways in Azerbaijan and Georgia shows a willingness to transition to sustainable transport alternatives. Notably, during COP29, an agreement was signed between the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), Global DTC, and PSA International to transform the Middle Corridor into a “Green Corridor.” This highlighted the aim to utilize digital technologies, such as PSA’s OptETracker, to optimize operations and track emissions, enhancing environmental transparency and accountability. There has also been a high-level commitment to fully implementing eTIR and eCMR systems, which would reduce CO2 emissions.

What we are seeing is that the Middle Corridor has begun to adopt new branding, incorporating new adjectives such as the Green Middle Corridor and/or the Digital Middle Corridor. Crucially, a greener Middle Corridor is not only an environmental necessity but also a financial opportunity for countries along the route. The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) will soon require importers to pay a carbon price for emissions-intensive goods. This gives producing countries a direct economic incentive to decarbonize their supply chains. Manufacturers that can demonstrate lower carbon footprints will face lower export costs and remain competitive in EU markets.

Is this route a catalyst for peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan or the spark that blows the powder keg in the Caucasus?

We often mention the 2022 war in Ukraine as the geopolitical catalyst for the Middle Corridor, and rightly so. But long before the headlines shifted to Europe, something significant had already begun closer to the region. Following the Second Karabakh War, the discussion around connectivity in the South Caucasus shifted. Suddenly, the idea of a trade corridor running across the Caspian and linking Central Asia to Europe became a more real possibility. As it stands, Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed on the text of a peace treaty. There is cautious momentum there.

It’s worth noting that similar shifts have happened on the other side of the Caspian as well. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, for example, signed a border demarcation agreement after years of tension. So yes, peace, or at least the promise of it, seems to be making a comeback in the region. And that matters. Because without stability, no corridor, no matter how strategic, can function.

But it’s not a one-way street. Peace enables connectivity, but connectivity can also drive peace. When trade routes become active, investment starts flowing, and regions become economically interdependent, the cost of conflict rises. Suddenly, war is not just a political crisis; it’s also bad business. Therefore, the materialization of the Middle Corridor will open up economic opportunities for the entire region and serve as an incentive to turn the page, where the dominant narrative is one of trade and cooperation, rather than conflict and war.

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis for Caucasus Watch