Recent elections in Abkhazia as well as statements from Abkhaz politicians could point to an emerging understanding among Abkhaz politicians on the need to change policies towards Tbilisi. However, since the idea of having direct Tbilisi-Sokhumi negotiations platform goes against Russia’s geopolitical ambitions in the South Caucasus, Moscow will oppose any changes in the existing status quo around Abkhazia.

Georgia’s Abkhazia held presidential elections on March 22nd. Released figures show that the voting turnout exceeded 71% with some 95,000 voters having participated in a widely unrecognized and criticized elections. The winner, Aslan Bzhania, has been an opposition leader in Abkhazia and candidate for the post of president of the separatist region in several recent presidential elections.

The elections followed demonstrations held earlier this year when hundreds of protesters assembled in front of the building that housed former president Raul Khajimba's administration. On January 9 demonstrators stormed the building and, after initially refusing to follow protesters’ demands, Khajimba, after Moscow’s intervention, resigned on January 13.

Though for many the recent political process in the separatist region might not seem a particularly new development which fits into the overall unstable situation Abkhazia has come to be famous for, there are nevertheless interesting trends showing wider troubles between Sokhumi and Moscow. Moreover, some signs reflecting Sokhumi’s growing willingness to be more open to direct negotiations with Tbilisi also emerge.

First, Bzhania’s tenure as president does not entirely reflect Russia’s preferences. Bzhania was poisoned twice. In mid-April 2019, he was suddenly hospitalized in critical condition in Moscow and then transported to Germany, where his illness was linked with heavy metal poisoning (involving elements of mercury and cadmium). His second poisoning took place just before this year’s elections leading many in Abkhazia to believe that Russia could somehow be related to it.

Bzhania might not be Moscow’s perfect choice also because of his views on relations with Tbilisi diverge from Russia’s South Caucasus policy. Hints from the media showed that there is a gradual shift in perception among Abkhaz politicians regarding the relations with Tbilisi. This has long been a taboo topic in Abkhazian politics, but as hopes for wider recognition of independence has failed, continuing severe economic underdevelopment, attitudes in Sokhumi towards Tbilisi also evolve. Surely, this does not mean that we are likely to see any drastic changes but considering recent statement from various Abkhaz politicians, the room for cooperation is larger than previously.

This sentiment was reflected in one of Bzhania’s recent statements that “whether we [Abkhazians] like it or not, Georgians and the Georgian state are our neighbors. Whether we like it or not, we have a lot of contacts both at the level of Georgian and Abkhaz citizens. These are the people who cross the border.”

Another interesting proposition from Bzhania involves introducing a new bilateral negotiating platform to address security issues. For the moment, there is only one, the Geneva format, which presupposes cooperation between Tbilisi and Sokhumi on vital security issues, however with Russian presence at a negotiating table. The latest Geneva format talks, held in December 2019, ended with no significant progress. Overall, around 50 such rounds of Geneva talks in the last 12 years have not produced much substance as Moscow has been consistent in refusing to address the issue of internally displaced Georgians (who remain refugees since early 1990s).

Another Abkhaz politician, Sergey Shamba, also suggested normalizing relations with Tbilisi, which clearly indicates there is a growing understanding on the need to hold direct talks with Georgia.

Therefore, Bzhania’s recently suggested new format of bilateral discussion between Tbilisi and Sokhumi goes against Russia’s geopolitical interests as Moscow has always been keen on being present at the negotiating table. Surely, it will prove extremely difficult to circumvent Russia in any negotiating platform, but the suggestion offers an interesting perspective into the evolving thinking of Abkhaz politicians.

An additional factor, the novel coronavirus, too could open up some possibilities for a tentative rapprochement. As Russia experiences troubles in dealing with the pandemic, Abkhazia will be less able to receive substantial medical aid giving a chance to Tbilisi to provide help. Indeed, at the time of writing this piece around 80 virus-hit patients were transferred from the separatist region to various hospitals across Georgia.

A wider geopolitical setting too should be considered. Relations between Moscow and Sokhumi have been under stress. Over the past several years there have been hints in the media on growing discontent within the Russian political elite regarding the way Abkhazia is run. Questions are raised on how effectively Russian money is spent. Complaints have been circling over what is seen as the predatory nature of an Abkhaz political elite who arefocused on extracting economic benefits from Moscow. High level corruption and the black market in Abkhazia have overshadowed various attempts by Moscow to control the effectiveness of its spending. This is reflected in one of the comments made by Russian commentator Sergey Markov when he decried corruption in the region, saying that the clan system prevents businesses from investing in Abkhazia.

Still, despite an emerging room for direct negotiation between Tbilisi and Sokhumi, Moscow’s pressure on Abkhazia will be decisive. It is larger geopolitical trends in and around the South Caucasus (same way as is the case with eastern Ukraine) that will weigh on Moscow’s position. Abkhazia (as part of Georgia) will remain one of the theaters of Russia-West military and economic competition over the former Soviet lands. The Kremlin will continue to see Abkhazia as a tool to limit Georgia’s westward ambitions. Moreover, in Moscow’s thinking, its military build-up in Abkhazia (where it hosts up to 5 000 troops) will also prevent any large non-NATO military cooperation between Tbilisi and the West.

Moscow is likely to change tactics rather than strategy in Abkhazia. Amid deepening economic troubles in Russia because of the coronavirus and low productivity, Moscow will try to pull strings on large expenses directed towards Abkhazia, limit corruption schemes in the region and help improve the security situation for Russian tourists (who have been dying in the past several years). Success of these policies is not guaranteed as Abkhazia has previously managed to evade Russian attempts to increase effectiveness.

Back to a tentative rapprochement between Tbilisi and Sokhumi. Indeed, the recent developments in Abkhazia and Abkhaz-Russian relations create a certain room for Abkhaz politicians to maneuver. We might see talks between Tbilisi and Sokhumi on creating a new one-on-one negotiation platform. However, in the longer run, Abkhazia’s dependence on Russian military and economic power will likely hamper any real possibility for constructive Tbilisi-Sokhumi talks. Russia’s larger geopolitical vision of the South Caucasus will trump local initiatives from Sokhumi.

Emil Avdaliani specializes on former Soviet space and wider Eurasia with particular focus on South Caucasus and Russia's internal and foreign policy, relations with China, the EU and the US. He can be reached at emilavdaliani@yahoo.com.