Georgia is amid protracted political uncertainty. Internal pressures coupled with criticism from abroad create significant duress for the ruling party and also risks breaking the political status quo which has remained largely intact since 2012 when Georgian Dream came to power, namely the domination of one party.

On July 28, Georgian Dream (GD), Georgia’s ruling party, walked back on a deal it reached with the political opposition in April thus ending month-long internal political crisis following the 2020 parliamentary elections. The deal was a result of month-long negotiations process effectively supervised by the European Council President Charles Michel. His personal representative Christian Danielson along with the US ambassador to Georgia, Kelly Degnan, helped hammer out a six-point plan that envisaged long-yearned for electoral and judicial reforms, and power-sharing in the parliament. The agreement also involved stipulations on the possibility of new elections and the issue of alleged political prisoners. The EU, backed by the United States, has played a mediating role in trying to resolve a series of crises in the small country with ambitions of strengthening ties with the West. Under the deal, early parliamentary elections were to be called in 2022 if GD would have received less than 43 percent of the votes in local elections of 2021. The document also set the rules for power sharing in parliament and outlined reforms in the judicial system and the Central Election Commission.

While the EU has often been a target for criticism over Georgia’s effectively stalled membership prospects and at times Brussels’ helpless political responses to the crises inside the country, Michel’s personal involvement signaled a new level of the Union’s engagement with a non-member state. This underlined Georgia’s importance to EU and reinvigorated hopes for the country’s eventual membership especially when the ruling party announced it intended to officially apply for an EU membership in 2024.

The decision to withdraw from the deal has complicated the ties between Georgia and its Western partners. “The United States is deeply disturbed and exasperated by the unilateral decision of the Georgian Dream party to withdraw from the 19 April Agreement, a document established through six months of difficult but collaborative negotiations, and one that gives an urgently-needed way forward for the Georgian people and their democracy,” the US embassy in Tbilisi said in one of the statements. Criticism also involves a wide range of issues from the government’s seeming failure to de-politicize the justice system, resolve the problems in the electoral system, strengthen the rule of law, and improve the economy.

It was suggested by opposition politicians that GD’s decision might be also linked to the upcoming self-government elections and troubles it will face trying to win more than 43 percent of the vote. Indeed, recent nation-wide polls carried out by IRI showed that GD is favored by only 28 percent of the population with United National Movement, traditionally the biggest opposition party, coming second with 15 per cent. Other polls showed only a slight increase of support for the ruling party, while GD’s internal findings showed the party will be getting more than 40 percent.

Yet another problem for the ruling party is dissention amid its ranks. The former PM Giorgi Gakharia’s active political campaign and growing popularity (9 per cent according to the IRI polls) have deviated significant support from GD to his new party – For Georgia. Eventually Gakharia might evolve into a veritable third power that is so needed and sought after in Georgia to break the vicious circle of near permanent GD-UNM competition. The emergence of Gakharia as an independent player also underlines a much more fundamental process unfolding in the Georgian politics. Multiplication of parties as well as steady process of generational change in the internal politics breaks the political status quo. Gradually older parties lose popularity, while newer, though not entirely dominant, nevertheless manage to gain 5-10 percent range. Diffusion of political power among multiple parties is thus a significant development, which differs from traditional Georgian politics of one party dominating the internal political landscape.

Ascendant Multi-Vectorism?

However, the abrogation of the deal by GD could have been also triggered by a much bigger unfolding process. Though the pro-EU stance within the Georgian public remains fairly high, for the political elites it becomes increasingly clear that the membership prospects are bleaker than ever before. Reasons range from troubles in the liberal world order, rise of illiberalism, and the divisions within the EU. The GD government might be undertaking a critical change to the country’s foreign policy whereby a more balanced approach will be taken. This involves building more equidistant external ties with both regional actors and global powers. For instance, Ukraine, another long-time EU-hopeful, started doing the same when the country was essentially shunned from the EU and NATO membership. Kyiv turned to China and signed a large investment deal to improve railway and ports infrastructure. Reaching out to Turkey is yet another foreign policy move Ukraine has pursued.

In Georgia’s case the fixation on the West increasingly no longer provides expected results. This however does not mean Georgia will be abandoning its pro-Western stance. Constructing closer foreign ties with other actors would allow Tbilisi to partially correct its inability to become an EU/NATO member. A multi-vector foreign policy has already found its way in Turkey, Iran, Russia, and other neighboring states. Perhaps Georgia could be heading this way.

Therefore, even the improvement of relations with Russia might be a part of this balanced, multi-vector foreign policy. Following the disturbances in Tbilisi during the Pride week when nationalists attacked the LGBT+ community and journalists and ensuing Western criticisms, Russia publicly made a series of offers on normalizing bilateral relations. Though Tbilisi has not been particularly enthusiastic about Russian proposals, Moscow’s moves shows there is a widening space for Russian diplomacy trying to leverage the rising disagreements between Georgia and its Western partners.

In the end the election results are unlikely to resolve the basic troubles haunting internal Georgian politics. Poor justice system and deficiencies in electoral system will persist, hampering the ruling party’s attractiveness among the populace and its Western partners. But distrust toward the major opposition forces will limit their chances for victory. As argued above, the decision to walk away from the deal could be geopolitically motivated. It reflects the changes in the region where the increasingly common turn to pursuing multi-vector foreign policy is becoming a dominant feature. It also signals a growing disenchantment with the collective West within Georgia’s ruling political class.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase.