Andreas Umland received a Dr.Phil. in history from the Free University of Berlin and Ph.D. in politics from the University of Cambridge. He studied, conducted research and/or taught at Leipzig, Berlin, Oxford, Stanford, Harvard, Yekaterinburg, Eichstaett and Kyiv. He is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation. From his Kyiv perspective, Andreas Umland gave, in German language, an interview to “Caucasus Watch” outlining his views on Russia’s involvement in the Southern Caucasus since the fall of the Soviet Union, and what strategies Moscow uses to achieve its interests. This is the English translation of this interview.

Many experts claim that Russia is using the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia, South-Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh as leverage over the South Caucasus Republics. Do you agree with this assessment?

Yes, this is the main function of these conflicts. Taken by themselves, these territories do not have much value for Russia. Such is, for instance, the case in regards to the control of the pseudo-states of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia. South-Ossetia is marginal in terms of its economy and actually a money-losing-business for Moscow. The beautiful region of Abkhazia has at least some touristic value.

The situation with the other pseudo-states is similar, also partially that of Crimea. This poses the question of Moscow’s real intentions. My answer is that, with these conflicts, as well as with those in Ukraine and Moldova, the South Caucasian countries should be kept unstable and Western organizations, mainly NATO and EU, deterred from further enlargement. This creates dependency relationships of different forms. In the case of Armenia and its conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, Yerevan is dependent on Russian support.

Moscow’s policies in the former Soviet Union are about suppressing European integration and sabotaging liberal counter-models to Russian authoritarianism, that is, alternative development scenarios that could become popular in Russia itself. In addition, some observers make geopolitical arguments relating to the projection of military power beyond the Caucasus, especially in connection to the situation throughout the Middle East. Russia wants to be present as a regional power in the Middle East, and continued influence in the Southern Caucasus is one of many instruments to achieve that. Yet, I would not overestimate this factor.

During the 4-day war in 2016 in Nagorno Karabakh, rumors started that Baku would have received the green light from Moscow. Do you believe that the Russian leadership will accept the fact that the conflict will be settled in favor of Azerbaijan in the long term?

If I look at that from my bird's-eye view in Kiev, it appears as only logical that Russia is trying to keep these confrontations going and countries in abeyance. The indeterminacy of the disputed territories and conflicting states prevents the consolidation of local societies and nation-states, which is in the interest of Moscow. The same applies to the Donets Basin (Donbas). Because of this instrumental role of the conflicts for Moscow, it would be illogical for Russia to allow a complete solution of such conflicts as, for instance, that over Nagorno-Karabakh in favor of either Azerbaijan or Armenia. Of course, the details of the concrete development of each of these conflicts differ greatly. In general, there are also a lot of differences between the various territorial disputes in the post-Soviet space. Nevertheless, the obvious Russian interest in continued control over the republics of the former USSR by fostering local instability is a common thread of all these conflicts. 

So the same is to be expected with regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia?

Yes, these regions are indeed extensions of the Russian control area, but their main purpose is the subversion of the Georgian state and less so territorial expansion of Russia itself. In the longer run, however, this creates dilemmas for the Kremlin, as a kind of habituation effect sets in within the Russian neo-imperialist public discourse, which increasingly begins to see these areas as actually belonging to Russia. Then, imperialist ultra-nationalists start asking why these areas are not actually made parts of Russia, like Crimea. However, this demand of fanatical Russian empire-savers contradicts the original function of the territories from the point of view of the rather utilitarian-thinking political leadership in Moscow. The Kremlin does not seek a direct extension of Russia-controlled territory for its own sake (with the exception, of course, of Crimea), at least not if that would lead to major foreign political problems. 

Russia's economy is known to be very dependent on the energy market. According to some estimates, 40% of Russia's GDP is in the energy sector. Does this explain the decisive action taken by Moscow against energy projects in the region, such as TANAP or the Southern Gas Corridor in general?

This is the second major determinant of Russian foreign policy. The first, as mentioned, is the prevention of counter-models and alternative political development scenarios in the post-Soviet space which could threaten the Putin System domestically. The second aspect is safeguarding the authoritarian regime’s financial foundation. Here it is important for the Kremlin to maintain Russia's strong position in global energy markets, especially on the European oil and gas market. The Russian economy is difficult or impossible to reform under the current kleptocratic-patronalistic regime. Because of that, securing energy exports remains the main economic basis of Russia’s peculiar power and exploitation system. The various pipeline projects are thus of crucial importance to the stability of the regime.

This circumstance can also be used to explain Moscow's, at times, aggressive approach to energy policy issues. To be sure, the energy conflicts within the Caucasus are of a different nature than, for example, were the disputes over the Nord Stream and South Stream pipeline projects, with which Moscow is trying to expel Ukraine out of Russian gas export operations to Europe and out of those Central Asian gas exports that pass through Russia on their way westward. This will free Moscow up in its conduct of military and non-military actions in Ukraine. There is a certain emotional element in Russian foreign policy with regard to Ukraine which, in my estimation, is less present in the Caucasus. Here, Moscow’s decisions on energy matters are determined more by rational power calculus.

There have been efforts by the Caucasus republics to look for other partners on the matter of energy and infrastructure projects. What does this mean for Moscow's influence?

Obviously, the respective countries strive for a diversification of their energy sources. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this question is the Russian-Turkish relationship. Overall, there are many conflicts of interest between the two countries. For example, Ankara is more pro-Georgian with regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and takes Azerbaijan’s side in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, Turkey is critical of Moscow’s treatment of Crimean Tatars since 2014. There are further conflicts of interest in Central Asia, Syria and on the Kurdistan issue. Nevertheless, there are projects in the energy sector where both sides work closely together, such as at Turkstream. At the same time, there are Turkish projects that diminish Russian influence. Against the background of such complications, the development of the Russian-Turkish relations remains a highly interesting issue in the future.

Turkey in particular was repeatedly pointed out as a potential regional power after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Has the country been able to establish itself as a serious counterweight to Russia in the Caucasus?

Turkey has established a close relationship with Azerbaijan and both countries signed a mutual aid pact in 2010. However, this treaty has not helped Azerbaijan to win the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Since then, one becomes more and more skeptical of the practical implications of this actually fully ratified and valid agreement. The pact between Azerbaijan and Turkey has always been an unusual treaty, since - apart from the US - hardly any NATO member has given such far-reaching security guarantees to a non-NATO member state as this happened in the 2010 Turkey-Azerbaijan agreement. Now, in a way, this already extraordinary alliance is being devalued by the growing partnership between Putin and Erdogan.

Unlike in the post-Soviet parts of Central Asia and Central Eastern Europe – from a comparative perspective – Russia seems to have retained a relatively large degree of influence in the Southern Caucasus. Moscow has preserved for itself a significant potential to pressure, in comparison to rivaling major powers such as the EU, Turkey and the US, or Iran and China. For example, Ankara was unable to prevent the de facto occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, even thought this was to the detriment of Turkish interests (not to mention European and American interests). Overall, I do not see that much progress by Turkey in the region. Russia seems to have been successful in keeping the Caucasian republics in abeyance, and thus in one way or another, within its sphere of influence. In that sense, I would rate the Russian Caucasus strategy as relatively effective, in as far as Moscow can still be considered a decisive factor in the region.

This differs from Central Asia, where Moscow faces more competition for influence from China, Turkey, and the US than in the Southern Caucasus. In the Caucasus one can still say: "Moscow calls the shots" (partly, in a literal sense so). Other actors try to get involved, yet, Armenia in particular, but also Georgia and Azerbaijan, still have to take into account Russian actions and cannot expect much help from external actors. Baku can no longer fully rely on the pact with Ankara from 2010, in light of the recent rapprochement between Erdogan and Putin.

Secretary-General Stoltenberg assured at the NATO summit this July that Georgia will definitely become a member of NATO and the NATO-Georgia Commission praised the country's progress in terms of membership requirements. Do you consider Georgia's approach to the West still as realistic? Or did Russia prove its veto power in the Russo-Georgian War of 2008?

There is an intensifying partnership between NATO, on the one side, and Ukraine as well as Georgia, on the other. Despite the (in)famous 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit Declaration, which promised future accession in response to the two countries’ submitted applications for membership, there is yet no concrete plan to implement this intention. In my opinion - and with such remarks I have already made myself rather unpopular in Ukraine - a soon entry of the two applicants into NATO is, for the time being, out of reach.

Instead, the two post-Soviet countries find themselves in a somewhat absurd situation, in which they can only become NATO members, when they will no longer need the alliance’s protection that much. There will only be a consensus on the accession of Ukraine and Georgia between all the currently 29 member-states of the North Atlantic Council when the two aspiring countries have, at least partially, resolved their simmering conflicts with Russia and are no longer in an ongoing confrontation with Moscow. Then, however, membership will no longer be as important to them because, in that case, their main security issue, i.e. the threat from Russia, will be resolved.

Therefore, I believe that today's, in many respects praiseworthy, NATO policy towards Ukraine and Georgia is partly counterproductive, as it raises too many unjustified hopes in these two countries. I can observe that often in Ukraine, and suspect that the situation in Georgia is similar. Yet, the understandable hopes of both nations for full NATO membership cannot be satisfied in the near future.

The ongoing deepening of NATO’s relations with Ukraine and Georgia is, in general, very good. Yet, it also diverts these countries’ attention from seeking alternatives ways to increase their security. The two post-Soviet states will continue to be in a very difficult situation for years to come. Their rapprochement with NATO has the effect of sidetracking them from the exploration and development of other, intermediate and, perhaps, more easily attainable security models and geopolitical options. This concerns, for example, the implementation of the well-known Intermarium (land between the seas) model of a security alliance of East-Central European and South Caucasian states, or of seeking a multilateral pact modelled on the Adriatic or Baltic Charters, and connecting the EU's associated Eastern Partnership countries with the United States.

As long as Article 5 of the Washington Treaty does not apply to Ukraine and Georgia, NATO's, by itself, welcome and encouraging commitment to the two countries has a partly security-reducing and not merely a security-enhancing effect, because, as I said, it also distracts these states from other foreign policy activities. NATO advances are also leading to wariness in Moscow and no one can ultimately know how the Russian leadership is going to respond. However, for the time being, both states remain – to put it bluntly – geopolitical outlaws, even if there is a great deal of moral and quite substantial, in a narrow sense, non-military support on the part of NATO and the EU for both former Soviet republics. It would be smarter if Washington, Brussels, and the various competent institutions of NATO and the EU (NAC, SHAPE, PA, EEAS, EP, etc.) would support Ukraine and Georgia in establishing alternative temporary security structures in the post-communist area, along the line of the mutual aid treaty between Azerbaijan and Turkey. This could enhance regional security until the indefinite date of a new expansion of the EU and NATO to the east.

The Bucharest NATO summit, with its promises to Ukraine and Georgia, without a plan to implement them, can be seen as a breaking point in the development of the entire post-Soviet space. The NATO summit declaration of 2008, in principle, acknowledged the precarious security situation of the two applicants and the legitimacy of their membership wish. It was, in a way, an adequate forecast of what would happen shortly thereafter with Georgia and six years later with Ukraine. However, NATO and its member countries have undertaken and still are doing far too little to help the two Western-oriented nations out of their geopolitical deadlock.

Moscow sees the color revolutions in the post-Soviet space as a danger, and with the Rose Revolution in 2003 Georgia's foreign policy reorientation towards the West took place. With regard to Armenia, do you see any possibility for a foreign policy reorientation in the course of the so-called Velvet Revolution or is the dependency on Russia too strong?

As I perceive the first signals from Pashinyan, so far, there is no intention to do so - either because the new Armenian leadership does not want that in principle, or because its understands that this would be an unrealistic project, at least for the time being. Pashinyan has signaled to Moscow that the Armenian-Russian alliance is being maintained. As long as Yerevan considers the defense and maintenance of the pseudo-state of Nagorno-Karabakh as one of its central state goals, Armenia would seem to remain bound to Russia, no matter what.

An interesting previous episode, in that regard, were the negotiations between Armenia and the EU on an Association Agreement which had been conducted rather seriously until mid-2013. Although the then President Serzh Sargsyan had made no suggestion that Armenia would resign from the Tashkent Pact, i.e. the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty, and the continued presence of Russian troops in Armenia was guaranteed by the continuing conflict with Azerbaijan, Moscow has purposefully sabotaged Yerevan’s negotiations with the EU and forced Armenia into the Eurasian Economic Union. This has made a bilateral free trade agreement between Armenia and the EU impossible.

Now, Armenia and the EU have concluded a stripped-down agreement, and so far this seems to be acceptable for Moscow. The new agreement does not foresee profound integration as within the framework of a full-fledged association with the EU, but only enhanced cooperation. One will see how Russia will continue to behave towards Armenia. This will probably depend crucially on the development of the internal Armenian situation. If Pashinyan succeeds in a kind of balancing act between making reforms and a limited rapprochement with the EU, on the one side, and still being able to satisfy Moscow, on the other, I would not exclude a gradual pro-Western and stable development of the country. On the other hand, I would not rule out that Moscow could someday react in a similar way, as in September 2013, if the new Armenian government goes too far in its overtures to the EU.

Armenia officially recognizes the annexation of Crimea within the UN. Do you think that in the future Armenia will no longer be considered as a possible partner for the West due to its proximity to Russia?

Western leaders know that Armenia has a particularly narrow range of action. For example, if Armenia behaved differently, Russia could simply withdraw its military support. Then Armenia would be on its own and it would be trapped in a sort of bracket between Azerbaijan and Turkey, which could mean that Nagorno-Karabakh will be lost again to Azerbaijan. This is - as all stakeholders and observers know - the crucial security lever that Moscow has with regard to Yerevan.

In addition, Armenia is in some ways pursuing a similar foreign policy project with this territorial conflict as Moscow has been conducting, with regard to Crimea. Maybe that is the reason why Yerevan is ideologically – at least partly – more on the Russian side. To be sure, Nagorno-Karabakh is officially not annexed and therefore cannot be equated with Crimea. Nevertheless, there are certain similarities between the two cases.

The EU has, in spite of Yerevan’s pro-Russian behavior, signed a new, enhanced cooperation agreement with Armenia. My impression is that Brussels would have also signed an association agreement with Yerevan, had Armenia not become part of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Apparently within the EU, the specific situation of Armenia is understood well, so that the, by itself, dubious recognition of Crimea by Yerevan has had so far no major negative impact in Brussels.

How do you see the Chinese influence in the region? Could this pose a threat to Moscow's own influence in the future?

As a non-expert on this issue, I can only intuitively guess that China's economic expansion, especially in Central Asia but also in the Caucasus, tends to diminish Russia's influence. However, unlike the EU Association Agreements, Beijing's economic offensives are not life-threatening projects for the Putin regime. The Chinese model is also authoritarian and does not challenge the current political status quo in the post-Soviet countries where Beijing engages. Moreover, at least on paper, there is a Russian-Chinese partnership, for example through the Shanghai Treaty Organization and an informal, but demonstrative Russian-Chinese front against Western democratization attempts.

That's why the Chinese influence has a different meaning for Moscow, and is mainly about economic issues. Perhaps, in some ways and cases Moscow does not mind if pro-Russian governments in the region are strengthened via Chinese investment. The calculus of the Russian government is thus more complicated here than in the case of the EU’s pro-democratic association policies, which is clearly seen as threatening the Putin system. In any way, Russia does not have the financial means to compete with China in the long term, in the Southern Caucasus or Central Asia, for economic influence. The Kremlin may partly appreciate that China is counteracting the economic influence of the West. But these are just deductions and speculations. With regard to the China-Russia axis, it remains to be seen what will be happening in Central and the Caucasus, as the balance of power shifts further each year to the detriment of Moscow.

Can you give a final assessment of whether Russia’s overall influence has decreased or increased compared to the 1990s?

Due to the developments on the global energy market since the end of the nineties and after the following period of relative economic successes, Russia is once again able to act more decisively on the international level compared to the years immediately after the Soviet Union collapsed. For example, Moscow is still the most important player in the Southern Caucasus region. Nonetheless, I would also say – in a way contradicting the statement just made – that Moscow's position is weakened compared to the 1990s.

There is an increasing tendency in all post-Soviet republics towards politics, policies and polities becoming more independent from Moscow. Consider, for example, the Rose Revolution of 2003, or the fact that Azerbaijan, due to its economic boom, has now more freedom of maneuver as a result of the rise of energy prices. In addition, other actors, such as Turkey, the West and China have become more active in the Southern Caucasus. The region had been initially a kind of a white spot for many players, right after the Cold War. Therefore, Moscow was less in direct competition with other external powers in the 1990s than it is today.

What position does the Caucasus take as part of the so-called "Near Abroad" in Russian foreign policy? Especially in comparison to other regions which are strategically relevant for Moscow, such as Eastern Europe, Central Asia or the Middle East?

The primary objects of Russian foreign policy are Ukraine and Belarus, though Belarus is currently not a burning problem for Moscow. The main focus is therefore on Ukraine. After that, probably come the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Both regions are roughly of equal importance to Moscow. Perhaps one cannot generally say which of them has higher priority, in Russian decision-making circles. The entire post-Soviet space is still the number one issue for Russian foreign policy. Everything else is subordinate to this interest.

I would go so far as to say that, for example, Moscow's involvement in Syria is related to Russia's interests in the post-Soviet space, as it seems that the Kremlin believes it can make a deal with the West. In exchange for an agreement in Syria, it is apparently expected in Moscow that Ukraine (as well as, perhaps, the Southern Caucasus) will be recognized by the West as a Russian sphere of influence. Thus, issues that at first glance seem to have little to do with the post-Soviet space are interlinked on an international level.

Russian-European, Russian-American and Russian-Chinese relations will continue to be subordinated to Russian interests in the former Soviet republics. This Russian priority is shaped by the obsession with a ​​revival or maintaining the old empire, the Tsarist as well as Soviet one, through vassal and satellite states, territorial annexation (Crimea and possibly soon Southern Ossetia) or through alliances such as the EEU and Tashkent Pact. In a sense, the 20th century is still not over, in the post-Soviet space.

Interviewer: Philip Roehrs-Weist