2008-2024: sixteen years of ceasefire after the Russian-Georgian war over the control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Due to Russia's occupation of the two regions, Georgia has forfeited control over 20 percent of its territory. The ceasefire is considered to be held, but this does not mean that the situation on the ground is frozen. A process of creeping annexation is eroding Georgian sovereignty, the last chapter of which is the Russian successful seizing of the Bichvinta dacha in Abkhazia. 

The Russian role     

Despite previous conflicts in these regions, both self-proclaimed republics remained unrecognized until August 2008. Subsequent to the Russian Federation's recognition, some UN member states aligned with Russia, including Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and Syria, also acknowledged the breakaway republics. The two de facto entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia badly rely on Russia for their existence. Russia remains the sole relevant partner for the de facto authorities. Moscow has implemented an extensive policy regarding passports, offering social services and pensions to those seeking Russian citizenship. 

Additionally, there are ongoing financial assistance programs and economic development initiatives in the de facto republics. Russia holds military strongholds in the regions, and its border guards (part of the FSB) are on the administrative line, which separates the de facto entities from mainland Georgia. Efforts to define “sovereign territory” and establish borders with Georgia have been initiated, referred to as borderization or, according to Tbilisi Administrated Territory, characterized as a form of creeping occupation, which takes numerous shapes.

The dacha of Bichvinta     

The Dacha of Bichvinta is located in a nature sanctuary on the Black Sea in Abkhazia. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, its ownership officially shifted from Moscow to Tbilisi. However, de facto, it is now under the sovereignty of Sokhumi. Abkhazia lacks the economic means to ensure its maintenance and the now unavoidable, if not overdue, restoration. Unable to administer it, Sokhumi has used Bichvinta as a bargaining chip. In 1995, in an attempt to appease the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, who had not recognized Abkhazia, Sokhumi leased the dacha and the relevant territory.

Since 2010, Russia has sought ownership of it and wants to turn it into a state dacha. And here comes the problem: Abkhazian law prohibits the sale of land to foreigners. An agreement was signed on January 19, 2022, between the de facto Abkhazian authorities and Moscow. According to this agreement, the dacha became the property of Moscow, but not the land it is situated on, which was leased once again. 

The Dacha was built from 1958 to 1961, during Nikita Khrushchev’s era, as the summer residence of the Secretary of the USSR. During his tour of the Caucasus in 1962, the Soviet leader took Fidel Castro to this location. It was at this place that Khrushchev himself was subsequently jailed in 1964 by the more Stalinist wing of the party. Aleksi Inauri, the thirty-year leader of the Georgian KGB who was instrumental in Khrushchev's ouster, carried out the arrest. He was the one who took Khrushchev from Bichvinta and escorted him to the special meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee in Moscow.

Holidays on the Black Sea haven’t always been auspicious for Soviet leaders, and Khrushchev’s arrest apparently set a precedent. However, the Soviet authorities also had multiple state residences in Crimea. On August 18, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev was vacationing in Foros when the coup plotters arrived to compel his resignation and the transfer of power to the vice president of the Union, who represented the more conservative element of the USSR and its security apparatus. Gorbachev’s opulent retreat faced gunfire a few times during the coup’s unfolding, leading to his subsequent confinement under house arrest. Nevertheless, the attraction of Moscow leaders to dachas on the Black Sea seems to be free from superstition. And now Vladimir Putin wants Bichvinta.

The Abkhaz-Russian agreement     

The Abkhaz people value their “independence” and the preservation of the de facto republic, language, culture, and local artistic and natural heritage. In this context, a transfer of a national asset like Bichvinta can only cause alarm. On July 11th, 2022, the Abkhaz public discovered that the dacha had been ceded, and the news sparked a scandal. President Aslan Bzhania, Foreign Minister Inal Ardzinba, and Security Council Secretary Sergey Shamba all unanimously defended the measure. Bzhania also provided his direct testimony, stating that before meeting Vladimir Putin, he had to spend the two weeks of mandatory quarantine at Bichvinta. He described the dacha as dilapidated, with some parts possibly beyond recovery. 

Government officials insisted that the transfer of ownership to Russia would ensure greater security. They claimed that high-profile figures from Russian institutions would come to the Abkhaz territory, providing additional protection for Abkhazia. In numerous meetings with civil society, Bzhania emphasized Putin's role, stating that without him, Abkhazia would not have separated from Georgia. The current Russian president significantly contributed to the political fragmentation of Georgia and ensured the political recognition of the secession. However, these arguments did not satisfy opposition groups, various sectors of Abkhazian society, including veterans, and parts of civil society. Public letters were written, and requests to the Constitutional Court were made to assess the constitutionality of the transfer. Bzhania's encounters with the public led to clashes. In Ochamchire, street disorders occurred, and in Gulripshi, the meeting was unable to reach a conclusion owing to unforeseen circumstances, as the local residents vehemently opposed the transfer of dacha ownership.      

In order for the agreement to become valid, it needed to be ratified. On December 27, 2023, the People's Assembly, the de facto Parliament of the Republic of Abkhazia, held an extraordinary, closed, and almost  secret session. During the session, at 6 a.m., they finalized the adoption of the “Law of the Republic of Abkhazia,” ratifying an agreement between Abkhazia and the Russian Federation. This agreement involved the transfer of the facility in Abkhazia to Russian ownership, outlining its utilization procedures. Of the 28 present Members of Parliament, 26 voted in favour of ratifying the legislation, facilitating the transfer of the Bichvinta state dacha to Russia. Speaker Lasha Ashuba addressed protesters outside the Parliament's building on December 27, 2023, informing them of the ratified law with amendments specifying geographical coordinates and preventing third-party land transfers. Abkhaz President Bzhania endorsed the ratification document on the same day. 

De facto sovereignty 

The truth is, Abkhazia has little or no resources to resist Russian expansionist ambitions and real estate plans. Abkhazia hosts approximately 3.500 Russian military personnel. Without the support of Russia, Abkhazia would not exist as an “independent” state. Direct financial injections from Russia make up half of the revenue side of the budget of Abkhazia, and since the country is largely unrecognized, the majority of tourists and businesspeople travelling to the Georgian breakaway region are Russians. 

Regardless of the high level of dependence, Abkhazians remain jealous of their independence and do not mean to be annexed to Russia. This is in stark contrast to South Ossetia, the other Georgian breakaway region, which has also been supported and recognized by Russia as an independent state since 2008. The leadership of South Ossetia randomly recalls that they believe their place to be in the Russian Federation and occasionally suggests conducting a referendum for annexation.                

The  Abkhazian leadership finds itself in an uncomfortable position of unsustainable independence. On one side, there are the expectations of Abkhazians, who,  after two wars and years of deprivation, in the permanent condition of isolation, like most unrecognized political entities,  believe they have reached a costly independence from Georgia. On the other side, there’s Moscow, with its demands and needs, untempered. The balance of power is incomparable on the Russian side, and the best Sokhumi can do is to grin and bear it. In official declarations, Moscow authorities always show respect for Abkhazian independence and try not to cause discontent among the local public. But the show can go on as long as Moscow believes it has had enough, as the Bichvinta case proves.      

It’s not the first time Moscow has appropriated a slice of Abkhazian territory. For years, there was a controversy over the village of Aibgha, located on the official Georgia-Russia border, which Moscow and Sokhumi now consider the Abkhaz-Russian border. In 2019, Russia registered Aibgha as Russian territory. Now Abkhazians are mobilizing for Bichvinta, collecting signatures and hoping to reverse the agreement, but there’s little room to believe that their action can affect Russian ambitions. Or that de facto sovereignty can anyhow prevail over the real, de facto, Russian control of the territory. 

De jure sovereignty           

Tbilisi claims that Bichvinta is another piece of the mosaic of the creeping annexation of Georgian territory by the Russian Federation. This final stage serves as a further element in a broader context of gradual and intricate annexation. The abovementioned agreements or acts of appropriation in Abkhazia are not isolated episodes. The constant expansion of Russian-controlled territory in South Ossetia poisons the process of borderization between the breakaway region and Georgian-controlled territory. Borderization implies the installation or upgrade of different types of installations that make it possible to physically separate the unrecognized territories from the Georgian homeland.  

In the absence of agreed-upon, demarcated borders, Moscow regularly pushes well into Georgia-controlled territory. 

On its side, Tbilisi refuses to agree on the establishment of a demarcation commission, fearing to legitimise the existence of the de facto state. The borderization and the area it affects remain one of the most thorny issues of the unsolved conflict. Along  the administrative border line, where people keep crossing and risking along unclear, if not moving, borders, the highest number of incidents are recorded. In 2023, some of these incidents were deadly. Two Georgians lost their lives to the borderization process and the secessionist and Russian law enforcement bodies. 

Naturally, the official Tbilisi defends its de jure sovereignty over the entire Georgian territory and therefore rejects the recent move. On December 27, 2023, President Salome Zourabichvili expressed her disapproval, stating: “Strongly condemn another land grab by Russians in Georgian territories and their creeping annexation policies. The strong popular reaction we see around the Bichvinta transfer is a direct result of continued occupation. I call on the international. community for a strong and urgent reaction.”
Simultaneously, Georgia's Foreign Ministry issued a statement asserting, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia refers to the so-called ratification of the agreement between Russia and its occupation regime on the transfer of Bichvinta resort [Bichvinta-Miusera Reserve, including the Bichvinta dacha] to the Russian Federation. The aforementioned illegal action is a continuation of Russia’s policy of occupation of indivisible regions of Georgia, which grossly violates the fundamental principles of international law. The so-called agreements signed between the occupying power and its illegal regimes are null and void, according to international law. Therefore, the so-called agreement on the transfer of the territory, signed under the circumstances of the occupation of the Abkhazia region by the Russian Federation, can yield no legal consequences. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia appeals to the international community to duly assess yet another step by the Russian Federation directed against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia.” 

The international community supports the Georgian position. Spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State Matthew Miller commented on the “ratification” of the Russian-Abkhaz agreement on the transfer of the Bichvinta state dacha to the Russian Federation’s ownership. Asked by a journalist to say whether “there is anything else you could do legally, militarily, to help Georgia get that land back,” Miller replied: “We will continue to be focused on this matter, but I wouldn’t want to preview any specific steps.”

In both cases, Aibgha or Bichvinta, Tbilisi regards any agreement as invalid. According to the Georgian authorities, no agreement or transfer of property and/or territory stipulated by the secessionist governments and Russia is legitimate. But in the absence of any enforcing mechanism, the creeping annexations and little but steady acts of encroachment continue. No conflict can be frozen; the situation on the ground keeps evolving year after year. Sixteen years passed after the ceasefire between Georgia and Russia was signed, guns are mostly silent, but the Georgian loss of territory continues. 

Contributed by Dr. Marilisa Lorusso