In early July Tbilisi was shaken by a wave of protests against the LGBTQ+ community. This evolved into violence perpetrated against journalists from nearly all channels causing worldwide outcry. As emotions subside it is now time to put these events into a wider perspective – the growing appeal of illiberalism across the region as well as the pursuit of multivector foreign policy are increasingly becoming the order of the day.

In a conservative country such as Georgia, antagonism to all the things liberal can run deep at times. Resistance to novelties, especially sexual and religious, is bound to cause divisions within the society. This in turn causes political tensions, deviation of attention from real problems the country is marred in, and with possible foreign policy repercussions.

Over recent months there has been an explicit appeal to populist, majoritarian rule in the country. Populism is molded to appeal to religious sentiments. To be sure in Georgia religious and populist sentiments were always popular, but to a certain level. Each government used the rhetoric to attain the powerful Georgian Orthodox Church’s support before elections. Similar calculations might be in work presently when the ruling government is tacitly siding with the Church in such issues as LGBTQ+ or other divisive topics. Indeed, the upcoming municipal elections this October are critical as the holding of potential snap elections are hinged on whether the ruling party collects more than 43% of the vote. Failure to do this does not only threaten the ruling party’s popularity, but it also could unravel the entire political status quo currently enforced in Georgia.

The return of the opposition forces to the governing posts as a result of municipal elections would imperil the ruling party’s position. The government would be further marred in internal bickering, which would undermine the effectiveness of the entire system. But beyond that the opposition’s victory would probably pave the way to changes in snap elections. Overall, it explains why an emphasis on cooperation with the Church is being made – its support could prove decisive.

This all could have been a usual business. Indeed, from Eduard Shevardnadze in the 1990s to present times successive Georgian governments used the support from the Church and at times relied on populist sentiments to garner the necessary votes before critical elections. The methods are widespread in the region. Once elections ended, however, populism subsided, and all went back to normal. 

This time, however, circumstances are quite different. Western criticism has become systematic, leading to unprecedented questioning regarding the path Georgia is heading on. The White House mentioned the use of personal sanctions, while the EU hinted that future financial aid will be contingent upon concrete democratic progress in critical areas such as the  justice system. “The United States is deeply troubled by the Georgian Parliament’s approval of Supreme Court nominees in contravention of the April 19 agreement. Ambitious judicial reform is critical to Georgia's success” – said US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken in a tweet on July 16.

There are indications that the western criticism is being increasingly disregarded in Georgia. While the opposition might blame Russia for this, the dismissal of western concerns stems from numerous other reasons. First is a growing illiberal trend in the region. A country can be nominally democratic with numerous parties, active free election campaigns and other features charachteristic to the rule by people’s consent. Nevertheless, this kind of democracy can be illiberal. Power politics can be a dominating feature allowing for long term preservation of political power and denigration of opponent political forces. Most of all, it can use the various religious and nationalist sentiments to increase or decrease tensions and divisions within the society. It happens across Eurasia and Georgia is no exception. Illiberalism is agile enough in appropriating the liberal ideas on state governance and molding them into the illiberal agenda.

Looking at the rise of illiberalism in Georgia one cannot ignore the pull Russia has on the country. As mentioned above, blaming all internal problems on Russia is idée fixe among opposition politicians, NGOs and at times even government figures. Exaggeration is commonplace, but when looking at the illiberal challenge from a long term perspective, it becomes clear where Russia got things right. Moscow had to prevent Georgia’s NATO/EU membership prospects. It did so in 2008 without large international blowback. Moscow gambled that the process would drag on. It does now, for decades, bringing about frictures across the very fabric of the Georgian society. Failure to attain membership reinvigorates the illiberal agenda. What seemed several years ago as haphazardly made speeches by some marginal nationalists, today the rhetoric of anti-liberal groups has grown in sophistication. Resistance to the western way of life and Georgia’s western foreign policy path has grown.

But perhaps the biggest source behind the rise of the illiberal problem are the troubles in the west itself. Liberalism is under strain. Its expansion after the Cold War turned into overextension, bringing tensions among its many members. Multilateralism no longer brings benefits for the founding states of the liberal order. Thence come attempts by several states (among them the US) to renegotiate the terms of the system. There is also China’s rise which remodels the Eurasian continent and the world economy. Russia too is somewhere there obstructing and weakening the operation of the liberal order. With these challenges the collective West has grown averse to further expansion of EU and NATO. 

This is felt in Georgia and might have wide-ranging repercussions for the country’s foreign policy. Tbilisi is unlikely to reverse its pro-Western path, but as time goes on and the membership prospects are becoming slimmer, other foreign policy directions will be sought. One possibility could be the pursuit of multivector foreign policy when the Western stance will be one of the pillars of Georgia’s foreign policy. Deeper ties with other Eurasian players will be entertained along with the traditionally close connections with the West.

The shift from exclusive pro-Western stance to multivectoralism could, however, hold risks, less security and greater uncertainty for Georgia. On the opposite side, a multivector foreign policy could be seen as an adjustment to new realities in the South Caucasus, wider region, and Eurasia at large. Multivectoralism is slowly becoming a dominant foreign policy course. 

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase.