![Abkhazia's "Russia" Problem](/upload/square/2024-05-17/yrmQAo78CEkSIZOfDb4Kv1KDHGxUxT1o3sEHqSCO.png)
Generational Changes and the Shift to Coalition-Style Governance
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Political life in Georgia is gradually shifting from one-party dominated government to a coalition-style rule. Despite its deficiencies, the inclusivity could indeed be the single biggest positive development for solving major problems in the judicial and electoral areas.
Georgia is amid a new round of internal political instability. Following the October 2021 municipal elections and the return of the former president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, his imprisonment and subsequent protests of varying scale across the country, the prospects for stabilisation seem minimal.
Neither side, the ruling party, or the opposition, is likely to back down, which creates momentum for further escalation of political rhetoric leading to more divisions than soothing of troubles. Though the above-mentioned immediate reasons serve as catalysts for the political crisis, there are more profound drivers which put pressure on the ruling party and the traditional way of making politics in Georgia.
One could be a diversification of political life in Georgia. Since 1990, the country never lacked the emergence of new parties. But the present situation differs in its richness as new parties of various ideological background are formed. This makes political competition fiercer, creating conditions for even greater political participation especially as the threshold for entering the parliament through elections was cut down from 5% to a much lower barrier. Thus, the ruling party now faces resistance in parliament, municipal organs as well as on the street. Therefore, growing pressure on the ruling party is unavoidable and is a result of changing political life in Georgia. Moreover, it could be suggested, even if there is a change in the government any future ruling party will face similar pressure from the opposition. The era of true political pluralism has begun in Georgia.
The second fundamental reason, and this adds pressure on the ruling elite, is the generational change. A greater number of younger politicians have begin actively participating in the country’s political life. They are predominantly born in the 1980s and the 1990s, while some are even younger. This is an important development as the very fabric of the political activism in Georgia undergoes structural changes. As a result, figures such as Saakashvili and Ivanishvili are becoming less interesting. For many the appeal they held is now dramatically decreasing. And though the Georgian politics is still largely revolving around individual politicians, there are indications that a greater attention is being paid to what each new party could offer to large segments of the population. In other words, the shift from the older generation to younger also means the change in how politics are made and perceived – populism is slowly losing its appeal. Increasingly, a more professional approach to the art of making the politics is now being demanded by the population.
This means that the political life in Georgia becomes more diversified, which, in turn, ushers in a time when one-party-dominated government will no longer be a possibility. Political coalitions are the future. Surely, since Georgia does not really have this kind of experience numerous problems will arise during coalition forming process, but this, for the moment, presents the only viable way for the country’s political life to develop. The recent example of the opposition fielding candidates from various parties for the second round of municipal elections gives us a glimpse into what the political life in Georgia will be in the future.
This also means that presently the pressure on the ruling party will be mounting and possibly lead to snap parliamentary elections. The longer the present critical situation continues, the more resources are dedicated to internal problems and less attention to foreign policy dilemmas. Such issues as the occupation of nearly 20% of the Georgian territory by Russian forces has been overshadowed by internal politicking. Moreover, as the results of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war show, major changes are taking place in the South Caucasus. Georgia risks disregarding those developments which might have tremendous impact on the country’s internal and foreign policy. An inward-looking approach is therefore a dangerous development which needs to be changed. It hampers Georgia’s ability to see priorities.
Take for instance Azerbaijan, which witnessed a major defeat in 1990s from Armenia and the de-facto loss of significant portion of its sovereign land. Concentration of political resources and their clever use for achieving foreign policy aims led Baku to a victory in 2020 war against Yerevan.
For Georgia translating national energies into concrete political success is only possible when internal political life is not as radicalised as it is now. There is also yet another problem which many do not often discuss in the analytical circles but is becoming more popular among the population: the entire political class, both the ruling party and much of the opposition, have become more distant from basic needs of the ordinary people. For a growing number of the population the ongoing political strife is more inter-party competition, more of Ivanishvili-Saakashvili struggle, than a contest of ideas on who can provide a better alternative to improve the country’s struggling economy, strengthen the military, boost potential in the education sphere and effectively deal with Russia’s creeping occupation. Moreover, there are also major troubles in such areas as an ineffective judicial system and election process, as well as a mismanagement of state funds.
In the short term these troubles minimise chances for finding a solution to the internal political problem. It is however the long-term perspective which could be more promising. The generational change and the shift from one-party dominated government to coalition-style rule could indeed positively respond to some basic challenges Georgian society is presently facing.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase.
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