About author: Markar Shangoyan holds a MSc in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Umeå. He is an editor in the Journal of the Turkish and Eurasian Studies Lab and a contributor to the Thucydides Chair. He researches the S. Caucasus and Turkey's foreign policy vis a vis Central Asia, Russia, Ukraine and Afghanistan.

On the 14th of January Armenia and Turkey officially started their direct contacts for the normalisation process. Special envoys from the two countries met in Moscow, in a move which was interpreted as a significant step towards the possibility of achieving regular and normal relations. The success of this process is complex and entails several variables that require investigation. One of the questions that comes up is connected with Armenia’s potential to negotiate with Turkey. Can a recently defeated and weak Yerevan state its conditions to Ankara? To answer this question it is necessary to examine the likely benefits for the two negotiating sides, along with the role of external participants to this process such as Russia and the West.

Potential benefits from normalisation

Regular and functioning bilateral relations between Armenia and Turkey may have several positive effects on a regional, bilateral, and also domestic level. In this context, the direct contacts between the two countries, the probable opening of the border between them, and also the beginning of a social discussion seeking to resolve issues of their common past, can foster stability and cooperation. The benefits for each country can be assessed in the spheres of economics, politics, and diplomacy.

Armenia, a landlocked country, borders Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, and Turkey. Having its borders closed with two of those countries results in economic, political, and social isolation. Opening the border with Turkey could decidedly alleviate this situation. The open borders can give Armenia access to alternative routes for its exports (e.g. port of Trabzon, Kars – Gyumri railway) and lower its transport costs. Studies indicate that there would be a significant growth in Armenia’s GDP (30% - 38%) as there would be an increase in exports and foreign direct investments.

Strengthening the bilateral economic relations between the two countries will also have specific political repercussions for Yerevan’s foreign and domestic policy. Due to its perceived threats from Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia has followed a strategy of external balancing by aligning with Russia. This policy has disproportionately increased Moscow’s influence in Yerevan. By normalising its relations with Turkey, Armenia lets a potential competitor enter the diplomatic equation. This can, in the long term, improve Yerevan’s ability to navigate between the influence of regional competitors.

Similarly, even though Armenia does not represent a big market for Turkish exports, there are specific benefits Ankara can reap by opening its borders. In economic and logistical terms, even though Turkey has promoted alternative routes bypassing Armenia (e.g., Baku – Tbilisi – Kars railway, BTC and BTE pipelines), it can complement those with more efficient connections such as the Baku – Julfa – Yersakh railway line, which is connected to Gyumri and can also lead to Kars. Having additional and more efficient routes along with the BTK line enhances Turkey’s role as a transportation hub. Furthermore, an increase in connectivity can lead to the development of Eastern Anatolia, Turkey’s least developed region with an approximate per capita GDP, in 2019, from 3200 TL ($237) to 5900 TL ($436).

The main gain for Ankara will be in terms of political influence in Yerevan, and subsequently in the South Caucasus. The establishment of direct Ankara - Yerevan contacts, along with the enhancement of their economic relations will make Turkey an important stakeholder in the Armenian domestic political scene. Moreover, Ankara, in its regional foreign policy, has been promoting trilateral schemes in the periphery to increase its presence and significance (Azerbaijan – Georgia – Turkey, Azerbaijan – Iran - Turkey). In this framework, President Erdoğan of Turkey stated in early June 2021, that Turkey would be “open to regional cooperation incorporating Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.” His words can be read both in the context of the 3+3 regional diplomatic initiative and the expansion of the trilateral Azerbaijan – Georgia – Turkey partnership. The latter is a daring suggestion that would grow Turkey’s regional influence, albeit directly contest Russian interests in Yerevan and the South Caucasus.

Lastly, the increased human interaction that will result from the open borders, could eventually lead to a higher degree of awareness and understanding for both societies. Politicisation of history, trauma and the stigma of the otherness can steadily subside with dialogue and more frequent people-to-people contacts.

Prospects of negotiation and power imbalances

Armenia and Turkey have recently reiterated their commitment to a normalisation process without preconditions. In reality, however, both countries have stated specific terms which serve their national interest. Some of the contested issues are connected with the historical interpretation of the Armenian genocide, the status of the Mountainous (Nagorno) Karabakh, the mutual recognition of the territorial integrity, and lastly matters of transportation (e.g. Zangezur corridor).

From the Armenian side, the country’s Security Council Secretary and the MFA’s spokesperson have mentioned Yerevan’s positions towards the normalisation process. The main requirements from the Armenian side are the following:

• normalisation with “no preconditions” and gradual discussion of all the issues,
• separation of the Armenian – Turkish rapprochement from the Armenian – Azerbaijani relations,
• invest in existing transportation infrastructure which has remained unused after the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
• and lastly, opening of all transportation links under Armenian sovereignty.

Turkey on the other hand has put its own terms which have been articulated by the country’s President, the Foreign and National Defence ministers:

• mutual respect on sovereignty and territorial integrity (recognition of Kars Treaty),
• the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
• the establishment of the Zangezur corridor (unsupervised link between Azerbaijan – Nakhichevan via Armenia),
• Turkish coordination with Azerbaijan throughout the normalisation process.

Based on the terms the parties have articulated during the previous months, it becomes evident that there are several positions where both disagree. Firstly, Turkey is not planning to make the same mistake it did during the Zurich protocols in 2009. Ankara has firmly positioned itself in favour of coordinating its efforts with Azerbaijan. Based on the Davutoğlu Doctrine, which highlights Turkey’s neo-Ottoman vision, Baku is Ankara’s main “vehicle” to project its influence in the South Caucasus. Moreover, Azerbaijan is the country that can unite Turkey with Central Asia due to its strategic positioning. In this context, the special status of the Zangezur corridor becomes the vital link that will ensure the unimpeded and unsupervised movement of goods.

The Turkish and Azerbaijani coordination on the rapprochement issue has led Armenia to seek Russian mediation. Yerevan is firmly against the establishment of the Zangezur corridor and is not ready to negotiate a peace deal on its own with Azerbaijan. Armenia, a small and vulnerable state recently defeated in a war cannot go against the political accord of Ankara and Baku. Without Russian support, Armenia is unable to safeguard its national interests associated with issues such as the status of Karabakh, transportation links, and its territorial integrity.

The stance of Armenia’s diaspora

From the various groups (political or non) that make up the Armenian diaspora, the most prominent is the party of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF). ARFs strategy is based on the initial recognition of the genocide followed by a campaign of reparations and territorial demands. The political group holds that if the Armenian – Turkish normalisation takes place without those conditions being addressed, the Armenian cause will be put at a disadvantage. The party was against the 2009 normalisation, and currently has strong reservations claiming that those negotiations entail many dangers for a defeated Armenia, while simultaneously Turkey is putting up additional conditions. ARF is not against a possible normalisation between the two countries, however, it raises specific conditions that Ankara finds unacceptable. Other groups of the Armenian diaspora hold different, usually more modest, positions concerning the rapprochement, nonetheless, they are underrepresented compared to ARF.

Russia supervising the rapprochement?

Moscow attempts to keep a monopoly in mediating all critical diplomatic initiatives and to reduce Western influence in the region. In this process, a partnership with Turkey is perceived as beneficial if both countries agree on those subjects.

The Armenian – Turkish engagement may create additional points of friction between the Kremlin and Ankara, nonetheless, Russia knows that controlling and supervising this process is a better alternative compared to going against it. The possible normalisation between Armenia and Turkey, which respects Russia’s political and economic interests in the region, is in Moscow’s favour as it will increase stability and lessen the role of the West in the South Caucasus. In this respect, Russia has welcomed Armenia’s proposal to mediate for the normalisation process, as it gets the chance to oversee a critical development in the region.

West’s plight to maintain the South Caucasus’ independence

Western powers (USA, EU) have attempted to stabilise the South Caucasus and keep it independent from external influence. Erika Olson, the United States’ Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, who oversees Washington’s policy in the Caucasus, remarks that the US supports freedom, democracy, prosperity, economic resilience, and peaceful conflict resolution in the region. Enhancing western values and promoting independent dialogue between the three South Caucasus states aims to reduce the role of external actors such as Russia.

In this setting, the rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey is both an opportunity and a threat. Initially, it is an opportunity as – in theory – it will steadily aid Armenia in becoming less dependent on Russia. That way Armenia may be able to converse directly with the South Caucasus states and steadily foster regional cooperation. Additionally, increased Turkish influence in the region may also back Western interests. Both the EU and the US support the Middle Corridor which seeks to transport goods and hydrocarbons from Central Asia to Europe through the Caspian.

Nevertheless, Turkey recently has become an unreliable partner for the West and specifically for the US. Its engagement with Russia and the “co-opetitive” relationship which has emerged between the two has brought about new realities. In case Turkey and Russia, in an attempt to foster their authority, sideline Western influence, the normalisation process will further diminish the impact of actors outside of the region.

Armenia’s posture in the negotiations

Yerevan knows that it is in no position to set terms to Turkey. The power imbalance between the two makes this infeasible. Balancing the power gap via Russian mediation is both risky and has proven inefficient. Seeking supplementary partners such as the USA or the EU would be the optimal plan for Armenia, but both are lately in a marginalised position. The main instrument Yerevan has is connected with the timing of the negotiations. If Armenia can stall its talks until Turkey’s next general elections, it will be able to gain some needed leverage against Ankara. However, it should be noted that the loss of valuable time entails the risk of derailing the normalisation process.