Dimitri Tskitishvili is a center-left politician in Georgia, a part of the world that often defines itself not in traditional left-right terms, but in more "geopolitical" terms. Tskitishvili has been involved in Social Democratic politics for more than 20 years, at one point serving as Vice President of the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY). In 2013, he joined the Georgian Dream party and became part of the government that achieved what has been widely hailed as Georgia's "first peaceful transfer of power." Peaceful transfers of power are the exception rather than the rule in Georgia.

As a member of the Georgian Dream parliamentary group, Tskitishvili served as deputy chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Georgian Parliament and later of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. His political project, however, revolves mainly around the overhauling of labor legislation. As the country moved from socialism to liberal democracy, there were no labor regulations, leaving an open field for all kinds of abuses, from grueling long hours to sexual harassment in the workplace. Creating a European baseline of rights was the reason he joined the movement in 2013.

As head of the ruling party's international department, Tskitishvili was instrumental in bringing the newly elected party into the fold of the Socialists and Democrats. He believed he was contributing to anchoring his party and government in an irreversible process. Alas, this was not the case. The rupture was gradual.

The U.S.-educated Mr. Tskitishvili is not the only one of his cohorts to become disillusioned with the policies of the incumbent party. He joined the ranks of the opposition and sought to "fight from within" to salvage the legacy of his own work, which was linked to Europeanization in a deeper sense. Caucasus Watch finds him in Tbilisi after a busy day on the streets. He is part of the opposition movement, which, Tskitishvili admits, has not been able to lead. The opposition is more spontaneous than organized. And yet, whatever comes next will require negotiation and leadership. 

You used to be a Georgian Dream MP, a deputy chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Head of the International Relations of the Party. In fact, you were instrumental in building a bridge between Georgian Dream and the Socialists and Democrats political group. And from that position, you spearheaded collective labor law reform, including collective bargaining in Georgia. What is the legacy of your engagement with the party and when do you feel it lost its way. 

Indeed, I was responsible for building this cooperation with the Socialists and Democrats. And I indeed sponsor the full revision of labour law in Georgia, piece by piece, with issues ranging from sexual harassment in the workplaces to establishing an obligation for each company to share financial data with its employees, and collective bargaining. The adoption of this legislative package was completed in 2020 and went into effect in the beginning of 2021. As a result, there was a new independent authority, with a strong mandate, and surprisingly well-funded, just as the country was moving towards the Pandemic-related lockdowns. 

During this period the Labour Inspectorate played a role also in monitoring adherence to the rules across workplaces. Initially, there was momentum, dynamism, and effectiveness. Inspectors were hired and gradually people started experiencing new rights. Some of the MPs picked up the cause in parliament and advocacy was effective. In time, interest in the subject subsided. Inspectors and unionists were assimilated by the system, undermining their own reputation, more in the spirit of bureaucratic routine rather than a ‘civil service.’ The Public Defender was only individual advocate with resolve to promote labor rights, despite his limited mandate.

So, by the end of 2019, when I left the Georgian Dream, it was clear that this party prioritized retaining power at any cost. The less pluralistic parliament that emerged in 2020 reduced the need for internal debates within the party and, after the invasion of Ukraine, things became much, much clearer. Anti-Western rhetoric became the norm, questioning liberal pluralism was normalized, and any demand for democratic rights, justice, or electoral law reforms was framed as the conspiracy of the “global war party.” Gradually, Russia and its socioeconomic model were described positively. 

Before going to Russia, let’s stay a bit more on Georgia. Two successive Georgian Prime Ministers now have been attending the ultra-conservative CPAC platform in Budapest, bringing together the European and American nationalist right. the Prime Minister Orban was the first one to visit Tbilisi following the latest elections. Is this the signal of an ideological shift or a more instrumental calculation?

I don't think that there's any ideological substance. Of course, being conservative is suddenly in fashion here. They sell well, and there are many willing to play politics with the Church and are quick to dismiss LGBT rights as a global conspiracy. They say they want Europe, but an “Orban version” in tune with the Kremlin, not quite democratic, not fully authoritarian. They have no problem with political pluralism, as long as there is control over financial resources, media platforms, and the institutional upper hand. Pluralism, but not competitive. 

Bidzina Ivanishvili is not an ideologically committed person. He is a conservative today and a communist tomorrow. He could not care less. Ideologies are instrumental in mobilizing people and achieving powers. The goal is not to share that power with anyone. 

It has been argued that Georgia never actually had a peaceful transfer of power, not even in 2012. The transition from Saakashvili was anything but “peaceful,” was it? During the latest elections, few would doubt the Georgian Dream secured the plurality of votes, coming first. Objections are articulated over the question whether the incumbent secured the majority. Does the country have a problem with elections or is this just a matter of a “winner takes all” political culture in which half the people always feel unrepresented?

I will not agree with the “never a peaceful transfer of power” assumption. In 2012 we did not have a French or German style electoral campaign. But it was peaceful and for the first time in modern history someone won, and someone lost and conceded. Of course, it was difficult. Even then, Saakashvili did try to “arrange” his victory, but the power lined up on the other side was too great to oppose. 

