Jacek Czaputowicz served as a Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland from 2018 to 2020, in the cabinet of Prime Minister Morawiecki. Caucasus Watch speaks to him as Poland braces for elections on October 15. 

Europe is watching, more closely than ever before, countries in the Black Sea and the Caucasus. Poland is not merely the champion of solidarity with Ukraine, but also one of the centres where the future of Europe is being debated. In many respects, the driver of Polish diplomacy for two years feels vindicated, as the Polish conceptualisation of the Russian threat and the necessity of a more geopolitically aware Europe is mainstreamed. Seeing eye-to-eye with London and Washington, Warsaw has always insisted that Europe should not depend on Russian energy supplies, should bolster its security, and have a more geopolitical perspective. 

Turning the question of enlargement on its head, Czaputowicz stands by the view that post-Soviet polities need to join the European project to change, not to change in order to join. Each of these states has the moral prerogative to join and the EU is Treaty-bound to consider their application. Political issues about “readiness” should be considered but not stand on the way. 

The worldview of the former foreign minister of the incumbent ruling party in Poland has been largely shaped by his personal history. In 1978 Czaputowicz joined the ranks of the Polish resistance to the communist regime and was twice imprisoned for his political activism in 1981 and 1985.  An intellectual of Polish diplomacy, he joined the Foreign Service Programme of the University of Oxford (1992-1993), obtained his PhD in 1997 and is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Warsaw since 2008.

Let’s begin with the prospect of EU Enlargement, potentially in the Black Sea and the Caucasus. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, is more active in facilitating talks in the South Caucasus and calls for a big-bang enlargement drive in the post-Soviet space by 2030. 

The Commission appears to be shooting down this ambition prioritising the deepening of decision-making structures. As the discussion over enlargement always brings to the fore the proverbial question "wider or deeper" and because this is an electoral year in Poland, where do you think Warsaw should stand on the question? 

Most Polish officials favour enlargement. This is a point of consensus in Poland, across the political spectrum. Before the war in Ukraine, enlargement was not the obvious choice among member states. Now, minds are focused. You see how the Baltic Countries developed. The EU makes a difference. Every European country should be entitled to join if they are ready and willing.  

France was traditionally sceptical, prioritising relations in the Mediterranean; Germany looked eastwards but often prioritised relations with Moscow, thinking of Russia as a strategic partner. They had different priorities, but now it is clear where we need to focus. 

In fact, we favour enlargement without the necessity of “prerequisite reforms” of the EU institutional framework. Countries like Germany want reforms first. This is a pretext for a different agenda. Historically, the problem is one of substance. We believe in a union of nations rather than sharing federal vision.

We always criticised the Normandy format for it prioritised relations with Russia over relations with Ukraine. In May 2018, I introduced a discussion in the UN Security Council. I proposed that the UN should appoint an UN Envoy to monitor the situation in Ukraine and send peace keeping forces. Russia objected but also France and German were sceptical. They preferred to deal with the conflict through Normandy format. 

But the EU was not a party to that format and other member states were not represented in it. Differently than in the JCPOA (nuclear treaty with Iran), where the EU was a party to the treaty. Our possibility to influence the EU policy towards Ukraine was therefore limited. Germany and France developed economic relations with Russia. Nord Stream II made Europe dependent from Russia in terms of energy resources. Russia had reasons to believe that an invasion was possible as no one would step up. 

So, the problem was not how decision in the EU were taken but what decisions were taken. It is now acknowledged that it was wrong policy. 

If you were to return as foreign minister, would you make the case for extending candidate status to Georgia by the end of the year? Would you propose the same for Armenia? Or should we focus on Ukraine and Moldova alone? 

In principle, Poland would support the candidacy of every Eastern country. So, if Armenia decides to apply, we will support that candidacy. There is a European Treaty, with the principle that every European country has the right to membership. Georgia too. Azerbaijan does not appear interested. 

The issue is whether political circumstances are ready. A peace Treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be helpful. Overall, we should not be telling either Armenians or Georgians “we don’t want you.” There is a Treaty obligation, and they have the right to apply. And there is a geopolitical dimension, as they would leave the Russian sphere of influence. That is important for Europe.

In August 2018 I went with foreign ministers of the Baltic states and Ukraine to Georgia. It was an expression of our solidarity on 10^th anniversary of President Kaczynski and presidents of these countries flight to Tbilisi. And we are committed to supporting Georgia’s democratic development at all times. 

Currently developments in Georgia are not positive, particularly the Saakashvili case. Georgia’s political system is sending all the wrong signals. There is an impression in Warsaw that Tbilisi is more open to the Kremlin. 

In 2008 Poland and Sweden championed the transition from a Black Sea Synergy, which included Russia, to an Eastern Partnership (EaP), decoupling the EU’s partnership with post-Soviet states from Russia. Looking at the state of play now, in Ukraine and the Caucasus, how successful do you feel is the Eastern Partnership? 

These states haven’t joined the EU since 2008. There has been cooperation but that is not quite the same thing. Ukraine’s attempt resulted in a first invasion in 2014 and there had been reflection on the matter. Ten years later there were countries more pro-European than others: Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. 

It might yet not be clear whether the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was successful. In our foreign policy, we prioritise the will of nations against the Russian pressure. Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia had obviously difficulties to relate to the EU, NATO, or the United States. For us, the US presence is crucial of our security, in a synergy with the EU. 

On the one hand you have Western democracies; on the other, you have authoritarian states.

Ten yeas ago the EU was not a geopolitical actor. They reduced relations to trade. Now, we have a deeper understanding, even by a European Commission that is self-described as geopolitical. There is now more of an understanding of how we need to move, looking forward. And that is positive. Initially, you might have called EaP naïve if you did not perceive Russia as a threat. We now know better: we have to fight for our values and attract other societies. 

Looking a bit deeper into this geopolitical discussion: Is the Polish Three Seas Initiative (3SI) a Master Plan or a vision? Could you compare how it differs from the EU’s broader Ten-T planning or China’s BRI?  

The Three Seas Initiative is already eight years old. There is a debate how to frame it. Some view this as a geopolitical project to integrate Central European Countries (CEE’s) in opposition to Germany on the one hand and to Russia on the other. I disagree. This is an infrastructural project first and foremost, enhancing our integration in the North-South dimension rather than East-West alone. 

The 3SI addresses a development gap. Within the EU, this project is important and will speak to inter-regional cohesion. An important element of the 3SI is that it is open to EU member states alone, with Ukraine having an observer status. We don’t want this project to be perceived as being in competition with the EU’s overall transport infrastructure Master Plan (TEN-T). 

Do the means to the 3SI ends matter? We went from focusing on Chinese synergies and the 16+1 platform in 2014 to the recent US Federal Commitment. What is Poland’s vision at this moment? 

Poland did take the lead in the 16+1 and was perceived by China as its key partner in Central Europe. However, it become clear that the Chinese were not willing to meet our expectations. They were using the 16+1 format and BRI to access the Single Market without added value. 

This project gave the Chinese levers, but Central European countries had a problem in accessing Chinese Market. Our trade deficit with China is huge. CEECs are too weak to deal with China on equal footing. The overall principle should be that we cooperate with China through the EU. Bilateral relations are important, but within a normative framework that does not undermine the Single Market. 

China often undermines the EU unity and bolsters bilateral frameworks or the 16+1. We have to avoid that trap. Hungary says that the EU prioritises the interests of Germany and France. In our opinion in relation with China the EU should better represent interests of CEECs. 

The American position is also important. “New Europe” is considered more committed to a security perspective, to the Euro-Atlantic position, and is frankly more pro-American. That is true. During President Trump’s and Secretary of State Pompeo visits to Poland, there was an impetus in bolstering our security ties, not least through an energy partnership. Washington observed geopolitical differences between Poland on the one hand and Germany and France on the other. Relations with Russia were at the forefront. Warsaw accepted this line of thinking. 

The US support in the 3SI predates the Democrats, who remain committed. That is positive. I represented Poland during President Zelensky’s coming to office, his oath at the Parliament. He said at the time they wanted to join 3SI. It was not possible, as they were not an EU member state. We created the Observer status. In response to his request, we created the Lublin Triangle, with Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland, to anchor Ukraine further and bolster cooperation, military and economic. After the war broke out, we mobilised support for Ukraine and the Triangle has catalysed closer cooperation. 

One of the three Seas of the 3SI is the Black Sea.  Is Warsaw of the opinion that the war in Ukraine should not end before Crimea is returned?

This is a relevant question for Poland, but even more relevant for Romania, our key partner in 3SI, which is a Black Sea country. When the war ends is up to Ukraine. We will stand by Kyiv no matter what they decide. We wish the Ukrainians to achieve their objectives. We never accepted the annexation. 

Poland, like Germany, remains an important hub for Eurasian logistics transiting through Russia to China, even as we speak. In the long run, is the so-called Northern Corridor politically viable? 

We are in favour of maintaining the Northern Corridor. There are however risks in allowing Europe to depend on Russia as a transit country. We need to deprive them from yet another blackmail lever. We said the same with Nord Stream. What’s more, we need to reflect on the level of our dependency on China. The EU and the US look more favourably to cooperation with India, which has system of governance closer to ours.  There is an interesting discussion about building connectivity routes to India via Israel and the Gulf states.

Some voices in Washington see in Poland’s 3SI a new vehicle for western influence in the Caucasus. Washington is apparently willing to even put money behind the 3SI. How is Poland relating to the idea of a Middle Corridor to China, led mostly by the Organisation of Turkic States. Does the 3SI have a Caspian dimension? 

There is a possibility that the project is framed in a manner that facilitates tighter cooperation with East Partners. In other words, the North-South demotion can be supplement by closer links with our partners, including the Caucasus. They could be integrated to one infrastructural network. Warsaw is open to this approach, as is Washington.

The EU should see the rationale behind this approach. Energy and goods connectivity needs to be reinforced. And economic cooperation facilitates political cooperation. The US wants to ensure that these countries are viable without Russia. In this context, the Caucasus is very important. 

Focusing on the ideological dimension of the vision you have for Poland. Poland has a special relationship with the so-called Anglosphere, particularly the UK and the United States. During your tenure, while others complained about President Trump neo-isolationism, Poland came close to building a Fort Trump. Also, you helped Theresa May to reach an agreement with the EU. Law and Justice Party (PiS) stood shoulder to shoulder with British Conservatives at the European Parliament. The US is now ready to invest Federal funds to the 3SI. To what extent is Poland a successor of the UK in the EU and is that significant for how you deal with the post-Soviet space. 

Indeed, we are closer than other states to the UK and the US.  Like us, the UK was supportive of EU enlargement. There was a more heightened attention on the Russian danger. They are closer to our vision of a liberal and competitive EU, driven by free trade. So, we share a value agenda. The UK left, we remained. 

We articulate the same EU vision, which is not federalist but a union of states and nations. On international arena we support freedom of nations to choose their way of development and alliances. We are for observance of international law and against spheres of influence. We miss this meeting of minds. But the UK as a member of Security Council and a country with robust military force remains a key player on international arena. We cooperate closely in supporting Ukraine. 

When I was foreign minister, we created tighter relations with the United States and developed a security and logistics infrastructure that after Russian aggression on Ukraine become extremely relevant and useful. President Biden visited Poland twice. 

France and Germany presented more nuanced attitude towards Washington and Mocow. For us the US is an ally, Russia is not. 

In our region countries share the same threats perceptions. Even if the situation stays like it is now, we prioritise anchoring Georgia and states like Georgia. We change countries via enlargement, we don’t enlarge once these countries have changed.