On December 7, 2023, people living in the eastern and northern parts of Azerbaijan experienced an earthquake in the morning, which was followed by a second wave, but this time a political one, after Ilham Aliyev, the President of Azerbaijan, announced early presidential elections to be held in February 2024. This decision, which gave the potential candidates less than two months to prepare for the next elections, was not unexpected, as compared to 2023, the approved state budget for 2024 allocated almost three times more money (60 million euros) for holding elections and providing statistical measures for the Central Election Committee. The Azerbaijani president's immediate decision was harshly criticized by the existing weak opposition, and the main rival parties in the country, such as the Azerbaijan People's Front and Musavat, decided to boycott the elections, emphasizing the growing pressure on the free media, the undemocratic environment and the lack of time to prepare for the race for the highest political position in the country. 

The political earthquake reverberated not only in domestic politics, but also in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, as the representatives decided to limit the power of the Azerbaijani delegation within the organization, also citing the absence of an invitation from Baku to monitor the snap elections in February, unlike in previous years.

President Aliyev's decision to call early presidential elections is based on two reasons. First and foremost, it is based on external exigencies, in particular the upcoming presidential elections in Russia on March 17, 2024 and in the United States on November 5, 2024, as well as several European countries holding similar electoral processes in that calendar year. Given the anticipated global attention to these electoral events, the geopolitical spotlight on the region is expected to diminish. Consequently, the timing of Azerbaijan's presidential elections before those of two major superpowers assumes strategic importance in terms of the country's positioning vis-à-vis emerging global dynamics. 

Moreover, the cessation of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh marks a pivotal shift in which actors seeking to influence Azerbaijan's domestic political landscape are poised to escalate their efforts. Recent instances, such as the contentious encounter between the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the Azerbaijani delegation, coupled with vocal censure from European quarters regarding political arrests in Azerbaijan, underscore the need for proactive measures. The electoral phase inherently introduces a degree of uncertainty, prompting President Aliyev to proactively mitigate potential disruptions by advancing the electoral timetable ahead of these pivotal international events.

Furthermore, the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War saw a significant outflow of Armenian residents due to prevailing security concerns, culminating in a reported number of only around 1,000 Armenians remaining in Karabakh by October 2023. Given the sharp demographic decline, a reassessment of mission goals and engagement strategies is imperative. The deployment of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers to protect the remaining Armenian population seems disproportionate, especially given the demographic composition of primarily elderly and disabled individuals. The feasibility of implementing a repatriation initiative for this diminished population is complicated by the continuing trend of out-migration. 

Ordinarily, Azerbaijan would have scheduled presidential elections for April 2025, closely coinciding with the potential withdrawal of Russian troops from the Karabakh region. However, such a timetable would carry inherent risks, as the Kremlin might seek to use its influence in Azerbaijan's domestic politics and economy to force negotiations for an extension of its mandate in the region. The decision to move the elections to early 2024 serves to mitigate such risks, giving Azerbaijan greater latitude to preemptively navigate potential Kremlin overtures and improve its bargaining position in discussions over the future disposition of peacekeepers in Karabakh. By advancing the election timetable, Azerbaijan aims to preemptively neutralize internal vulnerabilities and increase its bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the Russian contingent in the region.

On the domestic front, the ruling establishment has faced challenges in translating the victory in Karabakh into broad economic and social prosperity. Despite the significant military success, Azerbaijan's economic performance has stalled, with the lowest growth rate among CIS countries in 2023. This economic stagnation has exacerbated social inequalities and led to heightened tensions. The country's economic outlook has deteriorated markedly, with a meager GDP growth of 0.5 percent (some estimates put it at 1.1 percent) in the last reporting period, indicating an actual recessionary trend. 

While the retaking of Karabakh and progress in the peace process with Armenia have temporarily bolstered legitimacy and public support, these gains are perceived as temporary. Against this backdrop, President Aliyev's decision to bring forward the February elections and extend his term by another seven years is underscored by the need to consolidate power before the economic landscape may deteriorate further. 

In addition, Azerbaijan faces a challenge from the previous elections. With local elections in December 2024, followed by parliamentary elections in February 2025 and presidential elections in April 2025, it is difficult to manage three national elections in five months. This compressed timeline creates logistical and financial constraints, including coordination, resource allocation, and voter mobilization. In recognition of these challenges, moving the presidential election forward to February 2024 ensures better preparation and execution. By adjusting the election timeline, Azerbaijan aims to overcome logistical hurdles and maintain the integrity of the process. This decision reflects a practical response to the demands of a tight election schedule.

In retrospect, the rationale behind the decision to hold early presidential elections in 2018 has become increasingly clear. Following his re-election, the incumbent president initiated significant reforms in various sectors of the state apparatus, particularly within the military establishment. The cabinet of ministers, the presidential administration, and leadership positions in key ministries and the armed forces have been substantially reshuffled. These strategic adjustments empowered the president to take concrete measures to secure Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. The 2020 snap parliamentary elections further underscored the government's commitment to consolidating its domestic and geopolitical goals. The overarching goal remains the full restoration and stabilization of reclaimed territories, the resolution of border disputes with Armenia, and the achievement of a comprehensive peace agreement. These efforts are intertwined with broader imperatives related to the reform of domestic governance systems. Azerbaijan's success in regaining and stabilizing its territories represents a milestone in the post-Soviet landscape with profound historical significance. The pivotal role of President Ilham Aliyev, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, in guiding these transformative processes cannot be overstated. During his two decades in office, Aliyev has enjoyed a remarkable surge in popularity, with his approval ratings reaching unprecedented levels. According to political theory, politicians often seek re-election at the height of their popularity in order to reaffirm public trust and secure a new mandate. In this context, the decision to bring forward the presidential election is consistent with the need to capitalize on increased public support and renew voter confidence in the leadership. Thus, the upcoming electoral contest represents a critical juncture for President Aliyev to consolidate his mandate and continue his administration's transformative agenda.

In sum, the decision to move forward with Azerbaijan's presidential elections embodies a multifaceted response to evolving geopolitical dynamics, economic challenges, and domestic imperatives. President Aliyev's proactive stance seeks to strategically position Azerbaijan, address internal pressures, and bolster public confidence. As Baku faces critical transitions and strives to navigate its post-war landscape, the upcoming electoral process is a critical juncture for reaffirming the government's maneuverability against external actors. 

About the author: Ziya Kazimzada is a board member of the Milliyyet Research Center and is currently pursuing his master's degree at Masaryk University.