This time one side had all the resources. In fact, there was no political campaigning. The messages of the incumbent did not address the people, but Russia. You could hear the leadership of the Georgian Dream apologizing “for causing the war in Abkhazia,” and calling out “the crimes of the United National Movement.” They were echoing the Russian narrative. 

Domestically, the resources mounted by the Georgian Dream could not even compare with what was available to the opposition. Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the intelligence services, and the electoral commission were behind their campaign. Then there was capital: they would outspend the opposition four to five times.

Intimidation is a big thing. They {government} set the cameras to record the voting process and to guarantees that they know who is voting for who. Several press investigations and international organization reports document these allegations. Of course, we're not saying that no one voted for the Georgian Dream. The key for the Georgian Dream was not to win the election, but to win big and gain an overwhelming majority, because this party can look to no party to form a coalition government. They needed a majority. 

Yes, but the people did not go in the streets after the electoral results. They took to the streets when the Prime Minister said, “forget the country’s European perspective.” As a politician, what do you hope will be the result of these demonstrations. Does anyone have the moral or political authority to speak on behalf of the protesters? How would a ‘normal’ Georgian democracy look like? Can Europe be helpful at all?

That's a tricky question. After the elections, the people didn't go to the street. The reason is clear: this Spring, the people took to the street protesting the “Russian law” (foreign agents law). They left the street, believing that democracy will prevail, and they would respond to oppression by voting down the government. When the Georgian Dream emerged as the unconditional leader, the opposition was in shock, and they showed themselves clearly unprepared. Those that did take to the streets were unprepared and uncoordinated, which yielded seemingly insignificant protests, ending up with nothing. 

Finally, the Prime Minister made “the statement,” believing that the protest is over, he was surprised to find that it was not. The people came out on the street and started protesting spontaneously, without political help. Their numbers were impressive, and it was hard to see how the Georgian Dream was a majority with this many people rising up against them. They didn't know what to do. They have to listen, at least. 

But, when you don't have the leadership, you don't know with whom to negotiate. Here, I think, the opposition will coalesce around the President. If the government is cornered and they need to do something, they will look for a counterpart. The opposition, together with the President, can respond.

We know we need to get to new elections, with a new transitional government and politically balanced Electoral Commission. That is a clear demand. There is scope for negotiations. The collective leadership of the four main parties and coalitions – the UNM, the Unity for South Georgia, the Unity for Strong Georgia, and Gakharia’s For Georgia – will align behind this demand. These four blocks can negotiate as one if they can see the prospect of free and fair elections. Of course, we must be ready to accept the result of these elections, whatever that may be, whenever it comes. 

You have been sharing with me reflections to the effect that Russia is toying with the idea of a Confederate Georgia that can be controlled electorally rather than violently, within the space Moscow calls Near Abroad. Would do you feel that there are enough Georgians ready to accept something akin to the 1997 Primakov vision for a united but submissive Georgia, exchanging freedom for land? 

Not if people see this for the trap it is. But it's very difficult to communicate the difficulties attached to this vision and why, for example, a ‘unity’ achieved with Russian mediation could be dangerous for Georgian sovereignty. It’s not easy to explain to that Confederation presupposes recognition and the possibility of secession. I remember this documentary in the 90s, with Abkhazian leaders at the time admitting Confederation as a bridge to recognition, and independence. 

That is not on the table as an open discussion at present. However, you can connect a few dots as the Georgian Dream spent its campaign “apologizing” on behalf of Georgia, echoing the Russian narrative. If you find the country reliant for its integrity on Russia, then you have a perfect lever of control. Russia is pushing to finalize a demarcation process with the breakaway republics, a border of sorts. That would make them ready-to-secede. 

The model has been put forward in Moldova 2005 and again in 2019, unsuccessfully. So, why not try this in Georgia? Propaganda can go a long way. Signing an agreement can happen soon and it looks like unity. However, as soon as Georgia’s policy deviates from Russia’s will, Abkhazia and South Ossetia will leave the Confederation. What happens next can be blamed on the signatories and Russia can wash its hands. 

Reverting to the handling of the present crisis: to the extend Brussels wants to be supportive to domestic opposition, focusing on the government without penalizing Georgians, what is the way forward? Penalizing Georgia points to the freezing of visa liberalization. If Brussels moves down that line, they lose any leverage they have towards Tbilisi without any guarantee of an effect. Is that right? 

That's a difficult question. The voice of the European Parliament is clear. But implementing the resolution will require the involvement of the European Council and, taking steps against individual members of government will require a consensus. There is the looming prospect of a veto by Hungary and may be Slovakia, which would undermine unanimity. 

Which brings us back to what can be done. There are not many options. Freezing visa liberalization is easier because it is “merit-based,” founded on progress on reforms, and can be done by the simple majority of the council as a temporary suspension mechanism. This would be a direct response to backsliding. I hope this will not happen in December but may happen early next year. Nothing further can take place at present. One could expect a national reaction, say from Germany or France, but not at present. 

What may happen in the short run, could stem from Washington. The United States can move more quickly with targeted sanctions. The combination of domestic and international pressure could perhaps be effective and will force the government to sit at the negotiating table. We have to agree on date of the new elections under an improved electoral environment, with a politically balanced electoral administration and politically neutral state institutions.

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis