A new, highly fractured political period has begun in Georgia. The stakes are high for both the opposition and the ruling party, which creates an incrementally tense political environment prior to the crucial parliamentary elections in 2024.

Georgia entered a fragile political period that began with the intention of the ruling party, Georgian Dream (GD), to support the law draft on “foreign agents”. The law would have involved those NGOs with an income of at least 20% emanating from abroad. Introducing such a law would have had a serious impact on internal development as well as the country’s geopolitical position. After three days of protests and disturbances in central Tbilisi, GD abandoned the initiative. Nevertheless, the problems will persist, which will complicate Georgia’s internal political setting and ability to guarantee EU candidate status. 

The expected passage of the bill coincided with Georgia's efforts to comply with 12 EU recommendations in order to be granted candidate status by the end of 2023. In a very sensitive time when the West truly needs Georgia as the only and shortest land link to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, the bill would have complicated the process, giving Tbilisi little chance to actually achieve the stated candidate status. In other words, if the likelihood of Georgia joining the EU has increased as a result of the conflict in Ukraine, this geopolitical possibility could have been diminished by the proposed laws.

In the end, Georgia's internal dynamics may be characterized as oscillating between either the Western track, which entails constructing a democracy in the western tradition, or incremental shifts into an illiberal camp. Georgia probably will not end up being wholly pro-Russian. Those days are now gone, and Moscow no longer possesses the geopolitical sway to exert sole influence over Georgia and the South Caucasus in general. Nonetheless, Russia may and does make a concerted effort to reduce the Western influence in the South Caucasus, particularly in Georgia. Georgia’s Western aspirations might be put off in this way, giving Russia time to potentially reestablish its dominance in the area.

But the protests might have caused far more significant processes that could impact the country’s internal political life in the coming years. First, it is safe to say that the three-day protests ended the polarity that has prevailed in Georgian politics over the past ten years. In the struggle between the ruling party and the traditional major opposition force, the United National Movement (UNM), the former has always won by masterfully exploiting the latter’s extremism and blunders.

As a result, the protests drew a far larger segment of the public, particularly those who largely remained disinterested in politics, increasingly dull intra-party confrontations, and also did not support either GD or UNM. Perhaps for the first time in a decade or so, there is now an appealing motive – pro-Western sentiments – for wider sections of the population to unite and throw support behind a certain party. This momentum could pass too, as it often did during previous massive protests in the country. The major dilemma for the protestors remains the lack of political alternatives among the opposition forces.

Foreign Policy Dimension

In 2023, the geopolitical challenges for Georgia would likely remain the same as in 2022: avoiding being caught in the middle of the raging conflict in Ukraine and maintaining a stable pro-Western course. Nevertheless, the intensity of the external challenge will be much lower; with Russia preoccupied with Ukraine, Georgia will have greater room for maneuvering in foreign policy. Diversification of foreign ties will be in full swing.

Georgia also understands that the country is currently significantly more important geopolitically for the EU than it was before 2022. With the war in Ukraine, the traditional routes through Russia to Central Asia and China are now  restricted due to Western sanctions. The alternative Middle Corridor now runs through Georgia, and the corridor is set to expand further as the throughput and trans-Caspian connectivity grow. The Georgian leaders’ visits to Central Asian states throughout 2022 reflect Tbilisi’s changing priorities. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan too are interested in expanding their ties with Europe via the South Caucasus.

EU-Georgia relations are also making progress in other areas. Last December the EU decided to allocate 2,3 billion euros for building the Black Sea strategic submarine electricity cable, which would connect Georgia and Azerbaijan with the European Union. Moreover, Georgia also serves as a vital link for the EU to connect to the Caspian Sea. The gas deal signed between Brussels and Baku requires Georgia as a safe transit route.

All these taken together increases Georgia’s role in the EU’s eastern foreign policy. The overall foreign policy picture is thus promising for Tbilisi. The EU now seems more intent on expanding its influence in the wider Black Sea region. This also implies that a favorable geopolitical situation could serve as a major driver behind EU-Georgia relations. 

Yet Tbilisi’s application for EU membership could also be facing serious challenges because of the exacerbated internal political situation. The 2024 parliamentary elections are nearing, which in many ways will define Georgia’s internal and foreign policy dynamics. With no sign of a compromise between the opposition and the ruling party, the political climate will remain as tense as it has been over the past few months. The ruling party, despite being forced to withdraw the “foreign agent law”, nevertheless seems to be more confident than the opposition. And this is where the problem remains, which is highly peculiar to the internal politics of Georgia – the lack of viable alternatives among the opposition parties. The present momentum behind the protests could subside as no single political party holds enough prestige to mount an effective electoral resistance to the affluent ruling party. And as Georgia is gradually approaching the 2024 parliamentary elections, the dearth of popular opposition leaders could yet again suppress the popular sentiment for political change.

Emil Avdaliani, Georgia.