Relations between Georgia and the EU have soared over the past year. The reasons vary, but as both sides approach a crucial decision on whether Brussels should grant Tbilisi long-delayed candidate status, the EU needs to take a more strategic view of the overall situation.

The EU's imminent decision on whether to grant Georgia candidate status is a crucial moment for the country, and perhaps for the entire South Caucasus. Indeed, the stakes are high because the EU has never been so deeply involved in the South Caucasus, which in fact has never been as important to the Union as it is now.

The war in Ukraine has changed the dynamics in the wider Black Sea region. Suddenly, EU enlargement is no longer seen as an unlikely scenario. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have each made significant progress on their respective EU paths. Yet Georgia is lagging behind, having been granted an EU perspective only in 2022. This has changed the dynamics of relations between Georgia and the EU. Mutual political accusations and mistrust abound, and there are serious concerns about what Georgia's future EU path will look like.

The war in Ukraine also changed the long-established connectivity patterns across the Eurasian continent and, in the first place, the routes connecting two large economies: China and the EU. The northern trade corridor, which mostly passed through Russia, is now partially abandoned due to the sanctions imposed on Moscow by the West.
As a result, the South Caucasus has become the most geographically convenient transit area, forming the so-called Middle Corridor, which stretches from Turkey to Central Asia via Georgia and Azerbaijan. It is thus a multimodal corridor consisting of seas and mountainous terrain, which for decades made it a less prioritized route in the Eurasian connectivity. Now, the changing geopolitical situation is forcing the countries along the Middle Corridor and bigger actors to think differently, and the EU is a primary example. It now has to pay greater attention to the South Caucasus, and in particular to Georgia, which, due to its traditionally close institutional ties with the EU, now serves as a veritable bridge to the Caspian Sea and the Central Asian region.
Moreover, the South Caucasus has become a transit area for the EU to secure its growing energy independence from Russia. In this regard, Azerbaijan plays a key role, best exemplified by the gas deal Brussels signed with Baku in mid-2022 to increase imports of Caspian gas. In the longer term, the EU is also looking to Turkmenistan, with its massive gas reserves and potential Trans-Caspian pipeline project.

For the EU, Georgia is also a necessary partner given Brussels' high level of engagement with Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Even if Brussels' peace initiatives are initially successful, it will be difficult to maintain peace in the long term, as Russia is likely to challenge the new arrangement. Therefore, the EU needs a solid base in the South Caucasus, and in this regard Georgia could play a positive role in linking the Union with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, Georgia's progress towards the EU will also serve as a positive example for its South Caucasian neighbors. Both resent excessive Russian influence and are looking for foreign policy alternatives. More active EU involvement in the region would be welcomed as a powerful balancing chip against Moscow's power projection.

Therefore, the EU has a lot to lose in the South Caucasus if the situation changes dramatically and not in favor of the collective West. Indeed, this may happen if Brussels refuses to grant Georgia candidate status. 
Failure to grant the status would certainly have geopolitical ramifications. Russia would seize the opportunity and almost certainly try to deepen the rift between Brussels and Tbilisi. It has several options. One is economic. Russia is already a major trading partner of Georgia and could easily foster even greater commercial ties. But the EU's refusal will also reverberate. It will be used by its geopolitical rivals as yet another sign of the West's weakness and that the South Caucasus countries should not hope for Western support.

Therefore, it makes sense for the EU to look beyond the details of the current dispute that dominates relations with Georgia and consider a longer-term strategic picture. The vast majority of the Georgian population hopes for a positive decision on candidate status, which would be an acknowledgement of the historically close ties with Europe. It should also be said that there is an underlying sense of resentment that has its roots in the West's lukewarm response to Russia's invasion of Georgia. A sense of betrayal has always been in the air, despite genuine enthusiasm for integration into Western institutions.

This is why the EU needs to think geopolitically. Its previous waves of enlargement may have been mostly contingent on shared values with the new members, but they were never free of geopolitical and geo-economic motives. Both incentives are now present in Georgia's case. Trade routes, rail and road infrastructure - these are the major drivers behind the EU's push into the eastern half of the Black Sea region. Failure to produce concrete results risks unintended consequences. Georgia should also be particularly cautious. Its domestic situation should in no way hinder its much larger foreign policy goals - integration into Western political and military institutions.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of the Silk Roads.