The relationship between Russia and Azerbaijan has entered a phase of heightened tension, driven by diplomatic disputes and shifting geopolitical alignments in the South Caucasus. For instance, the latest decision by Azerbaijan to designate Russian lawmaker Nikolai Valuev as 'persona non grata' highlights this dynamic. This followed Azerbaijan’s closure of the Russian House Cultural Center in Baku, which Azerbaijani authorities accused of facilitating intelligence operations inside the country.

Moscow downplayed the significance of the move and suggested that the closure was a “misunderstanding” that could be diplomatically resolved. Azerbaijan’s decision appears to be a calculated move to assert control over foreign influence within its borders and signal a shift toward greater independence from Russia’s political influence.

Following the closure of the Russian House, Azerbaijan took additional steps to curb Russian influence by drastically reducing the presence of the Russian state-funded media outlet Sputnik Azerbaijan. The workforce was cut from 40 employees to just one, further underscoring Baku’s determination to limit Moscow’s ability to shape domestic narratives. Baku made similar moves against Western media outlets like the BBC, signaling its intent to reinforce its policy of sovereignization.

Tensions with Russia began on December 25, 2024, when an Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) Embraer 190 jet crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan. The aircraft, en route from Baku to Grozny, disappeared from radar before crashing into the Caspian Sea, resulting in the deaths of 38 passengers and crew members. Preliminary Kazakh investigations support the Azerbaijani authorities' claim that a Russian surface-to-air missile struck the plane, citing external interference. While Russian President Vladimir Putin extended condolences to his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, he stopped short of acknowledging responsibility or offering compensation.

The Azerbaijani government has since demanded that Russia formally admit its role in the incident, issue an official apology, and provide financial reparations to the victims’ families. Moscow has resisted these demands, fueling further diplomatic tensions. The event has intensified Azerbaijan’s efforts to reduce Russian influence within its borders.

Despite the tensions, it remains unlikely that Azerbaijan will move further to downgrade ties with Russia. Baku has historically maintained a careful balance between major geopolitical players, including Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the West. Energy cooperation remains a key factor. While some Russian commentators have speculated about blocking the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline, such a move would be largely symbolic, as the pipeline transports only 20,000 barrels per day. Azerbaijan’s primary oil export channel, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, remains unaffected. Furthermore, Russia itself benefits financially from transit fees on Azerbaijani oil, making economic retaliation counterproductive. Additionally, ongoing energy projects—such as Russia’s intention to supply Iran with 300 million cubic meters of natural gas per day  through Azerbaijan, serve as an additional stabilizing mechanism. 

Moreover, economically, Russia and Azerbaijan, while enjoying an asymmetrical trade relationship, nevertheless benefit from expanding bilateral commerce. In 2024, Azerbaijan’s exports to Russia totaled $1.178 billion, accounting for just 4.4% of its total exports, whereas Russian exports to Azerbaijan reached $3.621 billion.

Looking ahead, Moscow may attempt to exert economic and political pressure on Azerbaijan through various means, including trade restrictions, limitations on Azerbaijani migrant remittances, and diplomatic isolation. However, Russia’s leverage remains relatively limited. Annual remittances from Azerbaijani migrants in Russia amount to approximately $500 million, which represents only a minor fraction of Azerbaijan’s overall economy.

While Azerbaijan will continue engaging with Russia on strategic economic and energy matters, bilateral relations will remain somewhat cool. Both sides cannot afford bilateral tensions spiraling out of control given their other geopolitical preoccupations. Russia is engaged in its war on Ukraine, which, despite the seeming willingness from the US side, is unlikely to quickly end. 

Moreover, Russia has had rather tense relations with Armenia, its traditional ally in the South Caucasus. With Yerevan now openly seeking closer ties with Washington and Brussels, Russia cannot afford tense relations simultaneously with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Given the state of Russia’s relations with Georgia, troubled ties with all South Caucasus countries would not uphold Moscow’s ambition of maintaining primary influence in the region.

From the Russian perspective, the fate of its influence in the South Caucasus will largely be contingent on what happens in Ukraine. The victory there will inevitably result in increased prestige and the ability to project power in other regions. The three South Caucasus countries, too, will have to moderate their respective ambitions and adjust more closely to what Moscow wants. Until then, however, tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia are bound to renew. After all, Baku desires a more independent foreign policy, a trend that Moscow has consistently opposed.     

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.