The Armenian Diaspora has traditionally played a vital role in the history of the Armenian nation. Today, the Armenian Diasporas can be found in most European countries, the Americas, Russia, Middle East and Asia. In the countries where social institutions allow national minorities to form public organisations, Armenian Diaspora structures, including lobbying organisations and CSOs, occupy important roles in building dialogue bridges between these countries and the Republic of Armenia. In turn, the South Caucasian republic traditionally views the Diasporas as an integral element of Armenian statehood, recognizing their immense financial, cultural and ethnic-civilizational contribution in building modern Armenia. This recognition helped develop the Ministry of Diaspora in 2008, which was then substituted by the Office of the Chief Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs under the patronage of the Prime Minister of Armenia in 2019.

To understand the role and impact of Diaspora organisations in connection with Armenia, it is necessary to refer and research their interconnectivity with the foreign policy of countries where they operate, as the latter leaves a tangible mark on the direction of Diaspora organisations, as well as the values and mission they actively promote.

First, it is important to define what can be classified as an Armenian Diaspora organisation. There is no universal definition, as legislation varies by country. However, where ever Diaspora organisations exist and registered, the most all-encompassing definition is as follows: Diaspora organisation is a non-state entity formed abroad by representatives of Armenian Diaspora, Armenian descendants, who aim to rally members of the Armenian community in a particular country, as well as to develop better relationship between their country of residence and the Republic of Armenia, Armenian society. Diaspora organisations are formed not only on the principle of sharing fundamental values, which define their ethnic and cultural self-consciousness, such as unique Armenian language and religion, but also on the promotion of the pan-Armenian agenda, which includes the issues of worldwide recognition of Armenian Genocide and independence of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. These uniting elements are common for the most of Diaspora organisations, regardless of which country they operate.

Diaspora organisations do not only promote the exclusive Armenian agenda, but also strive to enhance mutual understanding between the Diaspora country and the Republic of Armenia, which would secure a strong, long term relationship. This is usually a key factor for Diaspora organisations to be successful and gain necessary domestic support before reaching Armenia. However, when the foreign policy agenda of a country does not resonate with the organisation’s goals or, as seen by the representatives of Diaspora organisation, goes against them, the most influential of these organisations have usually enough power to discontent with the official position of a country. This proves that these organisations are very solid influence disseminators not only abroad but also domestically. This is especially evident in the United States of America, where Diaspora structures are institutionally incorporated into domestic and foreign affairs and lobbying. A vivid example is the position of the Armenian National Committee of America, which had enough capacity to stand against some U.S. foreign policies, which do not reflect Armenian interests and, simultaneously, actively defend those initiatives, which foster a better American-Armenian relationship. This, as well as other similar examples of how Diaspora organisations make themselves vocal will be considered more thoroughly below.

At the same time, if the countries where Diaspora organisations have contentious relationships between each other, the most vivid example being Russia and the United States, it affects the very possibility of inter-Diaspora cohesion across countries and impacts the activities of Diaspora structures at international stage. This urges them to push actively their country’s interest and, by doing that, shifting them to become a classic example of what is called ‘soft power’ actors. From this perspective, collision of foreign interests in the South Caucasus and Armenia particularly can make Diaspora organisations engage indirectly in a public confrontation between countries, defending values and interests, which are advocated by these countries in Armenia. Hence, in the current modality of tensions between Russia and the West, it is especially important to consider how Diaspora organisations are engaged in these tensions and their prescribed role.

The current political relationship between Russia and the larger West (understood as the European Union, the United States, and Canada) is far from ideal. Even though Europe seems to become less united in its vision of how to deal with Russia, understanding that sanctions lead to more polarisation, while, as the French President Emmanuel Macron stated, “Pushing Russia from Europe is a profound strategic error”, there is no decisive opinion about when political confrontation will end. Under such circumstances, the role of third countries, where Russia’s and Western interests meet and often collide, is ascending. Armenia is no exception. The country has always been considered a pivotal geostrategic area, equally important for many geopolitical actors. The ‘Velvet Revolution’ in April 2018 only triggered more interest towards the Caucasian republic, prompting Europe to assist democratic betterments of the country, and further developing a special framework for cooperation, known as CEPA. In turn, Russia has been predominantly relying on its historically allied affairs with Armenia, as well as tight military cooperation, which was reconfirmed after the 2018 Revolution. The Armenian side relies on the revived policy of foreign complementarity, recognising the importance of cooperation with any country as long as it is beneficial. Balancing between geopolitical disagreements, Armenia pursuits more solidarity with the worldwide Diaspora, understanding the key moment for its mobilisation. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is adamant that Diaspora is an even more important factor for democratic reforms in the country. Under such circumstances, Diaspora organisations are more often invited to dialogue with Armenia about building a common future where “the borderline between Armenia and the Diaspora would be erased”. The American Diaspora media finds Prime Minister’s optimism to be contagious, as they put it, “Armenia and the Diaspora have never been as close to each other as than they are today. The anxieties of the past have been replaced by optimism. There is enthusiasm everywhere and a willingness to communicate with the Homeland and contribute to its economic growth”. Notably, the post-Revolutionary Armenian government does not prioritise particular Diaspora or Diaspora organisation but rather stresses the importance of equal cooperation with both Russian and Western Diaspora institutions. This is particularly why the Chief Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs, Zareh Sinanyan, although being an American Armenian descendant and former major of Glendale, made his first official visit to Russia.   

The Diaspora organisations in Russia are more of public organisations, playing an important socialisation role for the large Armenian community living in the country. At the same time, as long as lobbyism in Russia is not legally formalised, Russian based Diaspora organisations do not have institutionalised leverages to affect Russian foreign or domestic policies, especially related to Armenian affairs. Rather, the Russian Armenian Diaspora is famous for its persona-style approach, relying heavily on personalities instead of institutions.

For a very long time the Russian based Diaspora was viewed as the largest but non-structured segmental community, where the apparent monopoly to act on behalf of the entire Russian based Diaspora was often attributed to the Union of Armenians in Russia, led by famous Armenian philanthropist Ara Abramyan. The Union has been consistent in its endeavours to maintain positive dynamics in the Russian-Armenian relationship. This occurs mainly through the organisation of and participation in different initiatives within Russia, aimed at preservation of common historical memory and identity. Among such initiatives, are annual events organised to remember Victory Day, as well as commemoration of the victims of Armenian Genocide. Concerning the latter, Ara Abramyan, who also occupies the roles of  member of the Council of International Relations under the President of Russia[1] and a chair of the Commission for the information support of state national policy, urged the Russian State Duma to introduce a law to criminalisation Genocide denial. Even though history-oriented activities of the Union were somewhat common, the entity has not been proactive in terms of discussing current and future perspectives of Russian-Armenian cooperation, as many would hope so after the ‘Velvet Revolution’.

This vacuum was to some degree filled out by the brand-new body, called the Association of Armenians of Russia[2], which for a short period gained large popularity among Russian Armenians, positioning itself as a modern-type entity that proactively utilises social networks to reach Armenians of far and close Russian communities. Together with smaller organisations with a similar purpose, the Association aims to encourage Armenians to participate enthusiastically in social life of Armenia and Russia and enhance Russian-Armenian ties in all spheres. Nevertheless, as the Co-Chair of the Association Musheg Syuni argues, the current impact of Diaspora organisations is almost insignificant, although the potential is huge. Moreover, the larger Russian Armenian Diaspora organisations act incoherently, as Syuni affirms, “rather imitating their existence to serve own or others’, but not Armenian, interests”. Syuni asserts that there are certain individuals in  Western and other Diasporas who “replace genuine Armenian patriotism with hurrah-patriotism, enforcing their approach on others”, which in turn leads Armenians who live in Armenia to assume that “Armenians living in, for example, California are more progressive and better off specialists in their professional fields than Armenians from Russia”. According to Syuni, this is done deliberately to decrease the influence of Russia and Russian culture on Armenia, as the worsening of Russian-American relationship indirectly affects the perception of Diaspora in Armenia too. “The tensions lead Armenians who live in Armenia choose a camp, which they support.”[3]

