As EU-Russia ties dip further below, in-between states feel the most insecure. It is not so much about possible military repercussions for Georgia, Moldova or Ukraine, but rather about the potential decrease in EU’s willingness to maximize its efforts for the successful implementation of the Eastern Partnership Initiative. 

EU-Russia relations are at their lowest since the end of the Cold War. The trajectory shows a further downgrading of bilateral ties with limited potential for a meaningful improvement.

EU-Russia problems might be rooted in geography (as geopoliticians contend) as clear frontiers were historically blurred in the absence of clear-cut geographic barriers. The North European Plain served as a major highway for largest recorded invasions in human history such as by Napoleon in 1812, and Hitler in 1941. The historical memory of potential western encroachment is still vivid in the Russian political psyche.

But beyond geography other reasons also propel Russia and the EU down opposing paths. The drift between the two powers exemplifies internal debates or rather search in Russia for its identity. Slavophiles, eurasianists, westrernizers – competition between these philosophical currents have characterized Russian political thinking for at least the last two centuries.

The growing divergence between the EU (and Europe overall) and Russia is thus of much bigger scope. This is not to say that possible rapprochement is impossible in itself. Moscow would always seek a transactional approach in relations with Brussels, but it will now confidently eschew building bilateral ties within certain normative frames – the vision the EU has always had.

The drift is in fact happening not only because of the differences over Russian moves in Ukraine, Georgia or elsewhere. We deal here with a much larger development, namely, the effective application of “multivectoralism” in Russia’s foreign policy. Moscow seeks limiting its traditional Europe-focused foreign policy. New horizons and new possibilities have emerged over the past decade. Among them perhaps China's rise – biggest challenge to the West – but largest singly geopolitical opportunity for Russia. 

European Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joseph Borrell’s visit to Moscow underlined even starker divisions between the West and Russia. “We are at a crossroads,” – Borrell wrote in his article following the trip. “My meeting with Minister Lavrov highlighted that Europe and Russia are drifting apart. It seems that Russia is progressively disconnecting itself from Europe,” – was another of Borrell’s comments. Following the visit, Germany, Sweden and Poland on Monday each expelled a Russian diplomat in retaliation for Moscow's decision to oust three European diplomats for allegedly taking part in protests in support of Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny.

Borrell’s visit built on the overall negative trends in bilateral relations. In March 2019, a European Parliament resolution stated that Russia could no longer be considered a “strategic partner.” The Russian military turned down an invitation to attend a European security seminar for the first time in 30 years. In another statement the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on Friday that Russia was prepared to break off relations with the European Union if it continued with planned sanctions.

Still few think the troubles in bilateral relations are likely to cause a fundamental shift by Germany and France to a more aggressive policy, given economic, energy and strategic interests at play. Cooperation with Russia is strong in some sectors: Russian gas sales to Europe have been increasing in the last few years, so are Western investment in Russia. There are signs that Brussels might at times prefer a transactional approach to the relations with Russia – this might yield better geopolitical results.

In-between states

Crisis in EU-Russia relations seems to persist into the foreseeable future. Both entities are more or less able to live without much interaction with each other. What matters here is the fate of the in-between states such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – those which signed larger integration documents with the EU. Then come a second tier states – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus – which opted for very limited partnership with Brussels. Indeed, this concern was apparent in Borrell’s visit: “I argued as well the need to heed the call of the people of Belarus - which has been loud and clear for six months now - to freely choose their President. Respect for the territorial integrity of Georgia, the situation in Nagorno Karabakh, and the Syrian and Libyan crises were also among the issues we touched upon in a review of our troubled neighborhood, where Russia and the European Union remain more often than not at odds,” – the minister stated afterwards.

Perhaps, it is the first tier states which are most vulnerable to EU-Russia spat. Each of them has territorial problems with Russia and each has Russia's military presence on its soil. Additionally, Russia also seeks to limit Ukraine’s, Moldova’s and Georgia’s drift to Europe. As relations with Europe are to remain unstable Kyiv, Chisinau and Tbilisi are most worried about possible either economic or simply political repercussions.

However, what is more troublesome for the in-between states of both tiers is that Europe might, due to the already highly troubled relations with Moscow, seek limiting pressure points on Moscow. This could mean an unenviable position for the former Soviet states – protraction of their EU-membership hopes for years if not decades. Prospects would seem darker than before. But perhaps the biggest challenge for the governments of those states will be to keep pro-Western sentiments high among the local populations. The effective implementation of the extended Eastern Partnership Initiative could decrease those fears, but the pressure on the governments’ foreign policy will be immense. Take Georgia, being at the periphery of Europe and squeezed between Turkey and Russia, which do not enjoy positive ties with Brussels. Similar to Turkey and Russia, Georgia too could vacillate to adjust to the changing regional or even global geopolitical reverberations. This does not involve making a U-turn in foreign policy, but it certainly could involve an introduction of a more multi-vector foreign policy.

In the age of great power competition in the South Caucasus, which involves bigger Russian military influence and the re-emergence of Turkish troops to the region after one hundred years, Georgia feels the need to adjust to the evolving circumstances on the ground. Over time the urgency could increase or decrease, but the overall thrust would remain unchanged. In light of the West’s and specifically the EU’s absence during the Second Karabakh War or in its aftermath, for the European foreign policy in the South Caucasus to get back on track, it will be paramount to infuse larger finances, develop a tailored approach and perhaps even become more geopolitical.

Emil Avdaliani (@emilavdaliani) is a professor at European University (Tbilisi, Georgia)