Europe’s latest security crisis gravitates around the Black Sea. West of the Black Sea, Ukraine is fighting a war against Russia’s invasion with Allied support; east of the Black Sea, Russia develops the value chains that support its war economy. Because of the war, the Black Sea is now the most mined body of water on earth. Global food security, the territorial integrity of the eastern flank of the Alliance, and energy security in Southeast Europe could be determined across the maritime space. What should be NATO’s role in the Black Sea? 

There are three littoral NATO member states in the Black Sea: Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye. In November 2023, the three leading security policy institutions  in Bucharest the (New Security Centre, NSC), Sofia (the Sofia Security Forum, SSF), and Istanbul (the Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies, EDAM) published a report on what the role of the Alliance should be in the region. One of the contributors to this report is the Istanbul-based think tank, EDAM, that Ambassador Tacan Ildem chairs. 

Ambassador Ildem is a prominent figure in Türkiye’s Euro-Atlantic trajectory. He served as Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy to NATO (2016-2020), as well as Chairperson of the OSCE Security Committee (2011-2016), the Director General for International Security Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye (2009-2011), Türkiye’s Permanent Representative to NATO (2006-2009), and as the Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of the Republic of Türkiye (2000-2003). Besides Ambassador Ildem’s evident authority, there is a good reason to engage with a Turkish discussant: because of the 1936 Montreux Convention regarding the Regime of the Straights, Turkish authorities have control over the entry of military maritime traffic. As one sets out to the Black Sea, one is likely to come across Russia but is certain to set course from the Dardanelles. 

The EDAM-NSC-SSF report pays tribute to the Türkiye-mediated “Grain Initiative,” a brainchild of Turkish diplomacy that is also emblematic of Ankara’s regional approach. Do you see any chance for the revival of the flagship agreement for Turkish diplomacy in the region?

The report that the three institutions from the three NATO littoral states of the Black Sea, Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye was presented at the NATO HQ in November. We believe that it could contribute to the work of NATO while reflecting on this region. The Black Sea is referred to as a region with significant importance both in NATO’s new Strategic Concept and the EU’s Strategic Compass. The views contained in the report, we feel, could inform the conceptualisation of NATO’s deterrence measures but also provide the foundation of a strategic approach to the region. 

In the future, we might address the broader question of food security, a subject that entered into our radar screen in a profound way, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, and still remains as one of the important aspects of the ongoing war in Ukraine. In the dire circumstances that the international community was faced with, Türkiye, together with the UN, provided the necessary facilitation effort, given Türkiye’s bilateral relationship with both Ukraine and Russia, to reach a common understanding among the parties of the conflict. 

As for the grain deal, it is right to observe that there is no discernible way right now that this deal could be reactivated. Although it seems hard to achieve any positive result at this moment, in the weeks and months ahead, Turkey could help the parties, together with the UN, reach a common understanding that will enable this deal to be functional again. The agreement is important for food security, particularly for many countries of the Global South that desperately need access to critical items like grain. In the meantime, one may assume that efforts behind the scenes will continue. 

The report signals the failure of the Alliance to enlarge towards Ukraine and Georgia during the Bucharest Summit in 2008. According to the report, failing to enlarge towards Ukraine and Georgia during the Bucharest Summit in 2008 partly accounts for the present deterioration of security in the Black Sea. With this admission, let me pose three questions:

First, Türkiye has historically been a major advocate for Georgia’s accession to NATO. Over the course of the war in Ukraine, is Georgia getting closer or further to NATO membership, in your view?

I was the Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO during the 2008 Bucharest Summit. Expectations at the time were especially high in Georgia, but also Ukraine that during the summit a decision to elevate these countries' status in the accession process by initiating the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is a prerequisite for the process to move forward. However, a group of allies were adamantly against this idea, believing that these two aspirant countries were not yet ready to be granted with MAP status. Therefore, the Summit could only be able to yield a decision which one could term as a “constructive ambiguity”: membership perspective for the long term, when conditions were met, was the salient feature of this decision without operationalising it with the initiation of MAP. The timing of the prospective MAP was left to the foreign ministers. 

Türkiye, since the outset, remained committed to its longstanding position to support NATO’s enlargement, with the belief that integration to Euro-Atlantic structures would help these aspirant countries to realize their transformation into a more democratic and prosperous members of the Euro-Atlantic family of nations. Türkiye believes that if NATO enlarges with the inclusion of those aspirant countries in the regions adjacent to her, like the Balkans and the Caucasus, not only strengthen the collective defence of the Alliance but also contribute to regional security and stability. This conviction has led Türkiye to be among those nations that support the membership aspirations of both Georgia and Ukraine.

While analysing the occupation of Ukraine for the second time by Russia in February 2022, many experts dwelled on the deteriorated security environment,  starting with the watershed development of Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and the subversive actions it perpetrated in the Donbas region of Ukraine. However, it would be more appropriate, in my view, to go back to 2008, when Russia launched the war in Georgia and the de      facto situation created in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in order to better understand the root      causes of the situation that the international community today faces in Ukraine. It is a fact that Russia exploited the protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region to provide itself with buffer zones and with strategic rooms of manoeuvre. The existence of these protracted conflicts pose a real danger for the security environment with their potential to convert themselves into “hot conflicts.”      

The report proposes a trilateral framework of maritime security cooperation between Bulgaria, Romania, and Türkiye, which could extend to Ukraine and Georgia. If that is Türkiye’s preference, why did the Romanian proposal for a NATO Black Sea fleet fail? Would Türkiye be ready to take such an advanced security posture vis-à-vis the Russian Federation as a security provider in the Black Sea?

This is really a crucial question: you are right in reminding us of the past proposals, such as the Black Sea Flotilla. Now, the question is: why did Turkey object at the time? That is for a simple reason: when in 2014 Russia invaded Crimea, and illegally annexed it, the peninsula was thereafter militarised, and A2/AD (Anti-Access/Aerial Denial) capacity was created. This capacity allowed a protective umbrella for the Russian Armed Forces, covering a significant portion of the Black Sea region. Türkiye supported in the past a feasible, affordable, and sustainable Alliance deterrence and defence posture compatible with its NATO obligations in the Black Sea region, tailored to regional specificities. That is why proposals that overlooked the emergent post-Crimea military build up in the region had not been embraced with enthusiasm by Türkiye. If realized, such initiatives, like the Black Sea flotilla, would have remained within the crosshairs of this Russian A2/AD capability. 

Russia also used the Black Sea as a platform to project power to the Mediterranean Sea basin, notably to Syria and Libya. Russia, which used to be Türkiye’s northern neighbor over the Black Sea with this projection of power to Syria and Libya, also became its southern neighbour due to its presence there. Russia, in fact, attempted to flank Europe also from the south. That is why NATO’s 360-degree approach requires a holistic overview of the Black Sea in a geographical continuum that sees the region from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean. 

The current circumstances do not unfortunately allow the notion of “regional ownership,” that Türkiye has always been supportive of, to be effective with its original meaning and scope. At this moment, bolstering cooperation among the three riparian NATO members, Bulgaria, Romania, and Türkiye, will transform the original regional ownership ideal into more realistic and practical endeavour. Resembling NORDEFCO perhaps, these three riparian Black Sea Allies can augment their cooperation with a trilateral mechanism which could eventually also include littoral Black Sea partner nations. 

If the three Black Sea littoral allies could work on concrete projects, this would add to their own security but also contribute to secure and stable environment in the region. It is gratifying to see that right now these Allied nations are working as part of such a trilateral process to establish a mine counter measure task group which will aim at clearing the territorial waters of these countries from mines on for free and safe navigation. 

Regional ownership to include Russia in the cooperative security schemes of the past, such as BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmony, is not possible with the deteriorated security circumstances because of the Russian aggression. Same is valid for a new European security architecture. Nevertheless, Russia should not be written off forever. The reality dictated by geography and history requires us to have a long-term goal of enabling Russia’s return to the security order underpinned by the fundamental principles enshrined in the UN Charter and the founding documents of the OSCE, first and foremost the Helsinki Final Act. Depending on the new circumstances offered in the post-war period, and especially on how Russia would choose to behave, the past experiences of regional ownership could serve as a basis for a new security arrangement in the region.

Lastly, what do you think of the Russian deal with the Abkhazian regime to build a new naval base? This base, close to Türkiye, has been discussed as “Crimean Plan B” or dismissed as “a project to spread some money locally that is mainly focusing on contractors rather than security.

As I alluded to earlier, Russia exploits the protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region to provide itself with strategic rooms of manoeuvre. Therefore, attempting to build a new naval base should not be a surprise. However, I hope that Russia will not use Abkhazia military, particularly at a time when the war in Ukraine is ongoing. We know that NATO presence in the region has been strengthened since 2014. Türkiye has always advocated the need for all to exercise restraint and risk and escalation management in their calculations. While boosting deterrence and defence capability, we do not wish to see unnecessary escalation or raise the prospect of perceived provocation.

Although you mentioned at the beginning of this interview that the Montreux Convention has been time and again mentioned in our joint report, I could not help but touch upon it since some may have the tendency to consider the Montreux Convention as an impediment in upgrading NATO’s deterrence and defence in the region. However, I cannot emphasize enough that the Montreux Convention is an inseparable part of international law that must be fully respected by all. Rather an impediment for boosting deterrence and defence, it should be seen as a security and stability multiplier. Türkiye, being the custodian of this convention, implements its provisions faithfully. 

Türkiye’s meticulous attitude was once again demonstrated when Russia started to invade Ukraine in February 2022 under the logo of a “special operations.” Türkiye did not shy away from declaring it as a “war” and invoked the relevant provisions of the Montreux Covention in order to close the Turkish Straits to the warships of littoral and non-littoral states.

The report pays special tribute to offshore Black Sea oil and gas deposits as a potential counterweight to Europe’s traditional dependence on Russian fossil fuels. However, if we are moving towards a war of attrition, perhaps the security situation makes this discussion appear less relevant: this is the most mined body of water in the world; the possibility of Russia attempting to recapture Ukraine’s Snake Island is not out of the question. Do you feel this discussion is timely? If I am not mistaken, are there Russian Navy vessels permanently patrolling next to the Bulgarian and Turkish Exclusive Economic Zones?

Ensuring countries in the region are less dependent on Russian energy supplies certainly reduces opportunities for Russia to use hybrid tactics against these countries. However, energy security in the region also remains tied to Russian activities in the Black Sea, given the large gas reserves discovered. The joint report not only talks about the existing potential of the Black Sea in so far as these reserves are concerned but also pinpoints the possible Russian actions in the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of those littoral allies that could seriously threaten the exploration or extraction of the existing reserves. Therefore, not only the protection of the EEZs but the critical infrastructure will be of utmost importance in the future.

The report is not an exhaustive list of measures but a mapping of national and collective policy areas we must include on the agenda while trying to build regional resilience capacity. Although it is not easy to project a timeline for the proper exploration and extraction of these resources given the prevailing circumstances, but taking joint steps in that regard could provide a foundation for trilateral cooperation, which would be necessary for the future.

The report you co-authored refers to a Russia-Iran axis along the Caspian Sea. Is Türkiye not part of this axis, as, for instance, in the three plus three framework? Turkey’s security posture often depends on compartmentalising. Can Ankara compartmentalise its economic agenda and maintain an active deterrence posture in the Black Sea?

As I referred to earlier, in the light of indivisibility of security, Black Sea, Caspian Sea, and the Mediterranean regions need to be considered in a connected and comprehensive way in a geographical entirety. At the same time, such a holistic overview should apply by not focusing only on the maritime domain in the Black Sea but by looking at the land, maritime, air, and cyber domains from strategic and multi-domain perspective.

Since I mentioned earlier protracted conflicts, it is also important to mention the recent positive developments regarding the Karabakh conflict. When I was serving as the Turkish Ambassador to the OSCE, my constant frustration was to see the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group, together with different formal bodies of the OSCE to take pride for the containment of the conflict without having a genuine interest and effort in trying to find ways to resolve the conflict. But one thing is clear:" when you leave conflicts unresolved then there is always a risk that something might spark to convert them to hot conflict once again. 

Hopes for a lasting peace in South Caucasus heightened with the second Karabakh War in the fall of 2020, which ended the Armenian control over territories around Nagorno-Karabakh and the restoration of the Baku’s full control in Karabakh after Azerbaijan’s military operation in September of 2023. Türkiye sided with Azerbaijan throughout the process and contributed to the creation of the required basis for a peace settlement in South Caucasus. Türkiye, at the same time, started to give priority to an improved Azerbaijan-Armenia relations to pave the way for a lasting peace settlement and to the normalization of Türkiye-Armenia relations that would enable opening of borders between the two countries. 

It is important for Armenia to find a prominent place in all transport, logistics, communication, and energy lines while trying to lay a solid foundation for a final settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Regarding your reference to compartmentalisation, every state has an ability to compartmentalise different elements in their foreign policy practices, successfully or less so. 

To insist a bit on the spirit of my previous question, if we do take a 360-degree view of foreign policy, can someone be an ally of Russia in Syria and an enemy in the Black Sea?

This question articulates a fundamental mistake committed by many analysts in the West, who taking certain headlines in the news without going into details come up with unsound judgments. I recall when, on different occasions, I was asked to present my views on Türkiye’s stand vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine and Türkiye’s relations with both Russia and Ukraine under the assumption and expectation of the organizers of these meetings to learn about the perspectives of a so-called non-aligned country, ignoring the fact that Türkiye is a NATO ally. Probably they were forgetting that all decisions since 2014 to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and defence in the face of Russia’s pattern of aggressive behaviour were taken with the strong support of Türkiye. Türkiye has been stating its unwavering support to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine with its non-recognition policy of the illegal annexation of Crimea, but also the other parts of Ukraine. I have witnessed how Türkiye was so vocal in expression of these views, including the severe human rights violations perpetrated by Russia against the indigenous people of Crimean Tatars, at NATO Russia Council meetings when they were still functioning. 

High-level engagement at the leadership level has continued between Türkiye and Russia in recent years, partly because of the need to talk to each other about a number of conflicts they are involved in across different geographies. But Türkiye has strengthened its strategic partnership with Ukraine during that time. This partnership has encompassed different areas of cooperation, including mutually rewarding cooperation in defence industry. Today, although Türkiye-Russia relations appear complicated at first glance, there is a discernible pattern that goes back decades. Bilateral relations have been driven by careful compartmentalization, a term you were using before, of strategic interests and divergences. A culture of engagement has developed throughout the years, where both countries are able to “agree to disagree” on a number of crucial topics. This is evident across a broad range of recent issues, from Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh, to the Russian occupation and invasion of Ukraine, where they are on opposing sides. We see selective and limited cooperation where their interests are aligned, alongside competitive cooperation where strategic interests remain at odds in the broader context. This competitive cooperation pattern, at times, has been breached by “politico-military systemic anomalies,” such as the downing of a Russian fighter jet by the Turkish combat air patrols or the killing of 36 Turkish soldiers in Idlib by Russian and Syrian joint operations in 2020. Although such incidents strain relations, both countries have so far shown impressive comebacks.