The view from within Armenia is two-sided. Agreeing with the idea that Diaspora organisations could be more active but do not currently realise their full potential, Varuzhan Geghamyan, the Director of the Armenian Research and Development Institute, outlines several organisations, such as Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), which do have certain investments in several sectors in Armenia. As one of the biggest Diaspora organisations, AGBU is primarily a humanitarian initiative, which has been striving to bring educational, youth, cultural and other training and aid to Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh for decades. One of their latest projects, “BRIDGE for CSOs”, which stands for Bringing Real Impact with Diaspora and Global Engagement, is aimed at building capacity for local Armenian non-government entities in their mission to assist citizens’ needs. Implemented with the support of Western institutions, including Eurasia Partnership Foundation, and financed by the European Union, the project also seeks to enhance connectivity between Armenia-based CSOs and Diaspora organisations. As Geghamyan argues, it is seen with the naked eye that AGBU’s activities in general became more Armenia-centred in recent years.

This Armenian-centred or “Armenia first” approach should lie at the core of Diaspora organisations’ activities, but it is not always the case. As Geghamyan states, on the other hand there are notorious Diaspora organisations, like Policy Forum Armenia, which “clearly fulfil political order and do not act independently, having no policy expertise or whatsoever. As these organisations are strictly politicised, they have no connection with the reality, alleging that happenings before May 2018 were all wrong and bad [the period of Armenian ‘Velvet Revolution’], while everything that occurred after was all right”.

Geghamyan also suggests making a clear-cut distinction between Russian and American Diaspora organisations in terms of their range and scope of activities. As he argues, the Union of Armenians in Russia attributes itself solely to Russian-Armenian format of cooperation, whereas AGBU is more globally focused. At the same time, the Armenian pundit is sceptical about mobilisation of Diaspora organisations into the larger tensions between Russia and the West. As Geghamyan believes, the rather humanistic, “missionary approach” taken by Diaspora organisation to bring aid to Armenia do not directly presume any involvement into geopolitical clashes.[4] In this sense, Diaspora organisations differ drastically from many non-Diaspora state and public institutions, think-tanks and analytical centres of the West and Russia, entangled directly into proliferation of official geopolitical agenda of their countries.

Similar to Russia, Western Diaspora organisations are also non-homogeneous, differing for many Diaspora representatives in terms of the country of their origin, language used (Western or Eastern Armenian), degrees of integration into a native community, as well as primary target goals (domestic or foreign). The biggest Western organisations, like AGBU, Armenian Assembly of America, Council of Armenian organisations of France, Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) or other Committees around the world, are led by aforementioned pan-Armenian goals, whereas smaller organisations strive towards solving domestic issues relevant for the local Armenian community. The state intervenes only when it sees particular interest and benefit for itself from collaboration with a Diaspora organisation. As the Armenia-based “Orbeli Center” think-tank’s expert Narek Minasyan states, the promotion of pan-Armenian goals is done autonomously, Diaspora organisations carry them alone until the moment when particular political interests prompt Western governments to support or oppose the Diaspora’s agenda. This is equally true vice versa, when the Western Diaspora organisations juxtapose Armenian interests with the state’s foreign policy. As an example, Minasyan referred to the period of active negotiations and then ratification of Armenian-Turkish protocols (known as Zurich protocols), which were supported by officials in Washington, engaged in the mediation process, but found a huge disagreement among Diaspora organisations, particularly those, which protested in the United States against the normalisation with Turkey as a country that committed Armenian Genocide.[5] Similarly, Armenian Diaspora organisations heavily oppose any U.S. government initiative to assist or increase its military assistance to Azerbaijan. According to the latest address from the Democrat leadership of the Congressional Armenian Caucusto U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, “The U.S. has substantially increased security assistance to Azerbaijan totalling more than $102 million for fiscal years 2018 and 2019. <…> Armenia only received $4.2 million in U.S. security assistance in fiscal year 2018 and $2.8 million in fiscal year 2019 with just $2.1 million planned for fiscal year 2020”. Likewise, Diaspora organisations welcome any initiative to increase financial or any other support of their countries to Armenia.

Thus, it is through these official channels that Diaspora organisations try to stabilise U.S. foreign policy regarding South Caucasian states and direct it in favourable for the Armenia and Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) way. It is clear that such endeavours can be organised only when they are institutionalised and exercised systemically. They are carried out by the biggest Western organisations, like ANCA, which was originally established as one of the Armenian Justice (Hay Dat) institutions, formed by Armenian Revolutionary Federation alongside with similar institutions in Canada, South America, Europe, and other parts of the world. ANCA representatives hold frequent high-level meetings with decision-making authorities, such as U.S. Department of State or Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, who are engaged in the South Caucasian geopolitics and, particularly with the Minsk Group, peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Experts on Armenia find it quite unlikely that Diaspora organisations will engage in geopolitical clash between Russia and the West. At the same time, Minasyan sees particular correlation between the degree of international instability and increasing precautionary measures taken by Diaspora organisations to avoid unnecessary politicisation of their image. According to the scholar, Diaspora organisations are often cautious to not be targeted and associated with the country’s dominant anti-Russian informational sentiments and narratives. “They do exist and act in the environment made of these narratives, which create obstacles for the establishment of all-Armenian cooperative networks across the countries. The only way [for Diaspora organisations] to escape these narratives… is to systemically underline the supremacy of Armenian national goals over Russia-West polarisation.” Having said that, the expert does not exclude a scenario where Diaspora organisations could essentially become the channels through which geopolitical narratives are transmitted. As such, Minasyan refers to the perspective of the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Nagorno Karabakh. A doubtful question, which originates even more debates when one considers which country’s forces should be deployed there. “Any government, among other things, works with ethnic groups within own country. It sees them as big channels of influence, through which these narratives can be further propagated. Obviously, the Western Diaspora organisations would be against deployment of Russian troops in Karabakh. All in all, that means that there is a larger consensus among Diaspora organisations over the ultimate future of Karabakh, but the means to make this future happen are seen differently”, concludes Minasyan.[6]

There are several inferences drawn from this analysis.

First, it is important to stress all these factual evidences, seen through the organisation of numerous bilateral cultural, educational and other activities, which suggest Diaspora organisations in Russia and the West are in favour of the betterment of mutual relationship between their particular country and Armenia; hence, there can be an initial conflict in perception of orienteers that should be taken by Armenia. If the ultimate goal, understood as Armenian prosperity, is clear, the means to achieve it are viewed differently. This is especially clear when one takes certain issues of geopolitical importance, like the means to establish peace in Nagorno Karabakh, mentioned above, or of social significance, such as gender rights and equality, supported by the West Diaspora organisations and their representatives, and treated differently by Russian ones. This difference is directly echoed in Armenia, where Western-oriented NGOs share corresponding visions for liberal development and establish connections mainly with Western structures.

At the same time, Diaspora organisations from different countries and geopolitical hemispheres do not aim to undermine each others’ positions. They reflect carefully to any official political narratives of their countries and do not prompt to take them for granted, especially if the narratives do not serve for the betterment with Armenia. More importantly, what does unite Russian and Western Diaspora organisations is their awareness raising activities to demand world-scale recognition of Armenian Genocide and peaceful settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. In this respect, positions and actions of Diaspora organisations generally coincide with the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ official position, thus creating a basis for their cooperation. In fact, it is one of the core missions of the Armenian Embassies worldwide to invite Diasporas to dialogue proactively.

Western Diaspora organisations are more institutional in their support due to state mechanisms, which do not bind lobbying, whereas Russian Diaspora organisations are more dependent on individual efforts. This, however, does not mean that Russian Diaspora assistance to Armenia in principle is lesser compared to Western support. Using individual authority and connections, Russian Diaspora representatives attain betterment for the larger Russian-Armenian cultural and educational ties.

Finally, the current difficult political situation between Russia and the West is treated very carefully by Armenia. They country and its government do not stimulate one-directional approach with solely the Western Diaspora, instead, upholding and fostering enhancements with both Russian and Western Diaspora structures.

Contributed by Akop Gabrielyan, PhD (Armenia).

[1]Not to mix up with the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)

[2]In Russian: “Объединение армян России”

[3]From an interview recorded on 09.24.2019

[4]From an interview recorded on 09.25.2019

[5]From an interview recorded on 09.27.2019

[6]From an interview recorded on 09.27.2019