Iran is not part of any security alliance and it is not a security provider for any of the seven states along its borders. Supporting militias and projecting power is very different from committing to mobilisation to protect the sovereignty of another state. In the case of Armenia, Iran might be breaking with its traditional security norms. This may explain why a large Armenian defence delegation, led by Minister Suren Papikyan, visited Tehran on 8 March.

Interviews with Iranian analysts in Tehran in English are rare. However, Iran is now a key player in the Caucasus and it is difficult to understand the region without an Iranian perspective. Caucasus Watch contacted Dr Hassan Beheshtipour, an Iranian expert on Caucasus and Central Asia policy for the best part of four decades. Soviet analysts in Iran did not follow the well-trodden path from "comparative communism" to transitology in the 1990s. Instead, Tehran perceived the shift of Russian power from global to regional outreach with a sense of optimism and trepidation. After the first Karabakh war, the shift in the territorial status quo remained relatively unchallenged as Russia largely acted as a guarantor of the status quo. This is no longer the case, and Iran is rethinking its own security posture.

One of the institutions shaping Iran's new perspective on Russia and the post-Soviet space is the Institute for Iran-Eurasia Studies (IRAS), where Dr Baheshtipour is one of the 20 members of the Research Board. Besides the institute's 'Caucasus and Central Asia' focus, IRAS has traditionally covered Afghanistan and Ukraine, in line with Tehran's monitoring of the space where Russia has levers and power projection capabilities. At the same time, Dr Baheshtipour is a familiar face to Iranians, having worked as a television producer, including five documentaries on the region.

IRAS was founded by the former Iranian ambassador to Moscow, Mehdi Sanaei. The idea was to create a platform of platforms, bringing together Caucasus Area Studies experts from elite international relations institutions to build economic, political and security expertise. The institute works with similar institutions in Russia, India, Armenia and Kazakhstan. Importantly, IRAS is involved in training the next generation of Caucasus analysts, drawing from a pool of PhD and MA researchers from all elite academic institutions. 

They say that in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia was on the side of conflict. What is the role of Iran in the Caucasus? 

The question of Russia's involvement in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict is a matter of interpretation. Did the outcome of the 2020 war favour Russia, or did Moscow exploit the conflict to retain its footing in the South Caucasus? I think Russia accommodated to developments. 

In truth, the Russian elite never accepted the reduction of Russia from a global to a regional power. There is plenty of grandstanding. However, unlike China, Russia does not have the economic or scientific foundations of a superpower. The Russians cannot force their self-perception as a great power to the Americans in Ukraine, and in the long run I do not believe they will be able to stop Ukraine’s move towards the western orbit. 

Meanwhile, they have lost control of the status quo in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan, with the help of Turkey and Israel, changed the status quo. Russia was not motivated to oppose this change for three reasons: first, it was an alignment of the situation on the ground with the international status quo; second, in terms of resources, Moscow had to prioritise Ukraine; third, the Pashinyan government was perceived as pro-Western. Another Armenian president like Sargsyan might have had more room for manoeuvre.  He might have expected the CSTO to play a deterrent role. 

Iran's role in the conflict reflects a commitment to the status quo. Diplomatically, Iran stands by the principle of viewing Azerbaijan's victory in Karabakh as a restoration of the international status quo, a liberation. However, Iran opposes Baku's articulation of historical claims against southern Armenia, particularly over the so-called Western Zangezur region. If everyone with an unfounded historical claim changes borders, it will be a messy affair. We have more than 50 nationalities in the region. Everyone would be affected. 

Iran issued a stern warning at the highest level, stating that it would not allow the disappearance of the Armenian-Iranian border, which has geopolitical and geo-economic significance. As a result, Iran and Azerbaijan agreed to establish a transit route known as the 'Aras Corridor'. This corridor is intended to cross Iran's East Azerbaijan province, linking the village of Aghband in the south-west corner of Zangilan district to Ordubad in South Nakhchivan.

How does Iran view itself in the region, as Russia no longer guarantees its northern border. 

Looking at Russia's position in the region - and in particular the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict - we need to look beyond media discourse and propaganda. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia remained a great power in space and arms production. They continued to see themselves as a global power. In my view, it is a regional power. Moscow still believes that it is entitled to great power status, and the war in Ukraine is an articulation of this claim. It is clear that in the future Ukraine will seek NATO membership and closer integration with the West. And yes, the impact of the Ukrainian war in the Caucasus has changed Iran's security posture in the Caucasus. 

Azerbaijan, with the help of Turkey and Israel, was able to regain control of the Armenian-controlled territories of Karabakh and the surrounding areas. Russia took note of international law, its own strategic priorities and the political state of affairs in Armenia and decided to let the facts evolve. 

So, is Iran neutral to the change of the status quo in Southern Armenia?

Iran stands by and supports the status quo. Iran did not endorse Russia's invasion of Ukraine. At the UN, when the issue of Ukraine came to the fore, Tehran condemned the violation of sovereignty. In the Caucasus, Iran nodded to Azerbaijan's restoration of sovereignty over Karabakh as a liberation, even if its relations with Armenia were excellent.

Traditionally, Iran has supported a region-first approach to regional issues. One has to contextualise what this means beyond coordination within the three-plus-three framework: Iran, Turkey, Russia and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Iran's region-first approach is largely a counterweight to Washington's traditional position of "anywhere but Iran". The Iranian response is to delineate the space beyond the reach of US involvement: in the Persian Gulf and, of course, the South Caucasus. Naturally, Iran's position from Afghanistan to the Caucasus would have been very different if we had managed to move forward with the Joint and Comprehensive Plan of Action. I don't want to deviate from our discussion, but this could have been resolved. 

The "3+3" platform is currently focused on a security agenda. Iran believes that this agenda needs to be broadened to include economic, transport and other forms of cooperation. Iran's "region first" policy in the region is in fact Tehran's response to Washington's global "minus Iran" policy. If Iran and the United States had resolved their issues and stuck to the JCPOA, the status quo in Central Asia and Afghanistan would be different.

Now that Azerbaijan has begun to make a pseudo-historical case for the Zangezur Corridor, Iran has drawn a red line. Iran is unwilling to accept a fundamental change in the status quo, especially the takeover of Armenia's Syunik region. 

Would Iran cross the Aras River to prevent the emergence of a Zangezur corridor linking Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan? 

Firstly, Armenia wants to maintain its border with Iran. Armenia sees this border as a breathing space. The landlocked Caucasus state cannot rely on Georgia, and even less on Turkey and Azerbaijan, for access to the world, especially when things get difficult. Armenia wants and needs to maintain its border with Iran.

Of course, the Zangezur corridor could have some economic benefits for Armenia. But security trumps these considerations. What is at stake on this border is sovereignty.

Yes, but there is no Armenian army on the other side of the Aras River. There are 4,000 FSB troops. Can we still talk about Iran crossing the Aras to meet Russian troops on the other side? 

We should evaluate the Russian position on the Zangezur Corridor. The Russians have never said they are against it, but that is a tactical posture. Strategically, Russia does not favour the Zangezur Corridor. It is against Russian policy and interests.

As far as I know, Iran has brought this discussion into private meetings with Russia. Iran has said that its army will cross the border if an occupation of Syunik begins, and Russia has accepted this stance. Russia is informed and has accepted that Iran will cross the Aras River. What's more, Armenia and Iran have carried out joint manoeuvres to ensure that bridges can be deployed quickly.

Let us be clear: Azerbaijan claims Karabakh with reference to the 1991 Almaty Framework; then Baku makes historical claims outside the Almaty Framework to lay claims on Syunik. Something has to give; you cannot have it both ways. Similarly, Russia cannot demand that every international problem be resolved in a multilateral UN framework and then revert to bilateralism in the post-Soviet space. One has to be consistent.

Azerbaijan is a necessary transit point for Iran's trade with Russia. The relations with Baku are instrumentally significant. Where do you see Tehran's relations with Baku going? Do you see the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) taking off?

The Russia-Iran trade route would be important even if neither country was under sanctions. It is a key route for all three countries - Azerbaijan, Iran and Russia - sanctions or no sanctions. Turkey is also motivated to see it through because it diversifies its own access to Russia.

Developing this road has been a challenge. Iranian trucks have been travelling back and forth along the route for years, but the infrastructure is inadequate and customs procedures are slow, particularly in the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani government has expressed concern about possible fines from the United States and is dragging its feet.

The INSTC was never taken seriously by Russia until it was sanctioned. For 30 years sanctions have stood in their way. Now they need it and it is not there. 

In May 2023, Russia announced its cooperation with Iran on the construction of the Astara-Rasht railway. What is the level of commitment? When can we expect this project to be completed?

The West and Washington must understand that sanctions do not promote transparency. Sanctions create a shadow system. Both countries, Russia and Iran, see this as a confidential project. Information is limited. But the information coming from the relevant cabinet ministers and parliamentarians from the border regions suggests that real progress is being made.

It is true that Russia's resources have been significantly depleted by its involvement in the war in Ukraine. For now, medicines and other goods are crossing the border. But there are bottlenecks, and Russia is highly motivated to see this through.

In 2022, Tehran and Baku agreed to build a new corridor from Azerbaijan's Eastern Zangezur economic region to its exclave of Nakhchivan via Iranian territory. In October 2023, this was named the Aras Corridor. Do you think Iran and Azerbaijan will complete the project?  

For 32 years, the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan has met many of its needs with imports from Iran or via Iran. Azerbaijan's access to its exclave depended and depends on Iran.

The above mentioned Aras Corridor cuts the distance from Azerbaijan to its exclave down to 40 km. Because of the need for economic elasticity, the routes should not be seen as mutually exclusive. There is room for both the Aras and the Zangezur corridors. Both are needed. Of course, there is a Turkish ambition to connect Central Asia to Turkey via southern Armenia. Iran will keep this ambition in check.

However, it is in the interests of both countries to implement the Aras Corridor project, which has only the US as a spoiler. But because of its obvious economic benefits, I would give it a seventy per cent chance of coming to fruition.

What about Armenia's Corridors of Peace vision? What does it bring to the table?

As analysts, we see it as a valuable vision that addresses all the bottlenecks from a conflict resolution perspective. However, it falls short of being a plan that takes into account the agenda of the superpowers and the regional geopolitical balance. The vision is valid but not realistic.

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis