Six senior members of the Armenian government were asked to resign on November 18, 2024. Prime Minister Pashinyan was in the Vatican, not there to take the front stage. Speculation was rife as to why.

Some saw it as a trigger for new elections. Some saw it as a dealing with rival factions within the ruling alliance. The government's media line was that it was a "systemic" problem, rather than one of individual performance. There is little doubt that a government that came to office through a "revolution" in 2018, promising reform, could not be seen as failing to fight corruption and uphold the rule of law. 
Thus, the systemic element was linked to the judiciary and corruption. The timing, the sensitive nature of the ministerial portfolios - including police, judiciary, prosecution, security services - inevitably meant that speculation would persist. 
What came later was the appointment of women with significant government experience, but young and without their own political power base in first-line positions. This raised some eyebrows, not only in the Caucasus, but also in Europe. 
In an attempt to understand what has happened and the significance of the unfolding events, Caucasus Watch turned to Daniel Ioannisyan, the director of a civil society platform (Union of Informed Citizens) that focuses on the rule of law and anti-corruption campaigns. We discuss with him how convinced he is of the "systemic" scope of this reshuffle. 

For more than 15 years, you've been working on judicial and police policy reforms, which you currently pursue from a non-governmental platform (Union of Informed Citizens). From Poland to Bulgaria, from Albania to Armenia, there has never been an anti-corruption campaign that has not been politically contested. Do you have an answer to the question of how you can ever achieve “systemic” reform in rule of law if a significant minority of public opinion will view this as a “witch hunt” of the political opponents of the government of the day. How do you go beyond the “reform versus lustration” dilemma? 

You know, we didn't really have a lustration after the 2018 revolution, something that civil society has criticised and demanded. There were objective problems with the lustration demand. If you want to lustrate people who cooperated with the Soviet KGB, you will need the cooperation of the KGB, which is not likely to happen. The demand was there and was strongly affirmed. For instance, we need to find a way to fire judges involved in political prosecution and serious corruption cases. Unfortunately, that didn't happen.

The justice sector in Armenia is in a bad shape. Reforms have been ongoing for five years or more and we do not have much to show for it. That's mainly because the current government failed to use the window of opportunity in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, let's say the first year. That was when their electoral support was so strong that they could have passed any reform they wanted with little possibility of systemic resistance. 

Instead, there was thinking in terms of evolution. Under the previous regime, judges were told what to do. The thinking was that if they stopped telling the judiciary what to do, then the independence of the judiciary would be affirmed and everything would be fine. Of course, it does not work that way. You have to have a normal system with an executive branch that is separate from the judiciary. In those early days of the revolution, they had no experience with the civil service. By the end of 2019, they realized that as long as they didn't interfere with the judiciary, there would be no automatic "balance." 

After the Karabakh war in 2020, we had a deep political crisis, which fortunately was resolved when the country held parliamentary elections. It was a happy ending. However, there was a seven-month gap between the immediate aftermath of the war and the elections. During that time, everyone mobilized against the government. 

Nearly all the generals turned against the government, though hopefully they kept the troops out of that. The Judicial Council called for opposition to the government. Since November 2020, many judges actively and visibly boycotted, sabotaged, and disrupted the work of the government.

The case of the then Speaker of Parliament {Ararat Mirzoyan} is characteristic of the politicization of the judiciary. Mirzoyan was almost beaten to death. Telephone surveillance tapes suggest that the individual conspirators told each other, "One down, one to go," in reference to the Prime Minister {Nicol Pashinyan}. Subsequent searches of their homes revealed vast caches of illegal weapons, including mortar shells. We are talking about more than 3,000 rifles. 

In every country where the Speaker of the House is beaten nearly to death - from North Korea to Sweden - those arrested would be prosecuted and put on trial.  The same would happen to anyone who possessed such an arsenal. Not in Armenia. There was no prosecution in Armenia. This is how the court sabotaged the government.

As a result of this story, the government concluded that it must control the judiciary and that it is impossible to build an independent judiciary. This is a false and problematic conclusion. For example, the head of Armenia's anti-corruption agency, Davit Sanasaryan, was involved in a corruption scandal.

At the same time, established judges continued to exercise unchecked power. The head of the Court of First Instance, Mnatsakan Martirosyan, is a man who sent the incumbent prime minister to prison in 2009 in a clear case of political persecution. 

In a similar situation, what can a non-Governmental platform like the “Union of Informed Citizens” do to make a difference?

If you scrutinise government policy on justice, you have two tools: The first tool is to raise public awareness, domestically. The public can mark out a judge and demand his or her removal. The second tool is international advocacy, first and foremost with the EU and the U.S. We work with various agencies and suggest that certain reforms should be part of their "conditionality".

There is a third way, which is to get cooperation within the government, usually on issues that can be politically polarising. Of the three, public awareness is probably the most effective. 

Mid-November we saw six government resignations revolving around the police and the judiciary. That was framed by the government as a “systemic” anti-corruption campaign. This was followed by a wave of resignations in the civil service. Are you convinced that these forced resignations were not personal in nature and were indeed systemic?

I think we can take the Minister of Territorial Administration, Gnel Sanosyan, out of this framework. It was a completely different story related to road construction. The Prime Minister was told that a project had been completed and delivered, and he followed up with a post on his social media accounts. Then there was a backlash. People from local villages started shouting that the road had definitely not been delivered and called him a liar. So his resignation coincided, but had a different kind of motivation.

Many of these forced resignations had strong support from civil society. This was the case with Interior Minister Ghazaryan and the head of the Judicial Council, Karen Andreasyan. Andreasyan was clearly unfit for the role. Of course, while it's acceptable to demand the resignation of the interior minister, we're not happy that the head of the executive branch can force or even ask for the immediate resignation of a senior figure in the judiciary.

But there is little doubt that these resignations were necessary. Crime and corruption in this country are soaring year on year. This year there has been a 70% increase in violent crime involving firearms. And we are not in a good place when it comes to corruption. Investigations, prosecutions and trials do not reduce crime. This year, only one in four murderers will face trial. The dismissal of a bloc of ministers does indeed serve to divert attention and is better for the individuals who resign.

There were some people who were not asked to resign, such as the head of the secret service and the Prosecutor General. Clearly the problem is systemic and the en bloc resignations are a matter of political optics.

So, there is no issue of him getting rid of his political foes within the government?

They were all loyal to the prime minister. It is always difficult to fire someone, even in countries bigger than Armenia. It was not about loyalty. It was not about political control. It was about the image of the government and its perceived ability to deliver. For more than three years, there were calls for Interior Minister Ghazaryan to resign. And he hired Arpine Sargsyan, whose name had been put forward by civil society for more than two years and who had previously served as deputy minister.  She may be able to deliver some results, although I am not at all optimistic in the key areas of investigation, prosecution and the judiciary. 

Allow me to take a step back. OCCRP research suggests that the former deputy PM and Current Mayor of Yerevan, linked to the Velvet Revolution, is embroiled in an agricultural subsidies scandal, which favoured his family. The Speaker of the National Assembly Alen Simonyan has been embroiled in a corruption scandal related to public investment in housing.  How does this “reshuffle” help to address concerns that the new generation of Armenian politicians is not free of the stain of corruption. In what way is this reshuffle bolstering the confidence of the people in the justice system?

To be clear, this reshuffle came in response to reports from various districts that criminals were terrorising people and extortion was rife. It was a statement: either we have a state or we don't. Something had to be done. Especially with elections coming up. To be clear, we are heading for elections in 2026. The government needed to do something and be seen to be doing something. That is what this reshuffle was about. 

Yes, but here there is a point of substance. There are two possible narratives for this reshuffle. The first, advanced by those who hail it as a positive step, sees this reshuffle as a sign that the government is committed to reforms. They have allowed the women behind the reforms to take the lead, taking away the men standing in the way. That is an attractive narrative. The second, advanced by the opposition, is that the Prime Minister replaced political rivals that could undermine him with younger people whose whole political survival depends on his patronage. Which narrative convinces you? 

I absolutely disagree with the second. I would agree with the first narrative, particularly in relation to the Minister of the Interior. The Minister of Interior, Vahe Ghazaryan, who was forced to resign, was a close childhood friend of the Prime Minister. He is one of two members of the 13-member cabinet invited to his birthday party. He was the man who secured the loyalty of the police in the immediate aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh war. But it is also clear that he is not a politician, and he forced the prime minister's hand. He was unable to deliver a speech, not even to read it.

The minister who replaced him, Arpine Sargsyan, was always the driving force behind reforms, but when you have people with Soviet mentality, you have to give her the authority to deal with them.

Similarly, the head of the State Revenue Committee, Rustam Badasyan, has no politics in him. Again, he lacks basic political skills. The same goes for the chairman of the Investigative Committee, Kyaramyan: zero charisma. When addressing MPs, his language and respect left much to be desired. He is a good manager and, I believe, a man of integrity, but he is not a politician.

I think this reshuffle has nothing to do with getting rid of political rivals. Hypothetical political competitors might be the mayor of Yerevan, Aviyan, or the defence minister, Papikyan. They were not touched.

Another narrative is that this reshuffle was motivated by security concerns or fears of foreign influence. Again, this is unconvincing. Yes, the security services were vetted with a view to sacking people linked to Russia in 2020. This campaign was led by Argishti Kyaramyan, one of the six fired.

The Russians didn't like his campaign. During the war, when our dependence on Russia was greater, the Russians asked for his resignation. So he was sacked and then reappointed chairman of the Investigative Committee. No one can accuse him of being a security liability, because he led the campaign to ensure the absolute loyalty of the security services and the police in the very difficult post-war period. He may be many things, but he was not a supporter of Russia. 

Georgia was once leading international indexes as one of the least corrupt states in the region and, therefore, a globally attractive destination for foreign direct investment. What can Armenia learn from Georgia, if backtracking in justice and rule of law reforms can be so profound? Is it right to speak of reforms as a linear/evolutionary process?

Georgia is quite scary. We used to think that Georgia was past the point of no return. And yet we found out last week that this is not the case. We had a small election observation mission. The last time we saw violence in Tbilisi, it was comparable to what happened in Yerevan in 2015.  That was a decade ago.

The message is that top-down reform of institutions and legislation is not enough. You need bottom-up change as well. Society has to change. These days, for example, there is a debate in Armenia about the use of seat belts and child seats. We have a terrible record on this in Armenia, and we have quite a statistical number of road accidents. It is quite terrible. Parliamentarians want to enforce measures with fines. We are advocating a public information campaign. You have to work with the people.

Another thing that's frightening in Georgia is the setback in the fight against organised crime. Georgia was clearly a regional example that stood out. They left the country where representatives of organised crime were meeting and simply 'summoned' the prime minister or the president at will, wherever they wanted. After Saakashvili, these people went to prison, and that was stunning. But without taking society with you, even that backfired. There was a backlash. Enforcement is a starting point, not an end. Armenia has to learn, even though we have never faced the kind of challenge that Georgia has faced with organised crime. 

Looking ahead. Armenia goes to the polls in 2026. What is the best-case scenario for the evolution of rule of law in the country? What is the worst-case scenario?

It's very hard to predict. Armenia is not an island, it is a landlocked country. When we talk about human rights and the rule of law, we cannot hope to develop as a region with our neighbours. The region is becoming more problematic.

Iran remains unchanged. Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan are going backwards compared to ten years ago. Russia is not very fond of democracy. We are taking small positive steps. Our new Minister of Justice has enthusiasm, energy and a sense of direction. She may have something to show before 2026. We have a good Minister of Interior who is equally driven.

The political climate will inevitably be shaped by Russia's war in Ukraine. Given the power vacuum, we have felt particularly independent in the last three years. This is due to Russia's weakness and to the Ukrainian resistance. But one cannot predict the future. Things could go wrong. 

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis