The election results in Turkey will have a huge impact on the country's development trajectory. In terms of foreign policy, however, much of what has happened in recent years will remain unchanged. Ankara's approach to the South Caucasus will be no exception.

With the elections in Turkey, the debate about the country's possible foreign policy shifts has intensified. While there may be reverberations in Ankara's foreign policy towards the EU, the US or even Russia, in the South Caucasus Turkey's foreign policy will follow long-established patterns.

Over the past decade, Turkey has shown a growing Eurasianist shift in its foreign policy. China's economic rise and the growing geopolitical weight of Asia as a whole have led many countries in the Middle East and wider Eurasia to recalibrate their foreign policies. Looking East has become the new norm, with Iran and Russia perhaps the most prominent examples. Turkey is no exception, as in recent years Ankara has sought to extend its reach further east into Central Asia, in the hope of forming an alliance with the other Turkic-speaking countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. It has also managed to build economically viable and geopolitically advantageous ties with Russia, while remaining a major player in NATO and an important actor for the West.

Amidst the interlocking foreign policy approaches, the South Caucasus plays a crucial role in Turkey's self-positioning in the region. Turkey's approach to the South Caucasus will remain the same: Ankara will continue to support various existing and future infrastructure projects, such as gas pipelines, railways and roads, that would span the region from East to West. Turkey will also not change its approach to Azerbaijan. It will remain a strategic ally of Azerbaijan. The intensity of cooperation may vary, but the general view is that strategic cooperation between the two countries will continue.

Moreover, Turkey is likely to continue to apply its traditional approach of 'regionalism' to the South Caucasus. Sandwiched between Iran, Russia and Turkey, the latter believes that the region should fall largely under the influence of larger neighbours and less under the influence of non-regional actors. This also means that Turkey will support various regional initiatives aimed at minimising the influence of non-regional actors. 
However, this general understanding with Iran and Russia does not preclude the notion that Turkey will be highly competitive with its peers. Turkey will be highly self-interested and pragmatic. If Russia tries to put pressure on Azerbaijan, Ankara's reaction could be swift in many areas where Turkey and Russia have overlapping interests and can harm each other.

The same goes for relations with Iran, which is very wary of Turkish influence and is largely opposed to the creation of the so-called Turkish corridor along its northern border. In a sense, both Iran and Turkey will focus their efforts on advancing their respective interests in Armenia. For the latter, this is a positive scenario as Yerevan struggles to maintain a strong stance vis-à-vis Azerbaijan and is concerned about Russia's inability and perhaps reluctance to help its CSTO ally.
Turkey is likely to continue its diplomatic efforts to achieve a meaningful improvement in relations with Armenia. This could lead to the restoration of diplomatic relations or more extensive investment and trade ties. With Armenia's relations with Russia chronically troubled, the opportunities for Ankara are only growing.

Commanding geography

From a broader perspective, a revealing element of Ankara's foreign policy is that geography still dominates the country's perception of itself and its place in the world, perhaps more so than for most countries. Rather than being tied solely to the Western axis, Turkey has pursued a multi-vector approach to foreign policy over the past two decades.
The country is on the periphery of Europe. Its experience is similar to Russia's in that both have absorbed extensive Western influence, be it institutional, foreign policy or cultural. Both have been anchored in the geopolitics of the European continent for centuries. Because a multi-vector foreign policy model offers more room for manoeuvre, economic gains and growth in geopolitical power, both countries wanted to break away from their single-axis approach to foreign policy.

Both states have significant territories deep in Asia or the Middle East, as well as geopolitical schools of thought that consider Europe-oriented geopolitical thinking to be contrary to state interests - especially since the collective West has never considered either Turkey or Russia to be fully European. The two states have always pursued alternative geopolitical anchors, but found it difficult to implement them. No Asian, African or other geopolitical pole has proved sufficient to enable either Turkey or Russia to balance the West.

No wonder, then, that over the past two decades Turkey has been actively searching for new geopolitical axes. For Ankara, close relations with Russia are a means of balancing its historical fixation with the West. The same foreign policy model can explain Moscow's geopolitical thinking since the late 2000s, when its relations with Asian states rapidly developed as an alternative to its dependence on and attachment to Western geopolitics.

However, Turkey's search for multivectorism in foreign policy is nothing new. During the Cold War, when Turkey's focus on the Western axis was strong, left-wing Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit promoted the idea of a "region-centred" foreign policy. The idea was that Ankara should pursue foreign policy diversification beyond its traditional Western fixation, which meant deeper involvement in the Middle East and the Balkans. In 1974-1975, Turkey's then deputy prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, tried to pivot Ankara towards the Arab world. There were even attempts to forge closer ties with the Soviets.

This multi-vector approach is likely to continue in the post-election period. Ankara will refrain from openly taking sides in the Ukrainian war. It will also balance between the West and Russia, as this tactic will continue to give Ankara greater leverage in its relations with Moscow and Washington. But this approach will continue as long as it suits Turkey's interests, which also means that while there may be shifts in how Ankara perceives Russia, Iran and other major players, the overall picture is one of a country that will support the idea of a multipolar world order.  

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of the Silk Roads.