The election process in Georgia has come to an end. Yet, problems will not only resurface, but will grow in intensity. A protracted internal political instability risks undermining ties with the West and makes the country ever more insular and detached from critical geopolitical changes in the South Caucasus.

The recent election process in Georgia has been marred by controversial moves and rhetoric from major participants. A highly polarized political landscape is further rocked by the stealthy arrival of former president Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia and his arrest in Tbilisi several days later. This follows nearly a year of internal political instability following the 2020 contested parliamentary elections because of which the opposition refused to enter the legislative. As the stalemate deepened the EU facilitated an agreement between the ruling party and the opposition. Major parties, including the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) signed onto it, while United National Movement (UNM) – the country’s largest opposition party abstained. Eventually GD and UNM switched the sides: the ruling party left the agreement, while UNM became the document’s main supporter.

As the political instability deepened and the municipal elections drew closer, the former president Mikheil Saakashvili’s return once again highlighted the fragility of the internal political situation. The decision has galvanized UNM’s followers. For instance, on October 14 a crowd estimated by some to be 50 000-60 000 gathered in central Tbilisi demanding Saakashvili’s release. This once again signaled that the opposition can still gather large crowds – sign of popularity and power.

But his return is also a dangerous business for the opposition at large as his presence helps the ruling party to gather large rallies and re-integrate those who were otherwise growing unhappy with the GD’s rule. Saakashvili now serves as a “necessary evil” for his opponents.

The election results will not resolve basic internal troubles in the country. First, Saakashvili’s imprisonment will remain a major concern for GD by constantly testing the party’s ability to navigate amid emerging crises. The pressure from Georgia’s Western partners will be also growing to find a long-term solution to the former president’s case. It will risk undermining Georgia’s ties with the collective West, which supports the development of a freer justice system in the country and diversification of political life. Surely, a problem around one person is unlikely to serve as a decisive motive behind growing tensions. But Saakashvili’s imprisonment adds to an already long list of bilateral problems which exist between Tbilisi and the collective West.

The real dilemma for GD is that even if Saakashvili is released the development would likely help increase his number of supporters. His worsening health in prison (because of his hunger strike) will also facilitate the process and perhaps even decimate the numbers of GD’s core supporters.

The results of the runoff vote will not solve basic troubles besetting Georgian internal stability. First, there are economic troubles. Though the national currency has been fairly stable against US dollar for the last several months, it is expected to grow weaker as a result of Turkey’s difficult economic situation where lira has stumbled. Moreover, inflation keeps rising, salaries have stagnated, and foreign direct investments are at their lowest. With the Turkish investors leaving the country following the unsuccessful attempt to finance construction of Namakhvani HPP in western Georgia, large investments into Georgia are unlikely to take place for the fear of local protest and a generally uncongenial political situation.

Beyond the economic troubles, the problematic judicial system will remain a major hindrance as the changes on the municipal level cannot directly influence a process of this caliber. Likewise, the problematic electoral system will remain largely untouched.

These concerns will enable a quick deterioration of the internal political situation: pressure on the ruling party will be mounting from both within and outside the country paving the way for snap parliamentary elections likely to be held somewhere in 2022 or early 2023. Along the way, small and mid-size protests are likely to occur.

The post-election period is also about to see major reshuffling of traditional internal political life in Georgia. The key could be a gradual emergence of a third political power, former PM Giorgi Gakharia’s party “For Georgia.” With up to 8 percent of the vote received in the first round, Gakharia will likely abstain from openly supporting either GD or UNM. His cooperation with GD is however still more realistic as both loath UNM and openly fear the latter’s return to power. Regardless, Gakharia is gradually emerging as a pivotal third power in Georgian politics, breaking the vicious political circle of GD-UNM competition. “For Georgia” has garnered enough votes in many municipalities where it holds the so-called “golden key” – without For Georgia’s representative neither UNM nor GD will be able to form a majority in city halls in several towns across the country.

This highlights arguably one of the most important developments in Georgia’s internal political life – shift from a traditional unipolar governance to multiparty life. Some attempts were made in the past. For instance, in 2012 when GD’s founder billionaire and presently a shadowy ruler of the country, Bidzina Ivanishvili, challenged the then seemingly unassailable UNM and Saakashvili, a coalition of opposition forces was formed and eventually succeeded. When in power, however, it fell apart. Similar fate could await the UNM-led coalition in case the party succeeds, but the gesture is nevertheless indicative of deeper changes. Increasingly, an inclusive government seems more attractive and the only solution towards stabilizing the internal political situation.

Looking Ahead

Irrespective of which side wins, Georgia’s internal instability will persist. As argued, snap parliamentary elections in late 2022-early 2023 are likely to follow. The present municipal elections also signaled the emergence of a third power, For Georgia, and a more fundamental shift from a traditional unipolar to multi-party rule.

Increasingly tense political life in Georgia will impact the country’s external relations. The ties with the collective West, especially with the EU, will become fragile. This is not to say that a major foreign policy change is expected, but progress might be very minimal.

In the longer-term perspective, Georgia thus enters a protracted turbulent period when internal problem will overshadow wider geopolitical changes which is now taking place around Georgia. Insularity of Georgian political thinking could prove detrimental in many fundamental ways. As Armenia and Azerbaijan on the one hand and Armenia and Turkey on the other inch towards greater regional connectivity, Georgia’s inward-looking political life risks leaving the country out of major regional developments.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase.